

THE ROMANIC REVIEW

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A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION

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ARTICLES

- Linguistic Value of the Michel Edition of Joinville's *Histoire de Saint Louis* NEWTON S. BEMENT 193
- Proverbs in the Plays of Calderón EUNICE JOINER GATES 203
- Le Thème de la violence dans le monde tragique de Racine GERMAINE BRÉE 216
- La Bruyère Against the Libertines PHILIP A. WADSWORTH 226
- Montesquieu's Historical Conception of the Fundamental Law E. H. PRICE 234
- Pierre Lasserre, Goethe et Nietzsche SELIM EZBAN 243

REVIEWS

- Julia Bastin and Edmond Faral, editors, *Onze Poèmes de Rutebeuf, concernant la croisade*. [LAWTON P. G. PECKHAM] 253
- E. Walberg, editor, *Contes pieux en vers du XIV^e siècle tirés du recueil intitulé Le Tombel de Chartrose*. [JEAN MISRAHI] 254
- Charles Dédéyan, *Montaigne chez ses amis anglo-saxons and Essai sur le Journal de Voyage de Montaigne*. [DONALD M. FRAME] 258
- James Hutton, *The Greek Anthology in France and in the Latin Writers of the Netherlands to the Year 1800*. [ISIDORE SILVER] 262
- Marcos A. Morfínigo, *América en el teatro de Lope de Vega*. [W. L. FICHTER] 265
- Eugène Vinaver, editor, *Racine: Principes de la tragédie en marge de la Poétique d'Aristote*. [NATHAN EDELMAN] 270

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Paul Hazard, <i>La Pensée européenne au XVIIIème siècle: de Montesquieu à Lessing</i> . [NORMAN L. TORREY]	271
George Havens, editor, <i>Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Discours sur les sciences et les arts</i> . [OTIS FELLOWS]	277
Andrew Jackson Mathews, <i>La Wallonie, 1886-1892: The Symbolist Movement in Belgium</i> . [RENÉ TAUPIN]	279
A. Benvenuto Terracini, <i>Perfiles de lingüistas. Contribución a la historia de la lingüística comparata</i> . [MARIO A. PEI]	280
Charles E. Kany, <i>American Spanish Syntax</i> . [AUGUSTO MALARET]	282
Books Received	285

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LINGUISTIC VALUE OF THE MICHEL EDITION OF JOINVILLE'S *HISTOIRE DE SAINT LOUIS*

THE NUMBER of reliable texts on which studies of fourteenth-century French prose can be based with confidence remains comparatively small. Original manuscripts have been preserved in comparatively few instances, and the most important prose monuments are known to us, with too few outstanding exceptions, through fifteenth- and sixteenth-century manuscripts. This, in conjunction with the facts that copyists sometimes did not understand and frequently did not respect the language of the manuscripts they were copying, and that the language varied in its forms from author to author and even in the same author, has been at one moment or another the despair even of such capable philologists as Ferdinand Brunot, who in his *Histoire de la langue française* (I, 403) takes stock of this "désordre" and concludes that "le moyen français . . . a des époques, aucun période."

Even so, this state of flux, or rapid decline of the older language and seemingly disordered outgrowth of the newer one, is precisely what makes the period a fascinating one to the student of linguistics. The linguistically most chaotic text, provided it mirrors authentically what was happening to and in the language, can be the most valuable one for study, and certainly the most intriguing.

Louis IX of France died in 1270 and was canonized in 1297 after a lengthy inquest during the course of which Joinville's testimony had been heard in 1282. Some time between 1297 and the death of Saint Louis's grandson's (Philip IV's) wife Jeanne de Navarre, in 1304, she requested Joinville to have a book written "des saintes paroles et des bons faiz nostre roy saint Loos." According to internal evidence the work was completed in October, 1309 (MS fr. 13568, Bibliothèque Nationale), and although the dedicatory pages addressed to Louis X, son of Philip IV and Jeanne de Navarre (who had died in 1304), were added later (see page 5, line 14, apparently the first sentence composed), they could not have been addressed to him as late as 1314 when he became king of France, since he is addressed as "Loos, filz du roy de France."

The phrasing of that part of the dedication which refers to Jeanne de Navarre's request leads one to suspect that the work may not have been started in earnest, or with a view to completing without further ado that portion of it which Joinville intended to supply or found it necessary to supply, until after Jeanne de Navarre's death, which antedated her husband's (at the age of forty-six) by ten years and could have come as a surprise to Joinville who, in a letter dated June 8, 1315, when he was ninety-one, stated his readiness to leave at once to take part in the war in Flanders.

It was, then, a vigorous Joinville, and almost an octogenarian, who at the turn of the century, after having spoken the language of his native Champagne and of the court during nearly the last three quarters of the thirteenth century, partly directed the composition of, and in much greater part dictated the *Histoire de Saint Louis*.

Joinville's clerical staff was not able to extract a very great amount of appropriate material from older sources such as the *Chroniques de Saint-Denis*, Geoffroy de Beaulieu's account of the life of Saint Louis, in Latin, and its French counterpart by Guillaume de Nangis. Natalis de Wailly, the most indefatigable and most widely informed scholar among those who sought to establish the original text of Joinville's work, was able to discern the borrowed material as amounting only to the following passages, here cited with reference to the presumably more accessible edition of 245 octavo pages (356 including appendixes) prepared by Francisque Michel and published by Firmin-Didot et C^{ie}, Paris, 1881 (MS fr. 13568, Bibliothèque Nationale):

- (1) Page 218, lines 6-8 (Je vourroie . . . royaume).
- (2) Page 220, line 20 (Nous . . .) to page 234, line 5 (. . . Paris).
- (3) Page 236, line 13* (après . . .) to page 240, line 18 (. . . part).
- (4) Page 241, line 14 (Précieuse . . .) to page 242, line 6 (. . . dé-sertes).

*I have changed this; according to De Wailly's indications the passage would begin with line 21.

Although the orthography of the quotation beginning on page 236 with "Biau filz . . ." might for obvious reasons have been scrupulously respected by the secretary or scribe who copied it, one's considered opinion might well be that the remainder of this extremely slight amount of borrowed material was spelled in conformity with the orthography of the rest of the manuscript, and that this orthography was the orthography of the opening years of the fourteenth century as practiced by the secretarial staff of a well-organized chancellery in view of presentation by the author to "son bon seigneur," who in 1309 was twenty years of age.

There was also an author's copy, which in the sixteenth century still reposed in the Château de Joinville, but as for the original manuscript presented to Louis X, whose death in 1316 made him the fifth king of France to be survived by Joinville, it was never heard of again except indirectly. Probably during the reign of Charles V (1364-1380) and certainly not earlier, according to the opinion published in 1839 by Paulin Paris after careful study and comparisons, a copy of the original manuscript was made. This copy, so far as can be determined, was eventually found in Brussels, whence it was brought to Paris in 1746 by Maurice (le Maréchal) de Saxe, and became finally MS fr. 13568 of the Bibliothèque Nationale.

Unlike the later scribes who worked from the author's copy and were frequently so puzzled by an *s* in the nominative masculine singular (perhaps the *s* was puzzlingly inconstant in its presence) that they changed the verb from singular to plural and vice versa for masculine plural subjects without *s*, the fourteenth-century copyist who produced MS fr. 13568 was rarely deceived by the language and orthography of the original manuscript. He grasped its meaning readily, accepted its orthography so far as possible but after his own scribal fashion and standards, rejuvenated it where necessary, and all with the carelessness and inconsistency characteristic of his times, so easy to criticize now that what was building has evolved.

This scribe, says Ferdinand Brunot (*op. cit.*, I, 403), "en transcrivant Joinville d'après l'exemplaire donné à Louis le Hutin, le dénature complètement; il a fallu pour rétablir le texte primitif une véritable restitution. On s'en rendra compte en comparant l'édition Michel (Paris, 1858), qui reproduit le manuscrit, à l'édition de Wailly, qui le corrige (Paris, 1868 et 1874)." To this it might be added, in justice and by way of comparison, that this scribe nevertheless did not produce the type of comic result attained by Villon in his attempt to do just the reverse, that is, to change his own language into that of bygone times. The Michel edition, or MS fr. 13568, presents in the most graphic manner an obviously lay opinion, formed at approximately the three-quarter point of the fourteenth century, as to what was still clear and acceptable in Joinville's spoken French as recorded at the beginning of the century by a secretary or secretaries well versed in clerical work.

Basing an opinion upon pleasant and inspiring impressions acquired as a student in a course offered at the Sorbonne by Brunot, I doubt whether more mature reflection did not reveal to him the peculiar, particular, and authentic value of the manuscript "dénaturé." But researchers (see *Romanische Studien*, Heft 18, Berlin, 1920), including Brunot, have unhesitatingly drawn examples from the De Wailly edition, seemingly without stopping to establish its index of authenticity, which by definition is zero, that excellent and very purposeful work having been the result of research and not intended to serve as its subject.

Natalis de Wailly, having noted inconsistencies in the maintenance or abandonment of the remnants of Latin declension in the fourteenth-century manuscript, examined Joinville's thirteenth-century *chartes*, in which a two-case declension was generally observed. He found that the *règle du sujet singulier*, for example, was observed 835 times out of 842, and that of the seven violations, five occurred in a single *charte*, that of May, 1278 ("qui n'est connu que par une copie faite au siècle dernier"). He therefore felt justified in changing the fourteenth-century manuscript by substituting *li rois* for *le roi*, *li roi* for *les rois*, etc., etc., in order to make of it a document which, in his words, Joinville could have recognized as his own.

Whether Joinville's secretary would have recognized the orthography as being the orthography used by him during the first years of the fourteenth century is perhaps another matter, and open to question, for the fact remains, bearing directly upon the unique linguistic value of the fourteenth-century manuscript, that the vocabulary and construction or word order were Joinville's sole contributions to the original work, if, indeed, that contribution was not limited at some points to a mere relation of facts for whose retelling the secretary relied upon his memory rather than upon direct dictation.

For purposes of reminder and comparison, the table below presents examples of the thirteenth-century declensional forms adopted by De Wailly for application in restoring the fourteenth-century copy:

li rois	le roi	li roi	les rois
li peuples	le peuple	li peuple	les peuples
ses peuples	son peuple	si, sui peuple	ses peuples
cuens	conte	conte	contes
créerre(s)	créatour	créatour	créatours
sire(s)	signour	signour	signours
hons, hom	home	home	homes
lerre(s)	larron	larron	larrons

For comparison with the forms shown above, the forms shown below were extracted from the Michel edition (page references in parentheses):

li roys (95)	le roy (5)	li roy (173)	roys (143)
le roys (20)	au roy (7)	les roys (143)	
le roy (95)	du roy (1)		
ton peuple (146)	son peuple (146)	le peuple . . .	peuples (145)
	le peuple (144)	furent (144)	
	le peule (144)		
le conte (2)	le conte (118)		
sire (1)		Seigneur, (4)	
Nostre-Sire (12)		les seigneur (175)	
le seigneur (12)	seigneur (1)	ces seigneurs (19)	
un hons (130)	un home (146)	les hommes (10)	hommes (144)
le hons (144)			
home (2)			homes (168)
l'omme (8)	d'omme (186)		
le lierres (126)		larrons (125)	larrons (202)
nul liarre (229)			

Without having scrutinized the text of the Michel edition to its very dregs, I venture nevertheless to think that at least some portion of the irregularity of the fourteenth-century manuscript was begotten by irregularities in the original copy. Unless the contrary can be proven, one may

assume that at the beginning of the fourteenth century it was the sense of the sentence rather than either declensional endings or even the order of words, that distinguished subject from object; and that lay orthography, where it existed, was already more concerned with the distinction between singular and plural forms of variable words, than with any other distinction. The unsurpassed clarity of modern French as an instrument either for thinking or for the expression of thought has no other or more remote inception than the difficulty and fortunate necessity of starting to remodel the structure upon this foundation of disordered and disfigured remnants. Of this adversity was born the distinctive genius of the language.

The comparison drawn above, between forms taken from the fourteenth-century manuscript and forms taken from the thirteenth-century norm for the *chartes* of Joinville, is instructive but not entirely logical. For purposes germane to our present subject another comparison is in order.

During the only years in which the original copy of the *Histoire de Saint Louis* could have been produced by Joinville's scribe or scribes, other scribes, equally well trained and for obvious reasons experienced in the requirements of precision, were recording the doings and decisions of the common council or municipal magistrates (*li eschevin*) of Rheims, some sixty or seventy miles to the northwest. The documents or "case books" which they produced fell eventually into the capable hands of Pierre Varin, Doyen de la Faculté des Lettres de Rennes, and were published in *Archives administratives de la ville de Reims*, Imprimerie de Crapelet, Paris, 1843. The documents dated during the years 1300-1309 are reproduced in Tome Second, Première Partie, pages 1-98, to which I shall refer henceforth by page only.

Among these documents from the hands of the municipal scribes of Rheims are interpolated others, including a letter from the *prévôt* of Laon, about thirty miles northwest of Rheims, that is, in the opposite direction from the town of Joinville, and another letter from the *bailli* of Vermandois, about thirty miles northwest of Laon. Words extracted from these letters are *italicized* in the table below, to distinguish them from contemporary forms used by the municipal scribes of Rheims.

Also included in the table below are forms extracted from the fourteenth-century MS fr. 13568 Bibliothèque Nationale as edited by Michel. These forms are preceded by an asterisk, *thus.

*li amiraut (105)		*les amiraus (10)	*amiraus (88)
*l'amiraut (95)	*l'amiral (94)		
*le grant amiral (98)		*les amiraus (89)	
*son cheval (178)	*son cheval (75)	*les chevaux (73)	*les deux chevaux (167)
		*li trois cheval (167)	
	l'estal (25)	li estaus (26)	les estaus (26)
			leur estaus (26)
	*le coutel (98)		*trois coutiaus (136)

	le péril (61) *du péril (4)	li péril (23)	les perius (56) *ces périls (199)
li arcevesques (36) <i>l'arcevesques</i> (71) <i>l'arcevesque</i> (89) *li évesques (14) *l'évesque (14)	<i>l'arcevesque</i> (14) <i>l'arcevesque</i> (70)		
<i>ly chevalier</i> (89) <i>ledit chevalier</i> (89) *nulz chevaliers (127)	<i>le chevalier</i> (90) <i>ledict chevalier</i> (89)	*li autre chevalier (10)	*nulz chevaliers (132) *mes chevaliers (175)
*son chevalier (73) li tavreniers (11)	*au chevalier (29) <i>au portier</i> (70)	li tavreniers (39) aucun tavrenier (39) les ouvriers (13)	à ouvriers (13)
li enfès (62)	un enfant (62)	li enfant (24) ludit enfant (24)	des enfans (23)
*l'enfant (144)	*un enfant (144)	*les enfans (25) *les enfants (141)	*leur enfans (165) *leurs enfans (139)
ses pains (38) eschevins (13)	un petit pain (38) ludit eschevin (14)	li 2 pains (38) li eschevin (14) li eschevins (14) li 2 eschevins (13) <i>lesdis eschevins</i> (89)	2 pains (38) seur eschevins (89)
une maisons (11)	la maison (11) *la mèsou (219)		<i>les eschevins</i> (89) les maisons (60) *à mesons-Dieu (219)
raisons (25) raison (17) *la reson (2)	la raison (40) *par rèsou (176)	ces raisons (14)	les raisons (23) *les raisons (9)
<i>la gent</i> (70) *sa gent (2) sergens (40) <i>serjans</i> (70) *un serjans (167) *le serjant (152)	à bonne gent (13) *sa gent (3) dou sergent (26) un <i>serjant</i> (71) *le sergent (152)	li jugement (12) *les gens (13)	bonnes gens (11) *ses gens (12) <i>aus sergens</i> (89)
leur pères (62) *son père (7) *frères Yves (134) *frère Yves (134) *le tiers frère (30)	au père (62) *vostre père (10)	si frère (93) *ses frères (3)	as frères (25) *nos pères (52)
li maistres (96) *li mestres (14) *le mestre (14) *mestre Robert (10) *maistre Robert (9)	maistre (13) le maltre (96) *mestre Robert (10) *maistre Robert (9)	li maistre (25) *les deux mestres (137)	les maistres (33) *les deux mestres (137)
cele fille (62) sa lettre (98)	la fille (62) sa lettre (98)	lesdites filles (61)	les filles (61) unes lettres (36) lectres (40)
li une partie (41)	une partie (11)	lesdites parties (38)	lesdites parties (13)

	d'une part (12)		les 2 pars (74)
	de par le Roi (36)		
li sires (24) (40)	au seigneur (27)	sires (13)	tous seigneurs (55)
messires (13)	monsieur (42)		
messires (71)	no seigneur (70)		
li sire (40)			
le sires (24)	audit seigneur (93)		
Chiers sires (70)			
sire Evrars (13)	sire Robert (13)		
*sire (1)		*Seigneur, (4)	
*Nostre-Sire (12)	*Nostre-Seigneur (12)		
*le seigneur (12)	*seigneur (1)	*les seigneur (175)	
		*ces seigneurs (19)	

Irregularities attending the final stages of case reduction were already well afoot even in the best-regulated *champenois* of Rheims. But they were insidious, rarely outstanding in a given passage, and frequently counterbalanced by perfection of form, e.g., *Jehans li Larges, fix Hue, fil jadiz Jehan le Large, se plaignoit . . .* (50). Although of the same germination, they were of an earlier variety, and much less haphazard than those resulting from the partial and unsystematic rejuvenation visited upon the original *Histoire de Saint Louis* by the fourteenth-century copyist in what we may think of as a complacent effort to clarify it sufficiently for his times.

But how well, on the score of regularity, would the language of the original copy have compared to the language of the contemporary documents of Rheims? Living in the shadow of an archbishopric of which they were kept painfully aware, *li eschevin*, themselves aggressive on occasion, could not have failed to keep the clerical staff on its grammatical and orthographical toes as they developed a body of common law or usage (the word is theirs) which was constantly referred to in actions involving laymen, churchmen whenever they trespassed upon civil jurisdiction, and even the prerogatives of the king. It seems questionable whether the scribes of Joinville still maintained, in the years 1300-1309, an equally well regulated Romance language. By the same token, we may suspect that the fourteenth-century scribe found not a few irregularities, or "newer" forms, in the original *Histoire de Saint Louis*, and that the presence of these forms, in itself, was powerfully suggestive with reference to the transcription of any forms which had once been the rule and were now, to him, the exception. For he was not, after all, sufficiently removed in time from the date of the original, to consider it as a real *antiquaille*. It was a bit outmoded, perhaps, but by no means sufficiently so to require the services of a scholar for its comprehension and retelling.

Moving our roving inquest forward now to the years 1328-1350, let us glance into *Documents parisiens du règne de Philippe VI de Valois*, Paris, Champion, 1899, edited by Jules Viard. Here we are confronted, although not so constantly, with precisely the same mixture of forms by which the fourteenth-century scribe contrived, in Brunot's words, to "dénaturer"

Joinville's history, and this despite the fact that we are reading the reports of legal proceedings, highly formalized (the contagiousness of Philip's letters becomes evident in Rheims in 1332) but in constant contact with Latin, which accounts for much. Examples:

sires (I,15)	sires (I,15)	nozdz seigneurs (I,103)	nos seigneurs (I,103)
nostre sire (I,15)	nostre sire (I,10)		
seigneur (I,3)			
monseigneur (I,3)	monseigneur (I,4)		
li roys (I,15)	le roy (I,9)	les rois (I,112)	rois (I,91)
li roy no sires (I,118)			
rois (I,112)			
maistres (I,223)	meistre (I,215)	li maistres (I,25)	maistres (I,26)
maistre (I,223)			
li chapellains (I,131)	un chapelain (II,20)	chapelain (I,210)	les chapelains (II,20)
le chapelain (I,210)		chapelains (I,210)	
suer (I,15)	suer (I,98) seurs (I,172)	suers (I,25)	suers (I,25) seours (I,25)
	un coutel (II,352) le coutiau (II,246)		coustiaus (II,307)

From the forms shown above and from numerous others (e.g., *li maires*, I, 71 and *li maire*, I, 71; *li abbés*, I, 87 and *liquel abbé*, I, 88; *prevost*, I, 88 and *mestiers*, I, 117 and *mestier*, I, 217; *contes*, II, 255 and *conte*, II, 253; *si hoir*, I, 62 and *ses hoirs*, I, 67; *lidit juré*, I, 97 and *lesdiz notaires jurez*, II, 256) it is evident that the scribes of Paris were beset by the same indecisions as our copyist. But the degree of saturation by these new forms was not yet equivalent, although close, to that of the linguistic atmosphere in which, according to the visible results, our copyist worked. For instance, he was capable, perhaps inadvertently, of copying *li amiraut* as the subject of a plural verb form (Michel, 105), but was generally influenced by the forms of his time (e.g., *les amirauls*, 89; *les amiraus*, 105, 121).

A decade later, in the archives of Rheims for the years 1359-1361 (*op. cit.*, III), we find only two examples of old masculine singular forms, *ly ans* (173) and *ly mors* (173), plus a few old plural forms such as *li bon loyal subject* (148) and *tuit li habitans* (174), along with a growing orthographical variability, e.g., *estas* and *estats* (161), *fruiz* (161) and *fruitz* (169), *frais* (172) and *fraictz* (173), *clers* (175) and *clercs* (161). By contrast with the

re-latinized forms, the others must have appeared to unlearned contemporaries as resulting simply from substituting *s* for the final consonant of the singular form, nasals excepted.

Fortification, defense strategy, the siege, taxes, raising the king's ransom—all these subjects increased the number of letters to Rheims from surrounding towns, from Paris, even from Calais and London, and the aftermath brought constant dealings with the Paris parlement. Whether from this leveling influence or from natural growth, a vast change took place in the administrative language of Rheims during the second half of the century. For the period from November 10, 1393 to February 28, 1396 the records show only twenty-one common nouns spelled variably (e.g., *exploiz, explois; débats, débas; juridicion, jurisdiction; despens, dépens; scel, sel; profit, proufit, prouffit; délits, délictz; fourbours, fourbours, fauxbours; bailli, bailly, baillif*). Excepting a few plural formations such as *sergent sergens, jugement jugemens, exploit explois, fait fais, débat débas, droit drois, lieutenant lieutenans* (but not *fois fois, corps corps, accord accords*), the hundreds of remaining nouns, if we overlook an occurrence of *homs hommes*, are modern. Still more striking is the disappearance of the genitive and its replacement by the use of *de*.

It seems logical to assume that the results of the leveling influences observable in the language of Rheims were general, and consequently that our fourteenth-century scribe, had he produced MS fr. 13568 near the end of the century, would have left us a very different copy.

Such an assumption, balanced against the facts and opinions previously set forth in this study, would make the production of MS fr. 13568 contemporary with the composition, between 1354 and 1377, by the Norman author Henri de Ferieres of Gisors (prisoner of the enemy in 1347, captain in Rouen in 1369), of *Les Livres [I, Des deduis; II, Le Songe de pestilence] du roy Modus et de la royne Ratio*, Paris, Société des Anciens Textes Français, 1932, based by Gunnar Tilander on MS fr. 12399 Bibliothèque Nationale, dated 1379.

In this work the old masculine singular is extremely rare: *li messagiers* (I, 258), *li vilain* (I, 235). So also is the old masculine plural: *li marcheant* (I, 4), *li oiseillon* (I, 35), *li oisel* (I, 238), plus a few mixed forms: *esquielz capître* (I, 111), *aucuns deduit* (I, 139), *as preudomme* (I, 140), *deus heron* (I, 196), and two hybrids: *le fil . . . rompront* (I, 161), *au matins* (I, 299).

The demonstrative pronoun persists in the form of the definite article (e.g., *pren l'autrui*, I, 145) and the old genitive is found alongside the new one: *la maison Antecrist* and *la maison de Jhesu Crist* (I, 148); *qui estoit fille monseigneur Gui* and *qui estoit filz de la suer au duc Jehan* (II, 211).

Although Captain Henri de Ferieres, *chevalier*, knew and used, to the word (e.g., II, 14-26, 60-68, especially 24-25, 62-63), the legal formulas then used in administrative correspondence, no notable re-latinization of

orthography is evident in the work of his scribe, who for Book II was one Denis d'Hormes. Orthography and relationship of forms is generally simple, e.g., doi[gl] dois, os os, bras bras, aprentis aprentis, dame dames, beste bestes, viande viandes, chevalier chevaliers, main mainz, cerf cerfs, cuer cuers, bout bous, arc ars, clerc clers, porc pors, gent gens, mot mos, nuit nuis, genoul genous, coutel coutiaus, perdriel perdriaus, morsel morsiaus morsiaux, lieu lieus lieux. But also singular sire sires seigneur, hons homme omme. Only occasionally, albeit most impressively, is the chaotic effect of personalized spelling evident in the case of nouns, e.g. (1, n.s.; 2, acc. s.; 3, n. pl.; 4, acc. pl.): (1) cheval, (2) cheval, (3) chevaulz, (4) chevaulz, chevauz, chevaus, chevauz; (2) chiel, (3) chieuz, (4) chieuz, chieus, cheus; (1) oisel, (2) oisel, (3) oisiaus, oisiar, (4) oisiaus, oisiauz, oisiauz; (1) chevreul, (2) chevreul, (3) chevreurs, (4) chevreus; (1) eve, eaue, (2) eve, eaue, iaue, yaue, (4) eaus, yaues; (2) eul, eil, ueil, uieil, (4) ieus, ieuz, yeulz, yeulz, yeux, yeuz.

Aside from the known allowances for regional variation the manuscript on which the Michel edition of Joinville's *Histoire de Saint Louis* is based is probably, in view of the evidence, quite similar to what would have resulted if the scribe who committed to vellum Book I of *Les Livres du roi Modus et de la royne Ratio* had been confronted with the original *Histoire de Saint Louis* dated 1309 and requested to make a legible transcript of its content.

Consequently, if the probability appears to be sufficiently supported by the evidence, the Michel edition is a unique linguistic synthesis, an authentic synthesis of the French language of the first half of the fourteenth century, covering in effect, and with evidence of overlapping in both directions, the point of juncture between late Old French and early Middle French.

As such, it is entitled to a more important rôle than that of mere hybrid linguistic outcast to which it has been relegated since the appearance of the nineteenth-century copyist Natalis de Wailly's "restitution," which, for that matter, would possibly have astonished Joinville at least no less than the fourteenth-century copyist's adaptation completed approximately half a century after Joinville's death.

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PROVERBS IN THE PLAYS OF CALDERÓN

SPANISH DRAMATISTS have used proverbs since the days of Juan del Encina and Gil Vicente, and the latter dramatist even goes so far as to use a proverb with a conscious thematic intent in his *Farça de Ines Pereira*.¹ The purpose of this study, then, is not to prove that Calderón was in any way exceptional in his repeated use of proverbs, but merely to show in what manner he continued the tradition. In this practice, as in many others, he was apparently following the examples of Lope de Vega and Tirso de Molina, but his interest in proverbial lore must have been further stimulated by his five-year study at the University of Salamanca, center of proverb collecting during the first quarter of the seventeenth century.

The titles of Calderón's plays alone yield a goodly list of sententious statements or phrases involving well-known proverbs. Most of these plays fall under the classifications of *comedias palaciegas* or *comedias de capa y espada*, and the adage nearly always serves as the theme and helps to determine plot and situation. Among such plays are: *Casa con dos puertas mala es de guardar*; *No siempre lo peor es cierto*; *Para vencer a amor querer vencerle*; *Mañana será otro día*; *Fuego de Dios en el querer bien*; *Peor está que estaba*; *Mejor está que estaba*; *Bien vengas mal si vienes solo*; *Saber del mal y del bien*; *Dar tiempo al tiempo*; *No hay burlas con el amor*; *Hombre pobre todo es trazas*; and *Guárdate del agua mansa*. In *Casa con dos puertas mala es de guardar*, the whole structure of the play, with its complicated and entertaining intrigue, is dependent upon the conditions outlined by the proverb. Artistically speaking, *Casa con dos puertas* is one of the most perfect plays of Calderón.

Since the author's plays are a veritable code book on the sentiment of honor, it is not surprising that some of his titles and themes are proverbs derived from rules and regulations governing *pundonor*. Principal among these are: *Las manos blancas no ofenden*; *A secreto agravio, secreta venganza*; *No hay cosa como callar*; *Con quien vengo vengo*; *Primero soy yo*; and *Antes que todo es mi dama*. Structurally considered, *A secreto agravio, secreta venganza* stands out not only as one of the author's best tragedies, but as one of his best dramas.

Calderón is not noted for his ability to create character, but with the exception of *El alcalde de Zalamea*, and *El astrólogo fingido*, his best character portrayals do appear in plays where proverbs are used as themes, as for example, in *Guárdate del agua mansa*, *No siempre lo peor es cierto*, and *No hay burlas con el amor*. In *Guárdate del agua mansa* the two daughters of Don Alonso are shown to be entirely different from what they appear to be

1. See Virginia Joiner and Eunice J. Gates, "Proverbs in Gil Vicente," in *PMLA*, LVII, 57-73.

on the surface. True to the idea expressed in the proverb, the seemingly quiet and guileless Doña Clara is in reality an ingenious schemer, whereas the lively, flirtatious Doña Eugenia turns out to be a model of propriety and filial obedience. It is in this play, too, that Calderón traces one of the first examples of the *figurón* character.

In at least one play, Calderón chooses for his title an adage that contains a proverbial character, the highly entertaining *Hombre pobre todo es trazas*. In this play the proverb not only determines characterization and theme, but influences situation and plot.

As indicated by the proverbial idea expressed in their titles, Calderón's two philosophical plays, *La vida es sueño* and *En esta vida todo es verdad y todo mentira*, are related in theme with each other and with *Gustos y disgustos son no más que imaginación*, but the three plays differ widely in greatness of conception and execution. Standing at the very pinnacle of Calderón's vast dramatic production is *La vida es sueño*, a work in which he presents the whole of human life. The complicated symbolism of the play starts with a condemnation of the ancient adage that the wise man is ruled by his stars. Further fusion with proverb lore develops the ideas that he must not be content to follow a *carpe diem* philosophy, but must learn to govern his own passions, for life is a dream and only truth and goodness are eternal.²

A proverb is also the underlying theme of Calderón's best Biblical play, *Los cabellos de Absalón*. The honor of having written the play, though, must be shared with Tirso de Molina, from whose *La venganza de Tamar* he borrowed a whole act. Calderón also borrowed the use of the proverb, "La sangre sin fuego hierva," making it the motivating force and giving it much the same expression as did Tirso. Thus Amnon's incestuous love for his half-sister Tamar, expressed in *La venganza de Tamar* by an ingenious turn to the proverb,

*Que si la sangre, en fin, sin fuego hierva,
¿Que hará sangre que tiene tanto fuego?
(BAE, IX, 412)*

appears with little change in *Los cabellos de Absalón*:

—*Yo muero por ti, Tamar;*

2. Menéndez y Pelayo, *Calderón y su teatro*, Madrid, 1910, pp. 267-271: "El simbolismo de *La Vida es sueño* es bastante complicado. . . . No cabe duda que uno de los pensamientos de la obra pudiera compendiarse en aquella antigua sentencia: *Vir sapiens dominabitur astris*. Aparte de esta condenación del fatalismo sideral y de la influencia astrológica, que es indudablemente una de las ideas que la fábula viene á demostrar, hay otras dos . . . Hay realmente una tesis escéptica en el drama; pero no es más que preparación para la tesis dogmática que se plantea luego: el escepticismo no es más que un estado transitorio del alma de Segismundo antes de llegar á la purificación final de sus pasiones, de sus afectos y de sus odios con que termina el drama . . . De aquí el domar sus pasiones, de aquí que procure no gozar de la ocasión ni del sueño de la vida, sabiendo lo poco que dura, sino obrar bien, que, como dice el poeta, *es siempre lo más seguro para cuando despertemos*. Es la obra, más que otra cosa, un símbolo de la vida humana."

.....
 —Que soy tu hermana.
 — Es verdad.
 Pero si dice un proverbio,
 La sangre sin fuego hierve,
 ¿Que hará la sangre con fuego?
 (IV, 200)³

The dramatic force of the proverb as originally used by Tirso easily explains its retention by Calderón.

A consideration of Calderón's use of proverbs in the dialogue of his plays shows that in this respect he also follows the practice of his predecessors. Like the author of the *Celestina* and Cervantes he recognizes the realistic and humorous worth of these bits of popular wisdom in developing characterization and in enlivening the dialogue, and frequently places them in the mouths of servants, rustics, and other plebeians. We note that this characteristic tendency of servants to speak in proverbs is referred to as such in one of his plays.

—Haz lo que manda tu amo.
 —Si haré, aunque no he de sentarme
 Con él á la mesa.⁴
 — Es propio
 De los que sirven refranes.
 (El alcalde de Zalamea, IV, 90)

The comic note is sometimes heightened when the proverb appears in dialect, as in the following passage where the well-known adage "at night all cats are grey" is rendered in conventional Negro dialect as "all cats are black":

... que mueltas las luces,
 Tueros los gatos son neglos.⁵
 (La sibila del oriente, III, 213)

The same neat correspondence of proverb to speaker is again observed when an adage of Moorish origin is given in Moorish dialect:

Cosa santa!
 Moger, me ir á Meca, mientras

3. References are to *Las comedias de D. Pedro Calderón de la Barca*, ed. J. G. Keil, Leipzig, 1827-1830, 4 vols.

4. Gonzalo Correas, *Vocabulario de refranes*, Madrid, 1924, p. 237: "Haz lo que tu amo te manda, y sentarte has con él á la mesa, o y siéntate con él á la mesa." Inigo Lopez de Mendoza, *Refranes que dicen las viejas tras el fuego*, in Mayans y Siscar, *Orígenes de la lengua española*, Madrid, 1873, p. 159: "Haz lo que te manda tu señor, e pósate con él á la mesa." This proverb appears also in *El secreto á voces*, III, 369.

5. Sebastián de Covarrubias Orozco, *Tesoro de la lengua castellana*, Madrid, 1611, Art. noche: "de noche todos los gatos son pardos." F. Rodríguez Marín, *Más de 21.000 refranes castellanos*, Madrid, 1926, p. 121: "De noche los gatos, todos son pardos." See also *Céfalo y Pécris*, IV, 662.

*Tú de Ceca en Meca tandas.*⁶

(*El gran príncipe de Fez*, II, 333)

As in many other plays of the period, parodies occur frequently in the works of Calderón, and, like proverbs and ballads, are the special delight of *graciosos*. In the following passage two of these comic devices are utilized when a servant parodies his master's more dignified version of the proverb *ir por lana y volver trasquilado*:

—¿Á quién, sino á mí, en el mundo

Ir le hubiera sucedido,

Capricho, por una dicha,

*Y volver con un peligro?*⁷

—Á mí; que cuando creí

Que iba por los desperdicios

De una merienda, me hallo

(Nunca el refran mas bien vino)

Sin comerlo ni beberlo,

En una torre metido.

(*Basta callar*, III, 191)

At times, especially in the passages of lighter vein, a proverb suggested by the name of one of the speakers is humorously and naturally fitted into the dialogue. The following speeches are addressed to maids named Inés:

Como nos veamos despues,

Yo haré verdad el refran,

*De un poco te quiero, Ines.*⁸

(*No siempre lo peor es cierto*, IV, 225)

—Buenas nuestras amas van

—Pregúntaselo al refran

De, un poco te quiero, Ines.

(*Cada uno para sí*, IV, 751)

The most consistent use of proverbs for comic effect appears in the burlesque play *Céfalo y Pócris*, where the dialogue is woven chiefly of proverbs, interspersed with puns and many references to popular songs and favorite lines from the *Romancero*. The following dialogue between the Princesses Pócris and Filis gives some indication of the manner in which these proverbs are strung along:

6. Covarrubias, *op. cit.*, Art. *Ceca*: "Cierta casa de devocion en Cordova, a do los Moros venian en Romeria, de alli se dixo andar de Ceca en Meca." See also *Céfalo y Pócris*, IV, 654.

7. Cf. Correas, *op. cit.*, p. 250: "Ir por lana y volver trasquilado. Quando fué a ofender y volvió ofendido; y acomódase a cosas semejantes, quando salen al revés de lo intentado." Covarrubias, *op. cit.*, Art. *lana*: "Ir por lana, y volver tresquilado, quando uno piensa que ha de venir ganancioso de alguna jornada, y trato, y buelue con perdida." See also *Céfalo y Pócris*, IV, 664.

8. Correas, *op. cit.*, p. 496: "Un poco te quiero, Inés; yo te lo diré después." See also *Céfalo y Pócris*, IV, 667.

- Poc. El Rey á palacio vino,
Y sin ver nuestros regalos
Se fue.*
- Fil. Sabes, qué imagino?
Que al ánsar de Cantimpalos
Le sale el lobo al camino;⁹
Y sin duda á él le salió,
Pues sin vernos se volvió.*
- Poc. Aunque esa es razon aguda,
Quien se muda, Dios le ayuda;¹⁰
Y él así como llegó
No riendo la puerta abierta,
Á volverse se resuelve,
Por no hacer, es cosa cierta,
Mas que el diablo, pues á puerta
Cerrada, el diablo se vuelve.¹¹*
- Fil. Con todo eso, que él ahora
Sin vernos se vaya, es bien
Sentir.*
- Poc. Por qué?*
- Fil. Eso se ignora?
Porque á ojos, que no ven,
Hay corazon, que no llora.¹²*
- Poc. Yo me holgara, que informado
Fuera, que al enamorado
De Aura zurré la badana,
Pues que vino aquí por lana
Para volver trasquilado.*
- Fil. Yo sintiera, que á saber
Llegara su proceder.*
- Poc. Yo me holgara.*
- Fil. Por qué, necia?*
- Poc. Porque en quien de Rey se precia,
Mas vale saber, que haber.¹³*

9. Correas, *op. cit.*, p. 258: "La gansa de Cantimpalos, que salta al lobo al camino. Los de este lugar cuentan por tradición de los pasados, que una mujer llamada la *Gansa*, salta al camino de otro lugarejo vecino a tratar a solas con el cura de allí, que se llamaba Lobo . . ."

10. *Refranes glosados*, 1541, in J. M. Sbarbi, *El refranero general español*, Madrid, 1874-1878, VII, 26: "Quien se muda: dios le ayuda."

11. Correas, *op. cit.*, p. 58: "A puerta cerrada, el diablo se torna." Rodríguez Marín, *op. cit.*, p. 38: "A puerta cerrá, llega el diablo y se vuelve atrás." See also *No hay cosa como callar*, III, 680.

12. *Refranes que dicen las viejas*, *loc. cit.*, p. 166: "Ojos que non ven, coraçon que non quiebra." Covarrubias, *op. cit.*, Art. *ojo*: "Ojos que no ven, coraçon no quebrantan." Correas, *op. cit.*, p. 372: "Ojos que no ven, corazón que no duele, que no quiebra o que no llora."

13. Correas, *op. cit.*, p. 302: "Más vale saber que haber, para no menester." *Refranes que dicen las viejas*, *loc. cit.*, p. 163: "Más vale saber, qu' aver."

Fil. *¿Luego tú de aquesta historia
Mal contenta estás?*

Poc. *Es cierto;
Porque al principio es notoria
Cosa, que se hace el pan tuerto.*

Fil. *Y al fin se canta la gloria.¹⁴
Yo estoy triste desa extraña
Tragedia.*

Poc. *Hablemos las dos*

Fil. *Callar toca á la maraña.*

Poc. *Á quien no habla no oye Dios.¹⁵*

Fil. *Quien calla piedras apaña.¹⁶*

Poc. *Pues, aunque ocultos estan
Tus pesares, se sabrán.*

Fil. *No harán, si mi llanto enjugo.*

Poc. *Yo vi azotar al verdugo.*

Fil. *Yo enterrar al sacristán.*

(IV, 663-664)

Calderón does not, however, restrict his proverbs to the passages of lighter vein, nor does he confine them to the speeches of servants and burlesque characters. As one would expect, though, he chooses dignified, sententious statements for persons of rank and dignity, a great favorite among these being a variant of Cicero's *Sapientis est mutare consilium*.¹⁷

Consejo muda el prudente.

(*El astrólogo fingido*, I, 516)

(*De una causa dos efectos*, III, 44)

(*Las manos blancas no ofenden*, IV, 190)

(*El alcaide de sí mismo*, IV, 379)

(*La hija del aire*, II, 76)

Yo, Astolfo, aunque no prudente

Sea, hoy he de parecerlo

En mudar consejo.

(*En esta vida todo es verdad, y todo
mentira*, I, 587)

Consejo muda el más sabio

Sagrada sentencia dijo.

(*El maestro de danzar*, I, 623)

14. Correas, *op. cit.*, p. 29: "Al fin se canta la gloria. Porque al fin de cada salmo se canta Gloria Patri, et Filio et Spiritui Sancto . . . por metáfora se aplica el premio después del trabajo y semejantes cosas."

15. *Refranes que dicen las viejas*, *loc. cit.*, p. 170: "Quien non fabla, non l'oye Dios." Correas, *op. cit.*, p. 62: "A quien no habla, no le oye Dios; o a quien no llama, no le oye Dios."

16. *Refranes que dicen las viejas*, *loc. cit.*, p. 173: "Yo que me callo, piedras apaño." Covarrubias, *op. cit.*, Art. *piedra*: "Quien calla piedras apaña." Rodríguez Marín, *op. cit.*, p. 394: "Quien calla, piedras apaña, y tiempo vendrá en que las esparza."

17. Cf. Proverbs 12:15, "He that hearkeneth unto counsel is wise." Rodríguez Marín, *op. cit.*, p. 171: "El sabio muda consejo."

De parecer muda el sabio.

(*La exaltación de la cruz*, III, 638)

Que parecer muda el sabio,

Consejo toma el prudente.

(*Con quien vengo vengo*, IV, 315)

Proverbs inspired by rules and practices governing *pundonor* are used, likewise, in the dialogue of his plays. Among the most notable of such proverbs are:

La competencia en los nobles,

Dijo un hidalgo proverbio,

Que era una lid generosa.

(*Muger, llora y vencerás*, II, 661)

Pues la obligación, que tiene

Un amante caballero

En todos los accidentes

Del tiempo y de la fortuna,

De la vida y de la muerte,

Del amor y de la honra,

Es, saber, que ha de ser siempre

Antes que todo la dama.¹⁸

(*Antes que todo es mi dama*, IV, 436)

Que si dijo algun proverbio:

Antes que todo es mi Dama;

Mintió amantemente necio;

Que antes que todo es mi honor,

Y él ha de ser lo primero.

(*El postrer duelo de España*, II, 249)

Todo ocioso cortesano,

Dice un adagio, que tenga

Una dama de respeto,

Que, sin estorbar, divierta.

(*No hay cosa como callar*, III, 658)

. . . corriente

Queda el refran, que las blancas

manos no agravian, mas duelen.¹⁹

(*Las manos blancas no ofenden*, IV, 192)

Pues entre quien de honor trata,

Pleitear, y comer juntos²⁰

18. This proverb appears again in the same play, pp. 431, 434, 442, and in *Guárdate del agua mansa*, IV, 347.

19. Rodríguez Marín, *op. cit.*, p. 288: "Manos blancas no ofenden; pero duelen." This proverb appears again in the same play, pp. 185, 186, 190, 191.

20. See also *Las manos blancas no ofenden*, IV, 160, and *Los tres afectos de amor*, IV, 286.

Dice un adagio en España.

(*Mañana será otro día*, III, 715)

. . . *No sé á cual me inclino.*

Pero sí sé, pues que sé,

Que la ley del duelo dijo,

*Que yo con quien vengo vengo.*²¹

(*Cada uno para sí*, IV, 741)

. . . *cosas pasadas,*

Aunque disgustan, no ofenden.

(*No hay cosa como callar*, III, 677)

. . . *En trances de honor,*

Dice un discreto proverbio,

*No hay cosa como callar.*²²

(*No hay cosa como callar*, III, 684)

Y, hace mal quien su mal fia

Á quien no sabe del mal.

(*Con quien vengo vengo*, IV, 315)

Por vengarse uno atrevido,

Por satisfacerse honrado,

Publicó su agravio mismo,

Porque dijo la venganza.

*Lo que la ofensa no dijo.*²³

(*Á secreto agravio secreta venganza*,
I, 489)

Stylistically, Calderón treats the proverb in his serious lines in much the same way that he treats any other philosophic thought or idea. The structural parallelism of proverbs adapts itself naturally to his constant balancing of part against part, as exemplified in his beautiful glossed version of Góngora's *Romance de los Ceneles*. This passage too illustrates the hair-splitting reasoning which is also typical of Calderón and his period:

Don Fernando

. . . *si el comunicar*

Los males alivio ofrece

*Al sentimiento,*²⁴ *entre tanto*

Que llegamos á mi gente,

Mi deseo á tu cuidado,

Si tanto favor merece,

21. See also *No hay burlas con el amor*, III, 104, and *Con quien vengo vengo*, IV, 331, Rodríguez Marín, *op. cit.*, p. 83: "Con quien vengo vengo."

22. See also in the same play, p. 675.

23. See also in the same play, pp. 487, 490, 492, 494; *Las tres justicias en una*, IV, 572. Rodríguez Marín, *op. cit.*, p. 47: "A secreto agravio, secreta venganza."

24. Cf. Correas, *op. cit.*, p. 127: "Consuelo es a los penados contar sus fatigas y cuidados." Rodríguez Marín, *op. cit.*, p. 364: "Penas comunicadas—o contadas—, penas aliviadas." See also *Fortunas de Andrómeda y Perseo*, III, 230, and *Antes que todo es mi dama*, IV, 416.

Muley

Con razones le pregunta
 Comedidas y corteses,
 Qué sientes? pues ya he creído,
 Que el venir preso no sientes.
 Comunicado el dolor
 Se aplaca, si no se vence,
 Y yo, que soy el que tuve
 Mas parte en este accidente
 De la fortuna, también
 Quiero ser el que consuele
 De tus suspiros la causa
 Si la causa lo consiente.
 Valiente eres, Español,
 Y cortes como valiente;

.....
 Preguntado me has la causa
 De mis suspiros ardientes;
 Y aunque confieso, que el mal
 Repetido y dicho suele
 Templarse, también confieso,
 Que quien le repite, quiere
 Aliviarse; y es mi mal
 Tan dueño de mis placeres,
 Que por no hacerles disgusto,
 Y que aliviado me deje,
 No quisiera repetirla;
 Mas ya es fuerza obedecerte,
 una hermosura,
 Á quien he adorado siempre,
 Junto á mi casa vivía,
 Porque mas cerca muriese.

.....
 Y amor en nuestras niñeces
 No fue rayo, pues hirió
 En lo humilde, tierno y débil
 Con mas fuerza, que pudiera
 En lo augusto, altivo y fuerte;
 Tanto, que para mostrar
 Sus fuerzas y sus poderes,
 Hirió nuestros corazones
 Con arpones diferentes;
 Pero como la porfia
 Del agua en las piedras suele
 Hacer señal, por la fuerza
 No, sino cayendo siempre,²⁵

25. Cf. Correas, *op. cit.*, p. 15: "Agua blanda, en piedra dura, tanto da que hace cavadura." *Ibid.*, p. 224: "La gotera dando, hace señal en la piedra." Rodríguez Marín, *op. cit.*, p. 143: "El agua es blanda y la piedra es dura; pero gota a gota, hace cavadura."

*Así las lágrimas mías,
Porfiando eternamente,
La piedra del corazón,
Mas que los diamantes fuerte,
Labraron; y no con fuerza
De méritos excelentes,
Pero con mi mucho amor,
Vino en fin á enternecerse.*

(*El príncipe constante*, I, 264-266)

In another play, antithesis as well as the formal balance of speech with speech is revealed by two complementary proverbs that follow each other in close succession:

*Porque llevas,
Timonides, malas nuevas,
Y es fuerza que llegues presto.²⁶*
(*Argenis y Poliarco*, I, 382)

*Porque llevas buenas nuevas,
Y es fuerza que llegues tarde.*
(*Ibid.*, 383)

Proverbs, too, lend themselves easily to his characteristic manner of placing ideas in a chiasmic construction:

*Suele decirse de aquellos,
Que muy poco han estudiado
Que en Salamanca han entrado
Mas no Salamanca en ellos.*
(*Hombre pobre todo es trazas*, I, 453)

*Si decir suele el proverbio,
Que el tiempo es precioso, aquí
Es mas que precioso el tiempo.²⁷*
(*El maestro de danzar*, I, 621)

Another proverb that is treated in a passage thoroughly in keeping with the Calderonian style is *no hay burlas con el amor* ("no jesting with love").²⁸ A series of four *décimas*, each having for its last line the proverb, ends with the following recapitulating *décima*:

*Por burla al mar me entregué,
Por burla el rayo encendí,
Con blanca espada esgrimí,
Con brava fiera jugué;*

26. Cf. Rodríguez Marín, *op. cit.*, p. 258: "Las malas noticias llegan presto . . . Las malas nuevas corren las leguas más que las buenas . . . Las noticias malas, traen alas; y las buenas, no se oyen apenas." See also *Casa con dos puertas mala es de guardar*, I, 40; *El sitio de Bredá*, I, 244; *Basta callar*, III, 175; *Cada uno para sí*, IV, 750.

27. Cf. Rodríguez Marín, *op. cit.*, p. 172: "El tiempo es oro."

*Y así en el mar me anegué,
Del rayo sentí el ardor,
De acero y fiera el furor:
Luego, si saben matar
Fiera, acero, rayo y mar,
No hay burlas con el amor.*

(*No hay burlas con el amor*, III, 117)

Not infrequently, proverbs elaborated into other carefully wrought patterns furnish the imagery for some of the dramatist's most impressive lines. The fate of the proverbial moth that flits around a flame until consumed by it,²⁹ appears many times linked with the thought of some of Calderón's finest lyric passages and, doubtless inspired by Góngora,³⁰ he makes this proverb an integral part of his imagery. His method of using it as a justification for the temerity of a lover or for merely philosophizing upon the situation of anyone who may be attracted by an unknown danger is seen in the following passages.³¹ The thought in the first example is also associated with the parallel allusion to the mythological Icarus:

*Un deseo, ay de mí! tan remontado,
Que osó con alto vuelo
Calarse entre las nubes de algún cielo,
Donde el fuego vecino,
Con ligereza suma,
Abrasada la pluma,
Subió deseo, y mariposa vino.*

(*El mayor encanto amor*, I, 296)

28. *Ibid.*, p. 333: "No hay burlas con el amor."

29. Cf. Correas, *op. cit.*, p. 516: "Yo soy la mariposa que nunca paro, hasta dar en la llama, donde me abraso." Sbarbi, *Diccionario de refranes, adagios, proverbios de la lengua española*, Madrid, 1922, Art. *mariposa*: "Mariposa que busca la llama en ella se abrasa."

30. For two striking uses of this proverb as a metaphor, see *Obras poéticas de D. Luis de Góngora*, ed. Foulché-Delbosc, New York, 1921:

"El can ia vigilante
Conuoca, despidiendo al caminante,
I la que desuiada
Luz poca pareció, tanta es vezina,
Que iaze en ella la robusta encina,
Mariposa en cenizas desatada."

(II, 56)

"Entrase el mar por vn arroio breue
.....
I su fin, crystalina mariposa,
No alada, sino vndosa,
En el Farol de Thetis solicita."

(*Ibid.*, p. 88)

31. Other examples of Calderón's use of this proverb as a metaphor are: *El purgatorio de San Patricio*, I, 52; *Saber del mal y del bien*, I, 146 and 151; *El sitio de Bredá*, I, 247; *El astrólogo fingido*, I, 502; *Mañanas de abril y mayo*, I, 638; *Mejor está que estaba*, III, 425; *Mañana será otro día*, III, 723; *El castillo de Lindabridis*, IV, 679.

Pues como la mariposa,
Que halagüeñamente hace
Tornos á su muerte, cuando
Sobre la llama flamante
Las alas de vidrio mueve,
Las hojas de carmin bate;
Así el infeliz, llevado
De su desdicha al examen,
Ronda el peligro, sin ver
Quien al peligro le trae.

(Casa con dos puertas mala es de
guardar, I, 28)

The most artistic expression of this proverb is that in *La cisma de Inglaterra*, where the lover's passion is compared first to the bee that hovers around the rose, and then to the moth that circles about the flame until its wings are scorched. These stanzas are wrought in the peculiar Calderonian manner of molding thought and imagery into a symmetric architectural design of rare skill and beauty:

¿ No has visto providente y oficiosa
Mover el aire iluminada abeja,
Que, hasta beber la púrpura á la rosa,
Ya se acerca cobarde, y ya se aleja?
¿ No has visto enamorada mariposa
Dar cercos á la luz, hasta que deja
En monumento fácil abrazadas
Las alas de color tornasoladas?
Así mi amor cobarde muchos días
Tornos hizo á la rosa y á la llama,
Temor, que ha sido entre cenizas frías
Tantas veces llorado de quien ama;
Pero el amor, que vence con porfías,
Y la ocasion, que con disculpas llama,
Me animaron, y llegué á la rosa.

(IV, 139)

Another proverb which is used frequently by Calderón in his imagery and which had been elaborated also by Góngora in his *Soledades*, is the classical allusion to the asp which lies hidden among flowers, *latet anguis in herba*, employed by Virgil in his *Eclogues* (III, 93). A typical example of Calderón's use of the proverb is the following:³²

32. Other passages employing the allusion to the serpent are: *La vida es sueño*, I, 2; *Casa con dos puertas mala es de guardar*, I, 26; *Saber del mal y del bien*, I, 152; *Los hijos de la fortuna*, II, 14; *Ni amor se libra de amor*, II, 124; *El hijo del Sol Faeton*, II, 439; *Gustos y disgustos son no mas que imaginacion*, III, 132; *El secreto á voces*, III, 355; *Pieras afemina amor*, III, 453; *Dicha y desdicha del nombre*, III, 494; *Auristela y Lisidante*, III, 558; *Zelos aun del aire matan*, III, 696; *Darle todo y no dar nada*, IV, 9, 21; *No siempre lo peor es cierto*, IV, 237; *El castillo de Lindabridis*, IV, 683; *El pintor de su deshonra*, IV, 63.

*Bien hubiese un arroyuelo,
Que, áspid de cristal pisado,
Entre unas humildes yerbas
Del rústico pie de un árbol,
Quiso morder el ribete
De sus adornos, manchando
No sé qué cenefa de oro
Con saliva de alabastro;
Pues la obligó, por huir
La ponzoña de sus labios,
Á la brújula de un pie
Tan breve y tan bien calzado,
Que decía: jazmín soy
Del botón deste zapato.*

(Los empeños de un acaso, III, 279)

Summarizing briefly Calderón's use of proverbs, we note that plays containing proverbial titles and themes comprise some of his best and most famous works, that some of his best characterizations are found in these plays, and that though the majority of these proverb plays are among his *comedias de capa y espada*, they are by no means restricted to them. In the dialogue, proverbs are most consistently used as a comic device for the *graciosos*. However, highly wrought versions of a proverb appear also in some of his most famous lyrical passages, fashioned into the symmetric pattern that is a distinctive characteristic of Calderonian style.

EUNICE JOINER GATES

Texas Christian University

LE THÈME DE LA VIOLENCE DANS LE MONDE TRAGIQUE DE RACINE

*"Si vous n'avez appris à vous laisser conduire,
Vous êtes jeune encore et l'on peut vous instruire."*

"Et qui m'en instruira?"

"Tout l'Empire à la fois,

Rome."

*"Rome met-elle au nombre de vos droits
Tout ce qu'a de cruel l'injustice et la force,
Les emprisonnements, le rapt, et le divorce?"*

*"Rome ne porte point ses regards curieux
Jusque dans des secrets que je cache à ses yeux.
Imitez son respect."*

"On sait ce qu'elle en pense."

"Elle se tait du moins; imitez son silence."¹

Ce bref dialogue ne peut aboutir justement qu'à ce silence que préconise dédaigneusement Néron; il dessine du même coup le schéma essentiel du drame racinien. Deux jeunes hommes s'affrontent, l'un s'appelle Néron. Peu importe le nom de l'autre, la victime; quel silence plus parfait que celui qu'assure l'anonymité de la mort? De Britannicus à Néron, dans cette scène nulle communication ne s'établira. De plus en plus angoissé Britannicus cherche, dans les limites de son expérience humaine, l'argument qui touchera Néron, et qui du même coup fera de lui, Britannicus, un être vivant, présent, capable de se défendre; les sentiments de la justice, de la responsabilité, de la gloire, de l'orgueil, de la crainte, de la vanité, de la passion, tour à tour sont présentés comme arguments, selon une gamme descendante qui trahit son affolement croissant. Britannicus ne réussit pas, un seul moment, à toucher Néron, à changer l'attitude détachée, ennuyée et indifférente de l'empereur. Il a peur, le rythme même du dialogue traduit sa peur, et il a raison d'avoir peur. Il est devant le type d'être le plus dangereux qui soit au monde et qui, sous divers aspects, passe et repasse dans le théâtre racinien comme le motif conducteur d'une symphonie.

Néron dans cette scène découvre la puissance calme qui accompagne l'inaccessibilité aux sentiments, aux raisons, le refus d'entendre l'appel d'un autre être humain. La seule chose qui en lui soit engagée, tandis que déchiré jusqu'au désespoir Britannicus se débat, c'est la volonté d'être inaccessible; la lucidité froide de ses paroles en témoigne. Il est momentanément implacable; et c'est à ce moment que la destruction de Britannicus

1. *Britannicus*, Acte III, sc. 8, Racine, *Théâtre*, Ed. de la Pléiade, pp. 288-289.

est en réalité décidée. Chaque réponse de Néron à Britannicus est une suppression. Un instant encore Néron se laissera toucher, Burrhus aura l'illusion d'avoir communiqué avec lui, de l'avoir convaincu. La fin, quelques instants plus tard, montre toute l'étendue de cette illusion. Néron n'aime pas discuter. Il tue.

Britannicus, la victime, n'aura droit ni au choix de sa mort, ni par suite, à la dignité de sa mort. Néron lui enlève ce suprême recours de l'individu impuissant et menacé en le prenant froidement au piège le plus simple. Ainsi au début de la scène citée deux jeunes princes se confrontent, demi-frères, vertueux tous deux, l'un ayant droit au trône que l'autre occupe, mais à la suite d'intrigues dont il n'est pas responsable. Tous deux prétendent à la même femme. La tragédie pourtant jaillit en dehors de ces circonstances. Au cinquième acte l'un des deux a disparu, sans grandeur, sans même cette conscience de sa défaite qui aurait satisfait l'exigence humaine de justice. Il est anéanti, et c'est précisément l'acte qui anéantit Britannicus, qui, du fils d'Agrippine, a fait Néron. L'un est lié à l'autre fatalement. Pour exister Néron tue, c'est son premier acte libre. Et toute la noblesse et toute l'innocence de Britannicus ne comptent pour rien. Cette tragédie porte fort justement le titre de *Britannicus*, de tout ce qui normalement jeune, naïf et généreux se fie à la "justice," au "droit" contre un Néron. Ce n'est, d'autre part, en aucun sens la tragédie de Néron ni son triomphe, mais comme l'a indiqué Racine, sa naissance.

Personne autour de Néron ne s'y trompe. Agrippine n'en est pas à un meurtre près; Burrhus dans cette cour impériale a dû acquérir l'habitude de la violence. Devant ce seul acte de Néron pourtant c'est une fuite éperdue, le vide, et le silence réclamé à Britannicus. Burrhus reconnaît l'origine de la crainte dont tous sont frappés:

*Mais il vous faut, Madame, expliquer ma douleur,
Néron l'a vu mourir sans changer de couleur.
Ses yeux indifférents ont déjà la constance
D'un tyran dans le crime endurci dès l'enfance.²*

Le crime par ambition, le crime par passion, le crime commis, mais avec une révolte de la chair, commis, mais reconnu comme crime, est encore humain. Il vise à une fin distincte de la violence dont il est l'occasion. Néron, lui, ne tue pas par ambition. Il ne tue pas par passion. Ce n'est pas la jalousie qui le pousse car son caprice d'une nuit n'a rien de fondamental, et le dialogue entre lui et Britannicus empêche tout contre-sens. Son crime est vide de tout contenu passionnel. Du coup il place Néron à cette limite de l'expérience humaine où l'homme rompant le pacte tacite qui le lie aux autres devient "inhumain." C'est la combinaison de sa toute-puissance et de cette caractéristique qui donnera à Néron la liberté de faire de la violation du tabou humain un long et indolent usage. Burrhus et Agrippine

2. *Ibid.*, Acte V, sc. 7, p. 311.

sentent que toute vie devant cet être est un sursis. Cette conception du personnage de Néron et sa révélation dans la scène où il se trouve seul avec Britannicus, le seul être de son entourage qui, à ce moment-là, n'a aucune prise sur lui, sont profondément raciniennes. Indifférence et toute-puissance éprouvées pour la première fois simultanément et réalisées aussitôt par le meurtre, puissante conception dramatique à laquelle s'ajoute inquiétante, cette sournoise lâcheté qui tente l'expérience sur l'être le plus faible qui soit à la portée de l'assassin.

A travers tout le théâtre de Racine il s'établit d'un personnage à l'autre et sous la pression de volontés désespérément résolues, des rapports de victime à bourreau. C'est dans ces positions respectives et limites que les personnages se définissent et prennent, pour toute éternité, leur individualité unique et distincte dans ce monde. Le drame est toujours déclenché par une tentative de violence morale, et souvent physique, exercée par un être sur un autre qu'il tient en sa puissance. Tous n'ont pas la toute-puissance de Néron unie à son implacable indifférence; et tous ne se trouvent pas en face d'une victime de poids aussi léger dans ce jeu de la mort, que Britannicus. Mais chez celui qui momentanément veut exercer sur l'autre une force qui dépasse les limites de ce qui est permis le ressort de l'action est toujours le même: se faire craindre.

Heureux ou malheureux, il suffit qu'on me craigne.³

Voilà, avec maintes variations, le cri de tous ces personnages.

Le monde tragique de Corneille est un monde qui affirme, dans l'action, le triomphe intellectuel et moral sur un chaos extérieur ou même intérieur, de personnages qui parlent le langage de la grandeur humaine, tel qu'il est établi par l'accord de tous les hommes "nobles" et avec eux, des personnages cornéliens. Ce monde est donc un monde sublime.

Le monde tragique de Racine n'est pas sublime. Une seule fois dans *Alexandre*, Racine a tenté de nous montrer un de ces vainqueurs magnifiques et généreux chers à Corneille. Et il n'a réussi qu'à dessiner un personnage secondaire, le vaincu Porus, voué à l'échec, conscient de sa prochaine défaite, refusant jusqu'à la fin son adhésion au triomphe d'Alexandre. Porus qui devait mettre en relief la générosité d'Alexandre tue le sublime au lieu de l'illustrer. Car ce monde racinien naît au moment où les personnages cessent de communiquer, dans cette zone où la persuasion logique et sentimentale, les mots qui indiquent amour ou haine, ne signifient absolument plus que menace, chantage, tentative d'asservissement et de corruption.

Et la crainte dans ce monde est le plus puissant des dissolvants, des corrodants de sentiments humains. Qui oserait soutenir qu'au quatrième acte d'*Andromaque*, il reste chez ces quatre êtres entraînés dans la violence,

3. *Ibid.*, Acte III, sc. 8, p. 289.

la moindre parcelle d'amour? De la crainte naît la haine. Et la crainte comme la haine est à double tranchant. Sans haine Hermione aurait pu répondre à la supplication d'Andromaque, et dénouer ainsi sans catastrophe la situation. Amurat, cet autre Néron, dompteur de janissaires, qui écrasera Roxane avec la même implacabilité que Néron écrase Britannicus, vit dans cette atmosphère de crainte doublée de haine au milieu de ces janissaires.

"Comme il les craint sans cesse, ils le craignent toujours."⁴ Elle est belle la galerie racinienne des grands fauves tueurs sans cesse à l'affût: Néron, Amurat, Mithridate, Athalie, et sur un plan différent, mais de la même famille, Joad.

Joad seul a, au même degré, l'implacabilité à laquelle Néron atteint dans la scène avec Britannicus. Ils la partagent avec une seule autre puissance qui, sous trois noms, joue le même rôle dans toutes les tragédies raciniennes: le destin, les dieux, Dieu. Elle a, de commun avec Néron, le même visage féroce, capricieux, nonchalant; la même indifférence aux raisons et aux lois humaines; la même façon de présider à la destruction d'individus tout en bafouant leurs idées de justice, de droit, de bonheur, de comment on vit et meurt.

Ce n'est pas par hasard que le mot "inhumain" est un mot racinien par excellence avec son complément, qui est un jugement, le mot "cruel," et ce n'est que par un malentendu profond qu'il peut passer pour précieux. Car c'est précisément à la limite de l'humain et de l'inhumain que se place la tragédie racinienne. Elle se joue au moment où le destin à travers un concours de circonstances et parfois d'autres êtres humains, s'arroge des droits "inhumains." Elle oblige des individus subitement plongés dans le hasard d'une mort imminente à se définir par une réaction de révolte ou de soumission devant la violence qui leur est faite.

Ainsi Agamemnon, chef du camp armé des Grecs où dans l'attente des vents tout héroïsme se décompose, voit Ulysse en tant qu'ambassadeur des dieux, lui demander en otage sa fille, Iphigénie, comme Oreste ambassadeur des Grecs, vient arracher à Andromaque son fils. Le dialogue entre Agamemnon et Ulysse se déroule sur deux plans aussi irréconciliables que ceux où s'engagent Néron et Britannicus. Cette fois c'est au nom des dieux, appuyé sur les mots d'honneur, de patrie, de sacrifice qu'Ulysse fait violence aux droits humains. La révolte d'Agamemnon, momentanée, est douloureuse; sa résignation est une défaite, non une acceptation, et détruit, pour toute la pièce, sa dignité.

Les mots "gloire," "devoir," "honneur" pour lesquels l'homme consent au sacrifice sont remplacés, devant l'exigence inhumaine qu'ils recouvrent, dans le vocabulaire d'Agamemnon par les mots "malheur," "oppression," "victime," "immolation." C'est le jugement humain qui se dresse contre les dieux.

4. *Bajazet*, Acte I, sc. 1, Racine, *Théâtre*, Ed. de la Pléiade, p. 380.

*Ah, Seigneur, qu'éloigné du malheur qui m'opprime,
 Votre cœur aisément se montre magnanime!
 Mais que si vous voyiez ceint du bandeau mortel
 Votre fils Télémaque approcher de l'autel,
 Nous vous verrions troublé de cette affreuse image,
 Changer bientôt en pleurs ce superbe langage.*

*Seigneur, vous le savez, j'ai donné ma parole,
 Et si ma fille vient, je consens qu'on l'immole.⁵*

*Seigneur, de mes efforts je connais l'impuissance:
 Je cède et laisse aux dieux opprimer l'innocence.
 La victime bientôt marchera sur vos pas.
 Allez . . .⁶*

Cette cruauté, cette tyrannie des dieux "injustes," c'est ce qui a déchiré Phèdre, se jouant de sa révolte, indifférent comme Néron, devant une longue et épuisante lutte. Et suprême ironie, les dieux donnent à leur victime un sentiment de culpabilité.

*Je reconnus Vénus, et ses feux redoutables,
 D'un sang qu'elle poursuit tourments inévitables.
 Par des vœux assidus je crus les détourner:
 Je lui bâtis un temple, et pris soin de l'orner;*

Vaines précautions! Cruelle destinée!⁷

Cette destinée tendra, le jour même de la mort de Phèdre, le piège qui, à l'entrée du tombeau, la rendra criminelle. Peu important sa révolte, son jugement humain, sa volonté d'innocence:

J'ai conçu pour mon crime une juste terreur:

Je voulais en mourant prendre soin de ma gloire.⁸

Gloire et justice, évaluations essentielles au bonheur des hommes ou plutôt à leur existence même, et dont les dieux n'ont cure.

Il n'est guère différent de ces dieux, le Dieu des Hébreux tel que nous le présente Racine. Le Dieu de Polyeucte récompense le martyr. Polyeucte sait que l'approbation divine lui réserve une éternité glorieuse; et sa récompense se manifeste immédiatement ici-bas par la conversion de Pauline et de Félix. Le Dieu de Corneille agit selon la logique de l'ordre humain. Tandis que le Dieu de Racine récompense Joad de sa longue fidélité en lui montrant, le jour de son triomphe apparent, la trahison du jeune roi Joas,

5. *Iphigénie*, Acte I, sc. 3, Racine, *Théâtre*, Ed. de la Pléiade, p. 518.

6. *Ibid.*, Acte I, sc. 4, p. 520.

7. *Phèdre*, Acte I, sc. 3, Racine, *Théâtre*, Ed. de la Pléiade, p. 584.

8. *Ibid.*, Acte I, sc. 3, p. 585.

et Zacharie, le fils du grand prêtre assassiné. Aujourd'hui Mathan l'injuste, demain Zacharie, le juste, indifférence et injustice divines à l'égard de l'espoir humain que justice un jour partout sera faite. Il n'y a point de triomphe dans le théâtre racinien. C'est par là que ce théâtre pose, comme certaines pièces d'aujourd'hui, le tragique dans l'inadéquation entre l'ordre humain, établi sur certaines valeurs morales, acceptées par les hommes dans leurs rapports normaux, et l'ordre "inhumain" qui le domine, et où parfois l'homme s'égare. Cet ordre inhumain brise la dignité de l'homme, l'attaque dans ce qui est son existence même, le jette dans le déséquilibre et le mène à une mort désespérée. Le destin, les dieux, Dieu, font violence à l'homme.

Qu'il s'agisse de haine, d'amour, d'honneur, de vengeance, de guerre ou de gouvernement, la question clef qui se pose dans tout ce théâtre, qui noue et dénoue l'action, est: "Feraï-je violence?" d'une part; et "Me fera-t-on violence?" d'autre part. C'est la question essentielle qui se pose dans la moins "violente" des tragédies raciniennes, *Bérénice*. Titus le sait, lui qui est comme Néron, tout-puissant, et sur qui nulle force matérielle ne peut avoir de prise. Il pose le problème nettement:

*Rome observe aujourd'hui ma conduite nouvelle.
Quelle honte pour moi! quel présage pour elle,
Si dès les premiers pas renversant tous les droits,
Je fondais mon bonheur sur le débris des lois!*⁹

Et nous entendons comme en écho le cri de révolte de Britannicus:

*Rome met-elle au nombre de vos droits
Tout ce qu'a de cruel l'injustice et la force. . .*¹⁰

et les mots désespérés de Burrhus à qui il ne reste que la force de

*Pleurer Britannicus, César, et tout l'Etat.*¹¹

A ce choix qui se pose pour Titus sur un plan beaucoup plus subtil, mais d'autant plus périlleux, l'empereur répond "Non." Il ne violera pas le pacte qui l'unit à son peuple. Il repoussera la tentation de se mettre au-dessus des lois, volontairement, mettant ainsi lui-même cette limite à sa liberté que Néron par le meurtre de Britannicus détruit. "Feraï-je violence?" La question même suppose, comme réponse, selon l'ordre humain: "Non." Ce "non" ne peut être imposé aux puissants que par eux-mêmes. Fragile rempart qui protège chez eux, et ceux qui en dépendent, la dignité humaine. Il est souvent prononcé pourtant dans le théâtre racinien et il est déterminant. C'est le "non" de Titus; le "non" d'Assuérus devant le décret qui organise le massacre d'un peuple; c'est le "non" de Xipharès devant la tentation de déposséder ce vieillard courageux, cruel et violent qu'est Mithridate, son père.

9. *Bérénice*, Acte II, sc. 2, Racine, *Théâtre*, Ed. de la Pléiade, p. 336.

10. *Britannicus*, Acte III, sc. 8., *ibid.*, p. 289.

11. *Ibid.*, Acte V, sc. 5, p. 309.

Ce non est accompagné chez ceux qui le prononcent d'un calme et d'une dignité qui peuvent aller jusqu'à l'exaltation. "Glorieux et fidèle, je meurs,"¹² dira Xipharès lui qui par un hasard seul, ne mourra pas. Autour de Titus, d'Assuérus, la situation tragique se résoud, sans catastrophe, dans l'ordre. La fin de Bérénice est digne, humaine dans sa tristesse. La fin d'Esther est sereine. Et Xipharès crée autour de lui un monde vigoureux et presque joyeux.

En face de ce refus volontaire de faire violence, il est dans le théâtre racinien un autre refus, digne comme le premier mais profondément tragique. C'est le "non" que l'opprimé prononce devant l'exigence de l'oppresser, ce "non" que Phèdre, presque jusqu'à la mort a prononcé vis-à-vis de son destin, ce "non" qu'Agamemnon n'a pas eu le courage d'opposer à l'oracle. Ce "non" que prononce l'opprimé marque de façon absolue la limite du pouvoir et de la liberté de l'oppresser. Cette limite se trouve elle aussi dans le fragile rempart d'une volonté humaine. C'est le "non" de Bajazet à Roxane, de Monime à Mithridate, d'Andromaque à Pyrrhus. La situation de tous trois, à peu de chose près, est décrite par ces mots qui s'appliquent à Monime:

*Vous dépendez ici d'une main violente,
Que le sang le plus cher rarement épouvante,
Et je n'ose vous dire à quelle cruauté
Mithridate jaloux s'est souvent emporté.¹³*

Ce "non" est prononcé par les personnages raciniens dans la solitude, au seuil d'une mort violente, en face d'un marchandage féroce appuyé sur la force, qui pour prix d'une soumission offre la vie. C'est chez chacun des êtres qui le prononce le refus de se laisser violenter, d'abandonner une certaine liberté au-delà d'une limite où la crainte dépassée devient une indifférence aussi implacable que celle de Néron. Au moment où la victime prononce ce non, elle prend la figure du destin. Bajazet mourra, Andromaque et Monime vivront, peu importe. Tous trois, acceptant l'injustice inéluctable de leur destin et choisissant la mort, sont entrés dans "l'in-humain." Entre eux et ceux qui cherchent à exercer, à travers eux, une tyrannie, le silence est établi. De la crainte de Pyrrhus, à la haine de Pyrrhus, Andromaque est passée au refus de tout accord avec lui, à la révolte:

Non, je ne serai point complice de ces crimes.¹⁴

Ayant accepté la mort, elle est libre. L'inquiétude, la tension douloureuse qui entraînent Oreste et Hermione vers le désastre n'ont aucune prise sur elle.

*Andromaque, au travers de mille cris de joie,
Porte jusqu'aux autels le souvenir de Troie:*

12. *Mithridate*, Acte IV, sc. 2, Racine, *Théâtre*, Ed. de la Pléiade, p. 484.

13. *Ibid.*, Acte IV, sc. 2, p. 483.

14. *Andromaque*, Acte III, sc. 7, p. 161.

*Incapable toujours d'aimer et de haïr
Sans joie et sans murmure elle semble obéir.¹⁵*

Même indifférence, même inaccessibilité chez Monime:

*Non, Seigneur, vainement vous croyez m'étonner.
Je vous connais: je sais tout ce que je m'apprête,
Et je vois quels malheurs j'assemble sur ma tête.
Mais le dessein est pris. Rien ne peut m'ébranler.¹⁶*

Ce refus soustrait ces personnages, sinon à la souffrance, du moins au déséquilibre du monde qui de toutes parts les menace. Toutes les raisons du monde, tous les chantages, tous les sentiments, toutes les coercitions ne peuvent désormais les atteindre. Et il suffit de comparer la marche nuptiale d'Andromaque, qui pour elle est une marche vers la mort, à la mort désordonnée d'Hermione, la mort de Bajazet à celle de Roxane, pour mesurer la dignité que Racine attache au calme du détachement volontaire.

Car entre ces deux limites extrêmes de la liberté humaine marquées par ces deux refus, le premier exercé sur soi-même, le second posant dans l'oppression les limites de la tyrannie, se jouent toutes les nuances, toutes les tragédies de la violence qui cherche, à travers l'amour, la haine et tout le monde instable des passions, à exercer ses contraintes, à obtenir pour l'individu ce à quoi il n'a pas droit, ou ne peut avoir droit.

Le monde de Racine est un monde violent, traversé d'armées en marche, de défaites, de massacres, d'exils, d'esclavages où sombrent des peuples entiers. Et c'est pour avoir oublié ce fait que des générations de jeunes Français ont été portées, par des critiques scolaires, à admirer naïvement les "nuances," les "jeux" de l'amour dans ce théâtre, à s'extasier sur le "flirt" d'Andromaque et de Pyrrhus. Il ne s'agit pourtant ni de Voltaire ni de Marivaux. Il faut également avoir perdu de vue dans la lecture et les gloses, le sens dramatique, l'urgence même de l'action imposée par la loi de l'unité de temps. Devant l'imminence de la mort, des personnages qui s'appellent Andromaque, Phèdre, Athalie et qui *ne sont pas* vous et moi, font *acte*. Comment accepter du point de vue dramatique certaines inanités des commentaires "psychologiques" qui trop souvent dépassent à peine le niveau du roman feuilleton? Et ceci dans un monde où les actes entraînent à leur suite des mutations de peuples, de royaumes, d'empires.

Ce qui dans ce théâtre est essentiel, c'est que sans cesse deux mondes s'y confrontent, irréconciliables: celui des vainqueurs, et celui des vaincus; du fait qu'ils sont irréconciliables il n'est point entre eux de sentiments qui ne soient en déséquilibre, réfractés, brisés par ce milieu. Et l'amour y tient fort peu de place, lorsqu'il est autre chose qu'une forme, parmi d'autres, de la tyrannie. Il est bien peu de chose dans le drame qui se déroule, l'amour de Junie et de Britannicus devant la cruauté de Néron; ou celui de Monime

15. *Ibid.*, Acte V, sc. 2, p. 175.

16. *Mithridate*, Acte IV, sc. 4, p. 488.

et de Xipharès devant Mithridate. Qui se souvient d'Atalide la plus aimante des femmes raciniennes lorsqu'on pense à Bajazet? Achille et son amour ne pèsent guère dans la balance au moment où Iphigénie affronte son père, et les craintes d'Arécie et son amour ne peuvent rien pour Hippolyte. Que fera l'amour de Josabeth pour sauver Joas de son destin? Seul Assuérus, par amour autant que par politique, évite une catastrophe. Les amants raciniens sont bien pâles, et leur amour ne pèse pas plus que leur innocence sur le cours de leur destin.

C'est du vainqueur au vaincu, de l'opresseur à l'opprimé que se noue la trame et que se dégage le sens de l'action. Et pour Racine, le vaincu, la victime sont marqués et pour toujours. Etre vaincu, ce n'est pas dans le monde racinien mourir, comme Curiaque, glorieux et honoré sur le champ de bataille, ou comme Polyeucte chargé d'une gloire surnaturelle. C'est errer comme Andromaque, attaché à un être brutal et haï qui rappelle sans cesse le massacre affreux de ceux qui furent père, mère, mari, frère, sœur. C'est être sommé, sous menace, de laisser tuer un fils froidement, ou de renoncer à cette dernière liberté, la solitude. Etre vaincu, c'est être Astyanax dont la vie est à la merci des passions de vainqueurs capricieux. Etre "Troien" ou "fils d'Hector" c'est toute une destinée amère. Andromaque le sait, qui dit de ce fils pourtant passionnément aimé:

*Qu'il ait de ses aïeux un souvenir modeste:
Il est du sang d'Hector, mais il en est le reste.¹⁷*

Il n'est pas dans le monde d'évasion possible à ceux que la violence a ainsi déshérités. Le fils d'Hector, et le fils d'Achille n'ont rien en commun. Etre vaincu, c'est être Eriphile seule, amère, ou Arécie qui ne peut oublier qu'elle a

*. . . perdu dans la fleur de leur jeune saison,
Six frères, quel espoir d'une illustre maison!¹⁸*

et que toute joie lui est refusée. Etre vaincu, c'est avoir subi dans sa chair et dans son sang l'injustice inhumaine du destin et de la violence humaine sous une forme cruelle, et avoir perdu l'espoir de la voir corrigée selon la loi des hommes. Il convient que ce soit Eriphile que demandent les dieux. La pire défaite est celle qui exclut la révolte, celle de l'enfant, otage impuissant, celle de Britannicus inconscient du drame où il n'est que figurant marqué pour la mort.

Pouvoir se révolter comme Mithridate, se redresser et lutter, c'est être libre encore. Mithridate, Xipharès, Joad, Acomat, Mardochée n'ont pas des visages de vaincus. Ils connaissent l'ennemi et le mesurent. Mais dans la fuite affolée de Burrhus et d'Agrippine, malgré leur retour et leur espoir final, le signe de la défaite est déjà visible. Défaite également dans la sou-

17. *Andromaque*, Acte IV, sc. 1, p. 165.

18. *Phèdre*, Acte II, sc. 1, p. 589.

mission haineuse qui marque le visage d'un Mathan et le distingue de celui d'Abner.

Dans ce jeu mortel de la puissance, de la volonté et de la liberté, les plus vulnérables des êtres, les plus dangereux aussi par les catastrophes qu'ils déclanchent, sont les êtres puissants mais sensibles et qui veulent arracher à d'autres un don volontaire. Ce don ils le veulent libre; et toutefois leur volonté refuse d'abdiquer, comme celle de Bérénice, quand cette liberté s'exerce dans le sens du refus. Ils deviennent alors tyrans, mais vulnérables, et en contradiction avec eux-mêmes. Ce sont eux qui dans la tragédie racinienne précipitent l'action dans l'incohérence, créant un déséquilibre, des remous, qu'ils ne dominent pas, se désintégrant en pleine action. Ce sont les jouets préférés du destin: Pyrrhus en face d'Andromaque, Hermione en face de Pyrrhus et d'Oreste; Oreste en face d'Hermione; Roxane en face de Bajazet; Pharnace et Mithridate en face de Monime, et sur un autre plan Athalie en face d'Eliacin. Et presque tous aboutissent fatalement, ou sont prêts à aboutir, à une double destruction. Ils détruisent d'abord l'obstacle matériel auquel leur volonté se heurte; puis s'apercevant que destruction n'est pas soumission, leur désir à jamais inassouvi se retourne violemment contre eux-mêmes; la mort ou la folie seules peuvent résoudre leur dilemme.

L'ordre et le désordre du monde racinien se résolvent aux confins de la mort et se réalisent dans le destin unique et particulier de chaque individu à partir de la réponse, lucide ou non, qu'il donne, dans l'absolu, et sans égards pour sa vie ou pour sa mort, à certaines exigences humaines profondes d'autant plus gratuites que tout en dehors de l'homme, et souvent au dedans, paraît les bafouer. Et c'est à cause de cela, d'abord, que ce théâtre est l'égal du grand théâtre de l'antiquité et reste, par sa puissance, sans rival dans notre littérature.

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LA BRUYÈRE AGAINST THE LIBERTINES

READERS AND STUDENTS of La Bruyère have been inclined to minimize, or even to deny completely, the importance of his religious convictions as set forth in the final chapter of his *Caractères*. This disparaging attitude toward the chapter *Des esprits forts* seems to go back to Sainte-Beuve, who admitted La Bruyère's sincerity but in the same breath attributed the chapter against the libertines to a desire for immunity from criticism, "... une précaution ménagée d'avance contre les attaques qui n'ont pas manqué."¹ Sainte-Beuve's rather contradictory view of La Bruyère—a devout Christian using his religion for self-protection—becomes even more paradoxical in his concluding remarks: "Malgré ses dialogues sur le quietisme . . . je serais tenté plutôt de soupçonner La Bruyère de liberté d'esprit que du contraire . . . En beaucoup d'opinions, comme en style, il se rejoint assez aisément à Montaigne."² Echoes of Sainte-Beuve's appraisal are to be found in Nisard,³ Taine,⁴ and all the modern biographers of La Bruyère.⁵ Certain critics, and notably Taine, struck by the contrast between La Bruyère's outspoken, almost revolutionary ridicule of social abuses and his colorless conservatism in matters of religion, have applied to him his famous epigram: "Un homme né chrétien et Français se trouve contraint dans la satire; les grands sujets lui sont défendus . . ."⁶ The consensus of opinion is that La Bruyère was not or did not dare to be a religious thinker, that he merely borrowed, perhaps sincerely, the theological reasoning of various seventeenth-century preachers and philosophers, and that he wrote the final chapter of his book mainly as a precautionary measure.⁷

1. Charles-Augustin Sainte-Beuve, *Portraits littéraires*, Paris, 1862 ed., I, 402.

2. *Ibid.*, I, 403.

3. Désiré Nisard, *Histoire de la littérature française*, 5th ed., Paris, 1874, III, 190.

4. Hippolyte Taine, *Nouveaux Essais de critique et d'histoire*, 5th ed., Paris, 1892, pp. 35-50.

5. Maurice Pellisson, *La Bruyère*, Paris, 1896, pp. 60-62; Paul Morillot, *La Bruyère*, Paris, 1904, p. 181; Gustave Michaut, *La Bruyère*, Paris, 1936. This study by Michaut is careful and scholarly but negative in its conclusions. Michaut defends the religious sincerity of La Bruyère (p. 214) and argues against the "self-protection" theory of Sainte-Beuve (pp. 215-216). On the other hand he dismisses very casually La Bruyère's own remarks on the chapter *Des esprits forts* (p. 210) and fails to see the importance of the chapter's chronological development.

6. Taine, *op. cit.*, p. 50. La Bruyère's epigram is now usually accepted as being a reference to Boileau. Cf. Ernest Havet's note in *Correspondance littéraire*, I (1857), 106-108.

7. This interpretation has been expressed very clearly by Lanson: "Ce chapitre, sincère évidemment, mais sans personnalité, et qui ne contient que le reflet des pensées des autres, n'est pas une conclusion où tout l'ouvrage aboutisse . . . Avec le chapitre du Souverain . . . il est destiné à désarmer les pouvoirs temporel et spirituel, à servir de passeport pour l'indépendante franchise de l'observation dans le reste des *Caractères*." *Histoire illustrée de la littérature française*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1923, II, 8.

If the chapter *Des esprits forts* is difficult to evaluate, La Bruyère himself must be blamed for having created the difficulty. In the first edition of his *Caractères*, in 1688, he did not attribute to this chapter any special importance. His preliminary remarks assert that his book aims only to make man reasonable and virtuous "par des voies simples et communes, et en l'examinant indifféremment, sans beaucoup de méthode et selon que les divers chapitres y conduisent, par les âges, les sexes et les conditions, et par les vices, les faibles et le ridicule qui y sont attachés."⁸ But six years later, in 1694, he insisted not only that his work had a planned unity of composition "dans l'ordre des chapitres et dans une certaine suite insensible des réflexions qui les composent,"⁹ but also that his chief purpose was to convert irreligious readers to a belief in God. This passage, which has raised much doubt concerning La Bruyère's sincerity, must be quoted at length:

. . . n'ont-ils [the readers] pas les premiers reconnu le plan et l'économie du livre des *Caractères*? n'ont-ils pas observé que de seize chapitres qui le composent, il y en a quinze qui s'attachant à découvrir le faux et le ridicule qui se rencontrent dans les objets des passions et des attachements humains, ne tendent qu'à ruiner tous les obstacles qui affaiblissent d'abord, et qui éteignent ensuite dans tous les hommes la connaissance de Dieu; qu'ainsi ils ne sont que des préparations au seizième et dernier chapitre, où l'athéisme est attaqué et peut-être confondu, où les preuves de Dieu, une partie du moins de celles que les faibles hommes sont capables de recevoir dans leur esprit, sont apportées, où la providence de Dieu est défendue contre l'insulte et les plaintes des libertins?¹⁰

It is important to bear in mind that La Bruyère made this declaration in the preface which he wrote for the published text of his speech before the French Academy, and that his preface is a violently bitter answer to attacks which his speech, and indeed all his writings, had occasioned. The controversial nature of La Bruyère's preface has led critics to disbelieve the author's claim concerning the religious purpose of his book. It is difficult to accept his statement at its face value but, on the other hand, is it wholly false? Is it merely a pious afterthought introduced to disarm his enemies, or does it contain some element of truth?

The best way to find an answer to such questions is to study the development of religious thought in successive editions of the *Caractères*. The problem consists essentially of two widely different interpretations of the book expressed by the author at two dates, the first appearing in the first edition of 1688, the second appearing in 1694 in the eighth or last revised edition. Leaving aside the related but infinitely complex question of

8. *Discours sur Théophraste*. In La Bruyère, *Œuvres complètes*, La Pléiade edition, Paris, 1934, p. 36.

9. *Les Caractères*, "Préface" (La Bruyère, *op. cit.*, p. 82).

10. *Discours prononcé dans l'Académie Française*, "Préface" (La Bruyère, *op. cit.*, pp. 505-506). This preface was first published in the 8th edition of the *Caractères* (1694).

the "suite insensible" in the plan of the *Caractères* as a whole, limiting ourselves as much as possible to the chapter *Des esprits forts*, we can watch the growth of La Bruyère's views on religion and perhaps decide whether religious instruction is an important or a negligible feature of his work.

Although La Bruyère almost tripled the content of his *Caractères* by adding new remarks in subsequent editions there are certain aspects of his book which remained unchanged from the very start. The sixteen chapter headings which he chose for the first edition continued, with one partial exception,¹¹ to serve the author's purposes as his work expanded, like a well-planned filing system which, once established, need never be revised. A similar constant factor (which has not received attention from scholars) is that in each chapter the first paragraph, or in some cases even the first three or four paragraphs, stayed in this position throughout the book's mutations. When La Bruyère first prepared his work for the press he evidently paid particular attention to the opening remarks of each chapter and, in later years, felt that they should not be superseded. In the chapter *Des esprits forts* the initial item presents the idea that the libertines are not really "esprits forts"; they are "esprits faibles"; they are plagued by doubt; they do not have clear and distinct ideas either about the nature of their soul or about the existence of a superior and perfect being. These lines announce one of the major themes of the chapter—the weakness of the libertines—and mention the two main metaphysical points which La Bruyère will attempt to argue; also they disclose at once his indebtedness to Descartes and Pascal who (together with Bossuet and other sacred orators) were the principal sources of his personal doctrine.

As we make our way through the first text of *Des esprits forts* we find three paragraphs on the seriousness of death,¹² a comment on people who are led to atheism by imitating arrogant noblemen (9), then a return to the theme that libertines lack clear convictions (10-13, 15-16). La Bruyère gives his unshakable belief that God must exist as proof that God does exist, then states as a corollary that there are no real atheists but merely people too lazy to think. Next we encounter one of those isolated or miscellaneous articles which do not fit into a general philosophical system, which do not seem to be imitations of Descartes or Pascal, and which are perhaps the most personal and sincere expression of La Bruyère's religious feelings. This one (19) conveys the idea that human beings, since they continually betray and persecute one another, must inevitably desire the existence of a God to whom they can turn for comfort or justice. Or again, here is a reflection (29) inspired by the visit of Siamese envoys to the French court in 1684: it is inconceivable that the Siamese could convert us

11. The chapter *Du souverain ou de la république* was called, in the first three editions, simply *Du souverain*.

12. Articles 6-8. The numbers cited are those of the complete *Caractères*, i.e. of the 8th or 9th edition, or of any modern edition.

to their religion, yet our missionaries win many converts in Siam and other pagan countries—doesn't this fact show that Christianity possesses the persuasive advantage of eternal truth?

In the remainder of the chapter La Bruyère plunges bravely into the realm of metaphysics. First he offers a group of articles (31-33, 35) suggested by the celebrated wager of Pascal: Christian belief is either true or false and a choice must be made; the only safe course is for us to accept our religion as true, to live virtuously, and to count on eternal life as our reward. Then he undertakes at length to prove God's existence by the Cartesian distinction between matter and spirit and by the fact of thought (36). La Bruyère says, in effect: "My soul, which thinks and is not matter, must have been created by some exterior, thinking, more perfect spirit." This reasoning is summarized in a formula which echoes but condenses drastically the system of Descartes: "En un mot, je pense; donc Dieu existe." La Bruyère's final argument, a series of articles (37-42) also based on Descartes, is intended to demonstrate the eternity of the soul. The last sentence of the chapter sums up the two major conclusions, God's existence and the soul's eternal life: "Je ne conçois point qu'une âme que Dieu a voulu remplir de l'idée de son être infini, et souverainement parfait, doive être anéantie."

This is not the place to study the interesting question of La Bruyère's use, or misuse, of Descartes and Pascal. His method was frankly one of popularization. Writing for a later generation, above all writing a work of literature for a public with worldly tastes, his purpose was simply: "plaire et instruire." He should not be criticized for gaps or inconsistencies in his reasoning any more than should La Fontaine or Molière. In fact he himself insisted on several occasions that he was not a philosopher and that he was merely presenting a few of the many available proofs of God's existence. If he seems shallow, if he abridges and distorts the rigorous reasoning of Descartes, if he weakens the anguished insights of Pascal, it is nevertheless a mistake to infer that his preaching was lukewarm or perfunctory.

What can be concluded from the nature of the chapter *Des esprits forts* as it appeared in the first edition of the *Caractères*? It consisted of twenty-four articles, a number which was about average; seven chapters had more, eight chapters had less. But some of its articles were extremely long—especially the Cartesian proof of God's existence—and this fact rendered the chapter the second longest in the book. Thus in the first edition, at a time when La Bruyère had no enemies to discredit, at a time when his own thoughts were presented merely as an appendix to his translation of Theophrastus, at a time when his book contained very few daring remarks which might need to be covered up (his chapter *De quelques usages*, ultimately the most seditious, consisted of only eighteen items, all of them very mild)—at this early date La Bruyère placed a very strong emphasis on the

necessity for believing in God and made an earnest effort to attract libertines to religion. The most striking feature of the chapter, already apparent in this first edition, is its seriousness of tone; it contains no playful satire, no ridicule of manners, no stylistic acrobatics, no portraits—nothing but straightforward argument, somewhat simplified for the lay reader but still highly theoretical and almost austere.

It is well known that the second and third editions of the *Caractères*, with the text unchanged, were published in the course of 1688, and that the fourth edition, with the text enlarged by over 300 new articles, appeared early in 1689. One wonders whether La Bruyère wrote in a single year all this additional material which almost doubled the size of his book. Probably many of the added remarks were composed around the time of the first edition or even before; some were doubtless excluded at first for reasons of economy, then inserted in the revised version when it had become apparent that such reflections satisfied a real demand. The fourth edition, in which the chapter *Des esprits forts* grew from 24 items to 31, does not necessarily represent a new stage in the author's thought.

The first new paragraph (14), badly placed amid a series of articles on the idea of a perfect being, states that justice, i.e. the punishment of evil-doers, affirms the existence of God. The theme of the weakness of unbelievers is enlarged in three articles (20-21, 23) contrasting them with the great theologians and church fathers. One of these items (23) comments on the difficulty of explaining God's perfection and mystery in logical, reasonable language—a thought which may refer to La Bruyère's own difficulty, or to the dryness of the theological treatises in general, or, as some editors have believed, to the rationalistic metaphysics of Malebranche. The only other new remarks are three short paragraphs (24-25, 28) devoted to certain abuses of religion by presumably pious people.

The fifth edition, published a year later, in 1690, brought another five articles to *Des esprits forts*. Three of them (3-5), placed near the beginning of the chapter, explain some of the causes of incredulity—attachment to material possessions, intellectual doubt because of the great number of conflicting religions, and a desire to differ from the common herd. The next new item (30) is an exhortation to Christians to do good even in small ways. Not all of us can be great preachers or missionaries, but perhaps we can help a doubting friend to see the light: "Quand on ne serait pendant sa vie que l'apôtre d'un seul homme, ce ne serait pas être en vain sur la terre, ni lui être un fardeau inutile." This thought, which seems to ring with sincerity, might almost be considered as La Bruyère's own motto for the final chapter of his book. The remaining new article (34) is an argument, probably inspired by Pascal (although Pascal would have seen the danger of using it), to prove divine providence by the beauty of Christian doctrine: it is inconceivable that such a perfect religion could be false, or that God could have invented it to play a joke on mankind.

The sixth edition of the *Caractères*, brought out in 1691, offered very few changes in the last chapter, merely two new paragraphs (2 and part of 8) on old themes: the spiritual weakness of the libertines and the seriousness of death. It is interesting to note, however, that in other parts of the book La Bruyère was giving more and more attention to religious subjects. In this edition the famous portrait of Onuphre, the pious hypocrite, was introduced (*De la mode*, 24). La Bruyère's attacks on the abuses of directors of conscience (*Des femmes*, 42) and on the artificiality of sacred orators (*De la chaire*, 20) were becoming distinctly stronger. It was in this edition, also, that he expressed his hearty approval for the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (*Du souverain ou de la république*, 21).

With the seventh edition, in 1692, a number of new departures are to be observed. After a brief comment on death (18) La Bruyère introduces the character of Lucile, a libertine whom he seeks to convert. He does not sketch the portrait of Lucile but he does argue with him and answer his objections. One senses that Lucile was invented for the sake of variety in the chapter's style—so that some of the remarks could be presented in the form of dialogue or debate. The first conversation with Lucile (22) deals with the life of Christ, which La Bruyère claims to be attested by far better evidence than the deeds of Caesar, and hence more worthy of belief. The next article (43) is a long essay, in ten bulky paragraphs, to prove the existence of God by the grandeur of the universe. La Bruyère found his inspiration, of course, in Pascal's argument of the "infinitely great" but he did not hesitate to revise his source, to enlarge on it, above all to modernize it. The author escorts Lucile on a tour of the universe, describing the sun, the planets, and the stars in terms of the latest astronomical discoveries, using technical words and vast numbers to impress his listener, then concludes that there must be a force behind the universe; this force is God. The following article (44) depicts the "infinitely small." La Bruyère takes as his example the mite or "ciron" which had been used by Pascal (and also by Fontenelle in his *Pluralité des mondes*) but again he goes beyond his sources and refers to the most recent discoveries of microscopic life. The third article (45) in this group declares that man is greater than the material universe; he is a thinking being (i.e. the "roseau pensant" of Pascal); after which La Bruyère cautiously avoids committing himself on the question of life on the moon, a hypothesis advanced in the *Pluralité des mondes* by Fontenelle. In another series of new remarks (47-49) La Bruyère replies to two atheistic objections, the problem of evil and the uneven distribution of wealth. Thus, after only moderate progress in the fourth, fifth, and sixth editions, the author has now resumed his attack on the libertines with great vigor, introducing additional metaphysical arguments, adopting a more concrete and persuasive literary technique, and arming himself with fresh weapons from the realm of science.

What were the reasons for this new campaign? One was probably the great wave of scientific discovery, which La Bruyère exploited but in which he saw the danger to religion. For these were the days of burgeoning scientific periodicals, of controversial developments in the field of biblical exegesis, of inquiries into the validity of oracles and miracles, of the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns. Another reason, undoubtedly, was the growth of "fausse dévotion" under a king who had become excessively pious in his waning years. It is worthy of note that, in this seventh edition, La Bruyère extended considerably his portrait of Onuphre and introduced his famous definition of a religious hypocrite: "Un dévot est celui qui, sous un roi athée, serait athée" (*De la mode*, 21).

The theme of hypocrisy, which has been gaining more and more intensity in other chapters, enters the chapter *Des esprits forts* in 1694, in the eighth edition, the last augmented version of the book. After a brief exhortation (17) for us to think of God while we are still in the prime of life, La Bruyère presents two articles (26, 27) in which he distinguishes between true libertinism and "fausse dévotion." It will be recalled that, in the early editions of his work, he denied the existence of atheism. Now, on the contrary, he concedes that there are real unbelievers, or at least people who sincerely think themselves to be unbelievers, and he frankly prefers them to courtiers who are falsely pious. Hypocrisy in matters of religion stirred La Bruyère to stronger contempt than perhaps any other of the many vices which he criticized in the society of his age. The only other addition to the chapter is an article (46) placed immediately after the passage on the nobility of man. Following the model of Pascal, La Bruyère now humbles man's vanity and presumption. The existence of imperfection or ugliness implies the existence of perfection; but whether ugly or beautiful all things are created by God; man in his weakness cannot create even a worm or a toad; the most powerful king cannot make a drop of dew. These thoughts are the last in the long series of additions to *Des esprits forts* and bring the text to the form which is familiar to modern readers.

Having witnessed the gradual evolution of La Bruyère's chapter against the libertines we can now attempt to assess the truth of the author's declaration concerning the religious purpose of his book. First there is the question of the order or architecture of the chapters. A careful study of the book as a whole might throw more light on this problem but, speaking at least provisionally, there seems to be no great significance in the fact that the chapter *Des esprits forts* was placed at the end of the volume. This is simply a natural hierarchy of subject matter, a place of honor given to a chapter dealing with God. Possibly one can see a logical progression to it from the next to last chapter, *De la chaire*, but, as La Bruyère himself said at the time of the first edition, the book was planned "sans beaucoup de méthode." And the order adopted in 1688 remained adequate for the author's needs in all the later versions. When he insists, in 1694, on the

meaningful position of the final chapter, he seems to be taking advantage of an almost fortuitous circumstance to strengthen his argument.

On the other hand, La Bruyère's statement must not be rejected as completely unreliable. In spite of mysterious references to the subtle pattern of his work, his only definite claim was that the first fifteen chapters differed from the final chapter, for which they were a sort of preparation. In this he was certainly justified. The first fifteen chapters are composed mainly of witty or satirical, sometimes cruelly penetrating, observations on the vices of society. But the chapter *Des esprits forts* never descends to negative or humorous criticism; it consists wholly of rational argument to win his readers to virtue and religion. Even if uninviting or unsuccessful it is a serious effort to counteract the evils described in earlier sections of the book. La Bruyère can perhaps be accused of incompetence as a religious thinker, but never of insincerity. No other part of the *Caractères* is more earnest, more clearly stamped with strong personal convictions.

It has been seen that the element of religious instruction, already very considerable in the modest first edition of the *Caractères*, increased with each succeeding edition and even acquired new themes and greater eloquence toward the end of the book's history. This natural, forward-moving development is not compatible with the view that La Bruyère included the final chapter primarily as a personal safeguard. The evidence indicates that he gave this chapter at least careful attention, sometimes laborious attention, at every stage in his career, in a word that he considered it always an essential feature of his work.

To be sure, certain other chapters, such as *De l'homme* and *Des jugements*, grew to greater proportions than this one, a fact which perhaps implies other interests more dominant than religion. La Bruyère undoubtedly did distort the truth when, in his preface of 1694, to silence his critics, he announced that the whole purpose of his book was to guide unbelievers toward religion. Yet this certainly constituted one of his purposes, and not the least important. Religious zeal was a permanent and significant facet of his many-sided personality. One does well (in spite of Sainte-Beuve) to remember that La Bruyère, the friend and disciple of Bossuet, spent the last months of his life preparing a series of dialogues to combat the heresy of Quietism. He did not feel "contraint dans la satire." Religious discussion was not, for him, a forbidden subject, because he had no doubts about the truth of his religion. His chapter *Des esprits forts*, far from being a pious pose or a dutiful gesture, reflects an eager desire to spread his faith for the benefit of mankind.

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MONTESQUIEU'S HISTORICAL CONCEPTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW

THREE differing conceptions of the term *fundamental law* appear in the *Esprit des lois* or in the comment of its critics. According to the first of these theories fundamental law is the law which inspired and gave form to the first and simplest organization of the state. It is this theory which Voltaire imputes to Montesquieu when he criticizes the *Esprit des lois*. A second view, espoused in at least one place by Voltaire, characterizes fundamental law as the law made by "la nation assemblée."¹ The third is the conception of the *Esprit des lois*, in which theories of government tend toward the idea that fundamental law derives from the nature of social institutions, constantly changes with them, and must therefore be historically defined. In the *Esprit des lois* certain functions of the nobility are considered so essential to the monarchy as to constitute an important part of its fundamental law. My purpose in this study is to show how the views of Montesquieu, together with the reactions of his critics, recrystallized in the eighteenth century two contrasting theories of monarchy in pre-revolutionary France.

Montesquieu declares that the institution of the grand vizier is the "loi fondamentale" of the despotism.² In his *Observations sur le livre intitulé l'Esprit des lois*, Claude Dupin retorts that the first grand vizier under the Caliphate did not appear for several hundred years after the Hegira. "Donc l'établissement d'un grand vizir dans les états que l'auteur appelle despotiques, n'est pas, comme il le prétend, une loi fondamentale de l'état."³ In the *Commentaire sur l'Esprit des lois* Voltaire adopts this

1. The sentence quoted *infra* (n. 5 and 6) implies that only "la nation assemblée" can create fundamental law. The requirement is consistent with decisions in the United States which distinguish between ordinary law, made by legislative bodies, and fundamental law, made by the people themselves in convention or otherwise. Voltaire can acknowledge fundamental law in the latter sense because it is not necessarily unchanging. His objections are directed against the conception of the fundamental law as law which may not be changed. *Commentaire sur l'Esprit des lois, Œuvres complètes*, Garnier (éd. Moland), XXX, 457-458.

2. Montesquieu's definition of the "Etat despotique" precludes any sharing of the governing power by the despot. If the state develops at all, while remaining a despotism, a vizier is chosen to act for and on the authority of the despot. Since one primary concern of fundamental law is the generic form and functioning of the government, the author thinks the vizier a part of that law in the despotism. His remarks do not imply that the despotie government will always have a vizier. However, normal historical development will generally require a vizier in that governmental form. "Il résulte de la nature du pouvoir despotique que l'homme seul qui l'exerce le fasse de même exercer par un seul. . . L'établissement d'un vizir est, dans cet Etat, une loi fondamentale." *De l'Esprit des lois*, Liv. II, ch. 5, *Œuvres complètes*, Garnier (éd. Laboulaye), III, 118.

3. The work was Claude Dupin's *Observations sur le livre intitulé l'Esprit des lois, en trois parties*, 1757-1758, 3 vols. in 8°. The book was reviewed by Plesse and Berthier with a preface by Madame Dupin. Cited in *Commentaire sur l'Esprit des lois, Œuvres complètes*, XXX, 435-436.

criticism, willfully imputing Dupin's idea of fundamental law to Montesquieu. He further declares that under such a theory the Mayors of the Palace would be fundamental in the old French monarchy.⁴ Voltaire's own remarks about the Salic Law show that, if he believed at all in the fundamental law, he was far from accepting Dupin's conception of it.

Montesquieu's position regarding the status of the Salic Law reveals the extent to which he took long periods of history into consideration for the determination of real fundamentals in law. Voltaire writes on this subject: "La plupart des hommes qui . . . ne connaissent la loi Salique que par les propos vagues du monde, s'imaginent que c'est une loi fondamentale, par laquelle autrefois la nation française assemblée exclut à jamais les femmes du trône." He follows this passage by a statement of the origin of the law⁵ according to which Clothaire promulgated the rule barring women from the French throne with the aim of preventing the succession of one of two nieces.⁶ This action was based on a passage in the law of the Salian Franks excluding daughters from the inheritance of the *sala* or dwelling and close of an ancestor. The regulation of this sort of property, which is a *franc alleu* tenure and not feudal, is detailed with fair thoroughness in the Salic Law. In the *Esprit des lois* the titles governing inheritance *des alleux* in the Salic Law are outlined in full including the clause concerning failure in direct line of descent, a feature mentioned also by Voltaire.⁷ Montesquieu states that the Salic Law, in limiting the inheritance of women, did not establish the French form of feudal tenure but that feudal tenure established limits on the succession of women and thus finally altered in that regard the Salic Law. "La loi Salique," he continues, "et la loi des Bourguignons ne donnèrent point aux filles le droit de succéder . . . à la couronne."⁸ Among the Visigoths, on the other hand, he points out, the right of girls to inherit land caused their right to the succession to the throne. A brief line of generalization at the end of the chapter of the Salic Law sums up a process which the writer sees to be universal in the establishment of fundamental law: "Chez ces peuples, la disposition de la loi civile força la loi politique."⁹

4. *Ibid.*

5. It must be born in mind that the Salic Law *proprement dite* is not the celebrated rule about the royal succession but a collection of the laws and practices of the Salian Franks which is important as a side-light on German society. It is in no sense even a fragmentary code. ("Ceux qui ont voulu y trouver une règle pour la succession du royaume se sont entièrement mépris et ont fort mal interprété le texte: *De terra nulla ad mulierem hereditas perveniat* où il s'agit simplement de l'héritage de la terre et l'on ne comprit plus la défense absolue de la loi Salique. On corrigea dès lors: *De terra salica nulla ad mulierem hereditas perveniat*; la femme restait simplement de l'héritage du *mansus indominicatus* qui entourait la maison."—C. Boyet, C. Pfister, and A. Kleinlausz, "Le Christianisme, les barbares mérovingiens et carolingiens" in Ernest Lavisse, *Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu'à la révolution*, Paris, 1903, II, 109.)

6. *Commentaire sur l'Esprit des lois, Œuvres complètes*, XXX, 457-458.

7. *De l'Esprit des lois*, Liv. XVIII, ch. 22, *Œuvres complètes*, IV, 285-286.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

Montesquieu has here demonstrated that the *loi fondamentale* is more nearly the product of history and usage than the result of unanimous enactment or of mere conservation of principles inherent in primitive organization. He might have cited further examples of the exclusion of female heirs to the throne. This limitation on the royal succession is today accepted as part of the fundamental law of the French Monarchy.¹⁰

However, the core of Montesquieu's fundamental law in the French monarchy is the special position of the nobles. "Il ne suffit pas qu'il y ait, dans une monarchie, des rangs intermédiaires; il faut encore un dépôt de lois," we read in the chapter on the English government. "L'ignorance naturelle à la noblesse, son inattention, son mépris pour le gouvernement civil, exigent qu'il y ait un corps qui fasse sans cesse sortir les lois de la poussière où elles seroient ensevelies."¹¹ Here the "corps intermédiaires" are the nobles in their particular classes. The specific bodies which serve as a "dépôt de lois" are the parlements where the nobles of the robe use the rights of remonstrance and registration. Elsewhere he eulogizes "cet état de la robe qui se trouve entre la grande noblesse et le peuple; qui sans avoir le brillant de celle-là, en a tous les privilèges; cet état qui laisse les particuliers dans la médiocrité, tandis que le corps dépositaire des lois est dans la gloire . . ."¹² The *raison d'être* of the passages on England was the desire to hold before French eyes a clear picture of political equilibrium conditioned, in France, on the correctional powers of the nobles of the robe. For the latter phenomenon was the hallmark of France which distinguished her constitution from others as wings distinguish a bird from a beast.

In the *Esprit des lois* this dominance of the nobles is partly based on the fact of the Frankish invasion which pushed the Gallo-Romans into the servile or *roturier* class to make way for a Germanic nobility. The author even labors to prove that a species of feudalism had existed among the Franks in the German homeland where "il y avoit des vassaux, et non pas des fiefs. Il n'y avoit point de fiefs, parce que les princes n'avoient point de terres à donner; ou plutôt les fiefs étoient des chevaux de bataille, des armes, des repas."¹³ A retort of Voltaire to this passage is: "Quelle idée! Il n'y a pas de vassalité sans terre. Un officier à qui son général aura donné à souper n'est pas pour cela son vassal."¹⁴ The Abbé Dubos, remarking that the Gallo-Romans lived according to Roman Law even under Merovingians,¹⁵ declared that while the division of the Gauls into three classes or orders had

10. Declareuil, J., *Histoire du droit français des origines à 1789*, Paris, 1925, p. 400.

11. *De l'Esprit des lois*, Liv. II, ch. 4, *Œuvres complètes*, III, 117. Cf. Comte Henri de Boulainvilliers, *Histoire de l'ancien gouvernement français*, Amsterdam, 1737, 2 vols., I, 320.

12. *De l'Esprit des lois*, Liv. XX, ch. 22, IV, 391.

13. *De l'Esprit des lois*, Liv. XXX, ch. 3, *Œuvres complètes*, V, 420.

14. *Dictionnaire philosophique*, *Œuvres complètes*, XX, 10.

15. Jean Baptiste Dubos, *Histoire de l'établissement de la monarchie française dans les Gaules*, Paris, chez la veuve Ganeau, rue S. Jacques, 1742, 2 vols., II, 486 ff.

subsisted under the Frankish kings,¹⁶ the Franks, with the exception of the slaves, composed a single social order.¹⁷ His conclusion was based on laws regulating the composition money for the death of the Roman "possesseur" and the Roman "tributaire," but, as he alleged, providing a single sum for the death of any Frank.¹⁸ Montesquieu declares that Dubos simply left out of account the "antrustions"¹⁹ and shows distinctions in criminal penalties between privileged and unprivileged Franks.²⁰

The author of the *Esprit des lois* refers feelingly to Dubos' statements above as "cette prétention injurieuse au sang de nos premières familles . . . [et] aux trois grandes maisons qui ont successivement régné sur nous."²¹ Indeed the *germanisme* of Montesquieu was appreciated by his contemporaries and Voltaire turned it into ridicule. In his copy of the *Esprit des lois* a marker carries the note: "Nos pères les anciens Germains" opposite the page which shows the same words in the text.²² Reciting briefly in the *Commentaire* the homicidal crimes of *Gondebaud l'arien* he adds: "C'étaient là les mœurs des Francs et ce que Montesquieu appelle des manières."²³ Elsewhere magnanimously excepting Montesquieu, Voltaire attacks the "prétendus historiens" addicted to the use of "nous," "nos aïeux" and "nos pères" whenever the Franks are discussed. "L'abbé Velly dit nous," he writes. "Hé, mon ami es-tu bien sûr que tu descendes d'un Franc? Pourquoi ne serais-tu pas d'une pauvre famille gauloise?"²⁴ Branding a number of Germanic chiefs whose moderation is mentioned in the *Esprit des lois* as "barbare," "monstre," "scélérat," he terminates with the statement: "Et Montesquieu de Bordeaux appelle ces gens-là nos pères."²⁵ Nor will Voltaire believe with his great contemporary that the feudal period is "un événement arrivé une fois dans le monde, et qui n'arrivera peut-être jamais . . ."²⁶—not "quand la diète de Ratisbonne est assemblée."²⁷

In the mind of Montesquieu the *germanisme* of the French nobility and their arrival in Gaul as conquerors confirmed historically the fundamentals of monarchy in France. Athwart his path stood the Abbé Dubos' *Etablis-*

16. *Ibid.*, II, 503 ff.

17. *Ibid.*, II, 434-435.

18. *Ibid.*, II, 425, citing *Leg. Sal.*, Tit. 44.

19. *De l'Esprit des lois*, Liv. XXX, ch. 25, *Œuvres complètes*, V, 492.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*, p. 490.

22. Note on marker inserted in Voltaire's copy of *De l'Esprit des lois* at Leningrad (Edition de Leyde, 1749) and referring to the lines: "Nos pères, les anciens Germains habitoient un climat où les passions étoient très-calmes." *De l'Esprit des lois*, Liv. XIV, ch. 14, *Œuvres complètes*, IV, 170. This note is one of several interesting marginalia furnished the writer from the Leningrad Library by Professor Edith Phillips. It is a pleasure to acknowledge this kindness again.

23. *Commentaire sur l'Esprit des lois*, *Œuvres complètes*, XXX, 453.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 434.

25. *Ibid.*

26. *De l'Esprit des lois*, Liv. XXX, ch. 1, *Œuvres complètes*, V, 415.

27. *Dictionnaire philosophique*, *Œuvres complètes*, XX, 10.

ment de la monarchie française with its theory of Frankish subrogation to Roman rights in Gaul and consequent emphasis on King and Third Estate as fundamental in the French monarchy.²⁸ This position had been held by Bodin, by Audigier and Laccary in the seventeenth century and by Legendre de Saint Aubin in the eighteenth.²⁹ The position of Dubos was natural also to Voltaire; it rationalized the grandeur of Louis XIV and acclaimed him heir of the Holy Roman Empire. "M. l'abbé Dubos veut ôter toute espèce d'idée," writes Montesquieu, "que les Francs soient venus dans les Gaules en conquérants: selon lui, nos rois . . . n'ont fait que se mettre à la place, et succéder aux droits des empereurs romains."³⁰ Voltaire: "Dubos dit tout le contraire: il prouva que Clovis employa les armes, les négociations, les traités et même les concessions des empereurs romains résidents à Constantinople pour s'emparer d'un pays abandonné."³¹ There were certainly, in the theory of the *Etablissement*, more "traités," "négociations" and "concessions" than armed encounters.³² Dubos even points out that the treaties were not only concluded with the Eastern Empire but afterwards ratified by Justinian at the restoration of the Western Empire.³³ Voltaire confirms this barbarian tenderness for Roman feelings and points out that it was not until after the legal cession of Gaul to the Franks that the latter would presume to coin money on their own authority.³⁴ In an attempt to belittle the conquest he further points out, basing his remark on the Salic Law, that the invading Franks were very few in number.³⁵

In reaching the theory of the subsistence of Roman authority in the garb of Frankish power, Dubos essayed to prove not only that Clovis had been formally constituted successor to the Roman Emperor, but that he had

28. Dubos, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

29. Elie Carcassonne, *Montesquieu et le problème de l'ancienne Constitution française*, Paris, 1917, p. 89.

30. *De l'Esprit des lois*, Liv. XXX, ch. 24, *Œuvres complètes*, V, 485.

31. *Dictionnaire philosophique*, *Œuvres complètes*, XX, 11-12.

32. "Dès la première année de la guerre gothique, l'Ostrogoth . . . voyant bien qu'il ne pouvait point faire tête à la fois aux Romains d'orient et aux Francs, céda les Gaules entières, qui étaient à sa dépendance, à ces derniers. Non seulement les Romains ne se trouvèrent point alors en état de traverser cette cession, mais il fallait encore que Justinien, qui ne voulait donner aux Francs aucun sujet de lui déclarer la guerre, confirmât, par un acte authentique la cession dont je viens de parler." Dubos, *op. cit.*, II, 356-357.

33. Dubos is at great pains to explain certain alleged fundamental laws of the Empire, after its division under Theodosius, in order to show that the diplomatic precautions of the Frankish kings may have been directed toward the establishment of their own legitimacy as successors to Roman authority. Thus the confirmation of their authority by Justinian was necessary because "C'était à l'Empereur d'Orient qu'il appartenait de disposer du partage d'occident lorsqu'il venait à vacquer." According to Dubos Rome did not falter in the observance of this rule until at the time of the coronation of Charlemagne when the throne was occupied in the orient by Empress Irène. It was considered legal to disregard Constantinople at this time because the Eastern Empire had broken the fundamental law by seating a woman on the throne. A Roman emperor is credited with the statement "l'Empire ne tombait en quenouille." *Ibid.*, II, 387-408, *passim*.

34. *Dictionnaire philosophique*, *Œuvres complètes*, XX, 12-13.

35. *Commentaire sur l'Esprit des lois*, *Œuvres complètes*, XXX, 449 ff.

used that authority against Germanic tribes rebelling against Rome. For proof of Clovis' Roman status Dubos had relied on a complimentary letter of Saint-Remi to the King of the Franks which had a prominent place in the *Monarchie française*.³⁶ Voltaire criticizes Montesquieu for misquoting Dubos, to the effect that Clovis succeeded his father Chilperic in the dignity of *Maître de la milice romaine* in Gaul, when, as a matter of fact, the author's words are that Clovis came into that prerogative held by his father, a short time after his own accession to the kingship.³⁷ Voltaire admits the shadowy nature of this emolument when he states that it was frequently bestowed on one barbarian tribe in order to check the ravages of another.³⁸ Citing Gregory of Tours the author of the *Monarchie française* declares that Clovis was made consul by the Emperor Anastasius. He adds on no stated authority that the Frankish king had been made proconsul also. When he introduces this subject Dubos writes: "Nous voici arrivés à un événement de la vie de Clovis qui fut peut-être après son baptême celui qui contribua le plus à l'établissement de la *Monarchie française*."³⁹

The letter of Saint-Remi to Clovis which is supposed to document the main position is full of cautious exhortations addressed by the Bishop to a young monarch. It also contains the sentence: "Nous apprenons de la renommée que vous vous êtes chargé de l'administration des affaires de la guerre et je ne suis pas surpris de vous voir être ce que vos pères ont été."⁴⁰ These lines, far from definitive on the subject, are the only ones which could refer to the establishment of Clovis as a Roman *maître de la milice*. Since the letter was written at the time of Clovis' contemplated attack on the Roman official Syagrius in Gaul it probably represents a timely gesture of conciliation by a menaced Christian bishop.⁴¹ Speaking of this letter Voltaire simply restates the sense of the *Monarchie française*: "On voit par cette lettre que Clovis, jeune roi des Francs, était officier de l'Empereur Zenon, qu'il était grand maître, colonel-général . . . Montesquieu a grand tort de se moquer tant de l'abbé Dubos et de faire semblant de le mépriser."⁴² Characterizing Saint-Remi's letter as a simple "félicitation" Montesquieu asks: "Quand l'objet d'un écrit est connu, pourquoi lui en donner un qui ne l'est pas?"⁴³

In further support of his theory advocating Frankish continuation of Roman power, Dubos emphasized the existence of an "Armorican Republic" in Gaul against which Clovis had been compelled to uphold the authority of Rome. The author of the *Esprit des lois* disposes of the Abbé's hypo-

36. Dubos, *op. cit.*, I, 621-622.

37. *De l'Esprit des lois*, Liv. XXX, ch. 24, *Œuvres complètes*, V, 487.

38. *Dictionnaire philosophique*, *Œuvres complètes*, XX, 12-13.

39. Dubos, *op. cit.*, II, 219.

40. *Ibid.*, I, 622.

41. Voltaire calls Clovis a traitor and a rebel for attacking Syagrius.—*Commentaire sur l'Esprit des lois*, *Œuvres complètes*, XXX, 451-452.

42. *Dictionnaire philosophique*, *Œuvres complètes*, XX, 13.

43. *De l'Esprit des lois*, Liv. XXX, ch. 24, *Œuvres complètes*, V, 487.

thesis on this subject as follows: "il y a bien de la différence entre prouver par une page de Zosime, que sous l'Empire d'Honorius, la contrée armorique et les autres provinces des Gaules, se révoltèrent et formèrent une espèce de république; et faire voir que, malgré les diverses pacifications des Gaules, les Armoriques formèrent toujours une république particulière, qui subsista jusqu'à la conquête de Clovis."⁴⁴ In the *Dictionnaire philosophique* Voltaire begins his comment on the above passage as follows: "Montesquieu reproche à Dubos qu'il ne saurait montrer l'existence de la république armoricaine." However, the statement of the *Esprit des lois* is that this shadowy "république" did not survive from the day of Honorius to the conquest of Clovis. "Cependant," continues Voltaire, "Dubos l'a prouvé incontestablement par cette citation exacte de l'historien Zosime."⁴⁵ Jullian, author of the *Histoire de la Gaule*, points out that the text mentioned is the only one known which mentions or refers to an "Armorican Republic."⁴⁶

In what Voltaire has to say on the subject of the conquest there is evidence of a straining on his part toward agreement with Dubos. The theory of Clovis' status as "maître de la milice romaine" supported by Saint-Remi's letter and of the defeat of a hypothetical "Armorican Republic" by the Frankish King in defense of Roman sovereignty added to the authority of the French King by making him the heir of the Caesars. In the face of Montesquieu's position the effect was to proclaim the King and not the nobles the essential power in modern France. From the viewpoint of the *Esprit des lois* a real conquest of the Gallo-Romans by the Franks rationalized the dominance of the nobles in France, since feudalism, as Montesquieu maintains, was Germanic in origin. The nobility being essential in the system of the *Esprit des lois*, to serve as a "dépot de lois," it was to the interest of that system not to admit the defeat of the Armorican Republic by Clovis as "maître de la milice" and to oppose the theory of Frankish subrogation to the governing right of Rome in Gaul. Carcassonne remarks concerning Montesquieu's Germanic theories: "son germanisme, moins hautain que celui de Boulainvilliers n'est guère moins absolu."⁴⁷

44. *Ibid.*, p. 486. Cf. Dubos, *op. cit.*, I, 213 ff.

45. The passage cited is: "Totus tractus armoricus, coetereaue Gallorum provinciae Brittanos imitatae, consimili se modo liberarunt ejectis magistratibus romanis, et sua quadam republica pro arbitrio constituta"—Zosime, *Histoire*, Liv. VI.—*Dictionnaire philosophique*, Œuvres complètes, XX, 12. Cf. Cousin, *Histoire romaine écrite par Xiphilin, par Zonare, et par Zosime, traduite sur les originaux grecs par Monsieur Cousin, Président de la cour des Monnoyes*, suivant la copie imprimée chez la veuve de Damien Foucault, Paris, 1686, Liv. VI, p. 791. (The author was Louis Cousin who died in 1707 and is buried in the church of the Abbaye de Saint-Victor—see Germain Brice, *Description de la ville de Paris*, Paris, chez Francois Fournier, 8^e éd, 1725, 4 vols., II, 365 ff.)

46. "C'est en effet le point faible de la théorie de Dubos. La prétendue confédération armoricaine est connue seulement par un texte de Zosime." Jullian, *Extraits de l'Esprit des lois et des œuvres diverses de Montesquieu*, Hachette, 1913, 231 f.

47. Boulainvilliers is the Comte Henri de Boulainvilliers, author of the *Histoire de l'ancien gouvernement français*, 1734, to which Montesquieu refers frequently in his criticism of Dubos. Carcassonne, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

His conclusions about the theories of the *Esprit des lois* and of the *Monarchie française* on the Frankish invasion are equally convincing: "Dubos avait faussé l'histoire des origines par son chimérique système d'alliances et de capitulations: Montesquieu voit la réalité, c'est à dire le choc sanglant des peuples."⁴⁸

Voltaire's remarks on the modern functions of the parlements in the French monarchy carry further his opposition to the dominance of the nobility and to the *germanisme* of Montesquieu. Here his admiration for the English House of Commons and his appreciation of its sovereignty have influence. He does not recognize in the parlements any right to act as a "dépôt de lois," to check or veto legislation or to participate otherwise in lawmaking. "Ceux qui ont prétendu que la juridiction appelée parlement," he writes, "s'assemblant deux fois par an pour rendre la justice, était une continuation des anciens parlements de France, paraissent être tombés dans une erreur volontaire, qui n'est fondée que sur une équivoque."⁴⁹ He then traces the "équivoque" to a dispensation of Louis IX, who introduced the custom of holding "petits parloirs" in which certain law-cases concerning prelates were tried because the jurisdiction of the *baillis du roi* was not adequate. The term parlement, he says, was almost immediately applied to these royal assises.⁵⁰ What became of the real parlement, the body which Voltaire describes as an "assemblée de la nation?" The answer to this question shows the salient difference in his opinions from those of Montesquieu. "Comme on avait appelé du nom de parlements ces parloirs du roi, ces conseils ou il ne s'agissait pas des intérêts de l'état," he explains, "les vrais parlements, c'est à dire les assemblées de la nation ne furent plus connus que sous le nom d'états généraux, nom beaucoup plus convenable, puisqu'il exprimait à la fois les représentants de la nation entière et les intérêts publics. Philippe (le Bel) appela pour la première fois le tiers état à ces grandes assemblées."⁵¹ He cites numerous examples to show the atrophy of the celebrated right of remonstrance, even in the earlier period of the monarchy; among others the reply of Jean de la Vacquerie to a suggestion that the Parlement authorize Charles VIII to rule as a minor: "Le parlement est pour rendre justice au peuple; les finances, la guerre, le gouvernement du roi ne sont point de son ressort" (January 10, 1484).⁵² The *Etats*

48. *Ibid.*

49. *Histoire du Parlement de Paris, Œuvres complètes*, XV, 457; cf. *L'Equivoque, Œuvres complètes*, XXVII, 421-424.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 453.

51. *Ibid.*

52. In the reign of Louis XV when the functions of the parlement were the subject of bitter recriminations, Voltaire contributed substantially to the triumph of the ministry. According to Wagnière, the *Histoire du Parlement de Paris* (1769) was written at ministerial instigation. The essay *Les Peuples au parlement* (1771), which assumes parliamentary usurpations based on the *équivoque*, becomes really a tract in the controversy. The Chancellor Maupeou is responsible for one of many editions current in 1771.—*Histoire du Parlement de Paris, Œuvres complètes*, XV, 481. Cf. *Les Peuples au*

généraux were the original parlements; the *Etats généraux* were the real check on royal policies. If anything belonged to the constitution of the French monarchy, according to the author of the *Histoire du Parlement de Paris*, it was this body which, while representing the people, shared sovereignty with the monarch.

Voltaire understood Montesquieu's idea of fundamental law; it is in vain that he seeks to ascribe to the *Esprit des lois* an almost primitivist conception of the term. The truth is that Montesquieu saw legal fundamentals changing to keep pace with history. With a jurist's love of security he may have been slower in recognizing change and he sought the roots of law in the past. But the concept of change is dominant in his method. On the other hand Voltaire saw change as the great imperative — change that was too rapid to admit of permanent fundamentals. That is why, in so many passages, after detailing the kaleidoscopic governmental changes in European states, he writes again and again: "Il n'y a pas de loi fondamentale"; excepting, he admits elsewhere, "les lois de la nature posées par Dieu même" and "la véritable loi fondamentale qui est d'être libre."⁵³

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parlement, *Œuvres complètes*, XXVIII, 413; *Lettre au duc de Richelieu*, 20 mai 1771, *Œuvres complètes*, XLVII, 433.

53. *Commentaire sur l'Esprit des lois*, *Œuvres complètes*, XXX, 457. Cf. *Essai sur les mœurs*, XII, 14, and *L'A, B, C*, XXVI, 380-381.

PIERRE LASSERRE, GÖTTE ET NIETZSCHE

PIERRE LASSERRE, l'auteur du *Romantisme français* et de *La Jeunesse d'Ernest Renan*, a fortement subi, à un moment de sa jeunesse, l'influence de Götte et de Nietzsche. Les pages dans lesquelles il a consigné ses affinités électives avec l'auteur du *Faust* et le créateur du *Zarathoustra* intéressent l'histoire littéraire à plus d'un titre, car elles constituent à la fois un document sur la formation de leur auteur, et une contribution utile à la connaissance de Götte et de Nietzsche en France à la fin du siècle dernier.

Lasserre a lui-même raconté à la suite de quelles circonstances il avait été amené à prolonger en Allemagne une éducation philosophique qui avait exigé de lui une étude intensive de Kant et des autres métaphysiciens allemands alors en grande faveur à l'Université.¹ Ayant brillamment passé les épreuves de l'agrégation de philosophie en 1892, il avait été, un an plus tard, nommé à St. Briec. Son imagination était alors hantée par l'exemple et le prestige de Renan dont la mort récente avait laissé sur lui une impression ineffaçable.² Et si, en Bretagne, il put effectivement suivre la trace de son auteur préféré et s'imprégner de l'ambiance de sa patrie "réelle,"³ son esprit ne laissait d'être obsédé par le pays qui avait été, pendant longtemps, la patrie "idéale" de Renan, ce foyer de la science et de la philosophie où il avait cru pénétrer comme dans un temple. D'ailleurs, dans les milieux officiels, le prestige de l'Allemagne pour tout ce qui touche aux disciplines de l'esprit était resté aussi grand, en cette fin de siècle, qu'il l'avait été au temps de Mme de Staël et de Quinet. A l'Université, on croyait encore assez généralement "qu'on se perfectionne dans la philosophie au pays de Kant et de Hegel comme on se perfectionne dans les arts plastiques et la musique au pays de Raphaël et de Cimarosa."⁴ Les rapports enthousiastes qui circulaient aussi sur les représentations wagnériennes qui se donnaient en Allemagne agissaient également sur l'imagination de Lasserre, assoiffée autant de musique que de philosophie, et lui faisaient souhaiter plus ardemment encore de prolonger ses années d'apprentissage dans les universités et les salles de concert d'outre-Rhin. Une demande pour une bourse de voyage qu'il adressa, dans ce sens, au ministre de l'instruction publique, resta d'abord infructueuse. Louis Liard, qui était alors directeur de l'Enseignement Supérieur, ayant consulté le dossier du nouvel agrégé, y avait trouvé la consignation de son succès matériel accompagnée de quelques

1. Cf. *Mes Routes*, Paris, Plon, 1924, pp. iii sq.

2. Cf. *Renan et nous*, Paris, Grasset, 1923, p. 242: "Aucun des grands esprits que j'ai vus disparaître n'a laissé dans mon imagination un pareil sillage."

3. Cf. *L'Action Française*, 3 novembre 1908.

4. *Mes Routes*, p. iii. Principe discutable, selon Lasserre, qui ajouta plus tard que l'on n'a besoin ni de Berlin ni de Rome pour bien philosopher et bien peindre. Mais à l'époque dont il s'agit, on pensait autrement.

réserve ou, comme a dit Lasserre, de "quelques insinuations de méfiance."⁵ Cette hésitation ne fut pas toutefois de longue durée, car Renan vint au secours de son disciple d'une manière inattendue. Lors de la publication, en 1895, de l'étude sur Renan par Gabriel Séailles, *La Revue Philosophique* de Ribot demanda à Lasserre un compte-rendu de ce livre. Le jeune professeur en profita pour développer quelques considérations sur "l'idée d'humanité" telle qu'elle se dégage de l'œuvre et de la pensée renaniennes, et il fut agréablement surpris de recevoir, peu après, une lettre fort élogieuse de Louis Liard lui annonçant un revirement d'intention en sa faveur et lui accordant la bourse qu'il avait demandée. Le ministre, paraît-il, avait conclu, à la lecture de l'article, que son auteur, "pour un noceur, ne manquait pas de sérieux."

I

Muni de sa bourse de voyage, Lasserre quitta Paris au début de 1896 et passa deux années en Allemagne partagées entre Munich, Heidelberg et Berlin, "deux années exemptes de soucis, où je goûtai," a-t-il dit, "comme cela ne devait plus m'être donné par la suite, aux joies de la liberté."⁶ A son départ de France, il ignorait totalement l'allemand. Il se mit à l'étude de cette langue avec ardeur et, au bout de six mois, il était capable de soutenir convenablement une conversation. Il puisa toute sa science dans un exemplaire de *Dichtung und Wahrheit* dont il apprit un tiers par cœur.⁷ Mais si, contrairement à ce qu'il s'était proposé et à ce que ses maîtres espéraient de lui, il se montra, pendant la durée de son séjour outre-Rhin, plus assidu aux représentations de Wagner qu'aux cours de philosophie, ce n'est pas qu'il se désintéressât volontairement de la matière de ses études. La raison en est tout autre et tient simplement au fait que l'enseignement des universités germaniques se révéla, au contact de la réalité, fort au-dessous de la réputation dont il jouissait à l'étranger. A Heidelberg, Ernst Kuno Fischer qui avait succédé à la chaire de Zeller, et qui était célèbre dans le monde entier pour ses qualités d'historien et de commentateur, fit sur lui l'impression "d'un vieillard de beaucoup de vigueur et de carrure, d'un esprit très savant, assez gros, d'une forte médiocrité."⁸ Et ce qui contribua davantage à dissiper les illusions qu'il s'était faites sur la valeur de ces études, c'étaient les manifestations tangibles du pangermanisme naissant dont il observait l'expression non mitigée chez ceux-là mêmes qui étaient

5. "Lachelier, auprès de qui plusieurs de mes maîtres de la Faculté s'étaient amicalement informés de la marche de mes épreuves, leur avait répondu que j'avais l'air d'un noceur . . . Ce que je sais, c'est que, en fait de noce, je passais mes nuits, depuis un an, sur la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote et la *Critique de la raison pure*." *Op. cit.*, pp. iv-v.

6. *Ibid.*, p. vi.

7. "Je me servais du vocabulaire de Goethe avec d'énormes fautes grammaticales. Jamais je n'ai tant énoncé de vérités premières pour la simple raison que le lieu commun m'était plus aisé à exprimer dans cette langue étrangère que les nuances raffinées de la pensée." *Ibid.*, pp. xiii-xiv.

8. *Ibid.*, p. vii.

censés professer en politique, sinon un idéalisme largement humanitaire, du moins un libéralisme quelque peu pondéré. Les professeurs d'université, tout comme les simples instituteurs, les gens de lettres et les artistes qu'il rencontrait, faisaient ouvertement devant lui l'apologie d'un prussianisme aussi brutal que sommaire, et certains d'entre eux poussaient même l'acharnement jusqu'à lui vouloir prouver que la défaite de 1870 avait été "très bienfaisante pour la France."⁹ Aussi la conception d'une Allemagne éprise de rêve et de pensée pure, qu'il avait puisée dans Taine et Renan, fut-elle remplacée, au contact des gens et des choses, par une notion plus précise ou, si l'on veut, moins livresque. Mais, heureusement, l'aliment intellectuel que les universités allemandes n'avaient su lui dispenser, il le trouva au contact de certains livres dont l'enseignement exerça sur lui une influence décisive et profonde. A Heidelberg même, dont la science aride l'avait laissé totalement indifférent, il lut pour la première fois dans le texte, au cours de l'été de 1896, le *Faust* de Goethe qui devint dès lors, et devait le rester par la suite, un de ses livres de chevet.¹⁰ Lasserre trouva dans le héros de Goethe l'incarnation même du démon de la connaissance dont il se sentait lui-même animé, un esprit aussi cruellement dévoré que lui par "cette inquiétude qui remplit et agite l'âme humaine quand elle se replie sur soi pour s'interroger . . . quand elle compare ce qu'elle est et peut à ce qu'elle se sent intérieurement aiguillonnée à vouloir être et pouvoir."¹¹ C'est sans doute à cette époque qu'il médita l'interprétation toute personnelle du *Faust*, qu'il publia à son retour en France, et dont on ne saurait s'exagérer l'importance dans l'histoire de son esprit si l'on pense au ton d'adhésion et à la flamme dont elle est animée.¹²

9. *Ibid.*, p. xiv. En littérature, il trouva que les deux écrivains français que la plupart des lettrés germaniques mettaient au-dessus de tous les autres, étaient Claude Tillier et Gobineau. "A la bizarrerie de leurs admirations en matière de littérature française, les Allemands joignaient la prétention de connaître mieux que nous nos vrais génies et de nous les révéler." *L'Action Française*, 30 avril 1911.

10. Cf. *Faust en France, et autres études*, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1929, pp. i-ii.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16. A cette première attitude de Faust, qui exerça une forte séduction sur lui, comme elle avait fortement agi sur la première génération du romantisme, Lasserre consacra plus tard quelques pages significatives de sa thèse (cf. dans *Le Romantisme français*, le chapitre intitulé "La Chimère de l'Esprit: Faust," pp. 94-103). Pour Legrelle aussi, dans l'essai qu'il publia sur le même sujet en 1862 dans *La Revue de l'Instruction Publique*, ce qui fait la vie et le pathétique du héros de Goethe, c'est "l'inquiétude incessante de la pensée humaine, le besoin et le tourment des aspirations idéales . . . la torture sans trêve d'une activité dévorante." Cité par F. Baldensperger, *Goethe en France*, Paris, Hachette, 1904, p. 233.

12. Cette étude parut sous le titre d'"Introduction au *Faust* de Goethe" dans *Le Mercure de France* de septembre 1898 (pp. 652-672), et fut réimprimée la même année en tête des *Pages choisies de Goethe* (pp. 1-15), que Lasserre publia, en collaboration avec Paul Baret, à la Librairie Armand Colin. Elle fut recueillie seize ans plus tard, avec de légers développements, dans *Portraits et discussions* (Paris, Mercure de France, 1914, pp. 125-154), — le seul de ses écrits que Lasserre ait jugé digne d'être imprimé trois fois — indication de l'influence énorme que l'œuvre de Goethe a exercé sur lui. "Depuis que je m'étais rendu capable de la lire en allemand," écrivit-il en 1924, "il n'est guère de sujet que je n'eusse pu illustrer avec les textes de cette Bible" (*Mes Routes*, p. xvii). Deux ans

Selon Lasserre, ce que Goethe a voulu exprimer dans la première partie de son poème,

c'est, pour employer un mot célèbre de Renan, *l'encéphalite* d'une adolescence ivre d'orgueil intellectuel et de confiance en la pensée; c'est cet idéalisme d'un jeune cerveau très fort qui se flatte de pouvoir fonder exclusivement la vie sur la connaissance, réaliser l'accord actif de ses sentiments et de sa conduite avec la vérité universelle; et c'est aussi la prompte déception réservée à cet idéalisme.¹³

Faust qui, à quarante ans, avait tout lu mais n'avait pas encore vécu, fera, sous l'égide de Méphistophélès, l'apprentissage de la vie par la faute, car Goethe, loin de nourrir une conception facilement optimiste de l'existence, se faisait au contraire une notion sévère et tragique du mal, puisqu'il a compris que "l'homme ne se forge un peu de sagesse qu'au feu de la souffrance":

L'homme ne fait rien de bien spontanément; il faut qu'il se soit trompé. Une conscience ne s'assagit et ne s'élève, n'acquiert quelque empire sur la destinée, qu'en réfléchissant sur ses erreurs. Pour Goethe, l'individu ne progresse en bonté et en puissance que par une série de renoncements et de recommencements nécessaires. Il n'a pas eu ce sentiment passivement olympien et impassible, que les "pauvres d'esprit" lui prêtent, de la destinée humaine, mais un sentiment tragique. L'esprit de Goethe était tragique par la profondeur de son naturalisme. Le *Faust*, qui est le poème de la puissance humaine, pourrait s'appeler par là même le poème de l'éducation par la faute, par l'erreur et par le malheur. Une éducation humaine, voilà donc ce qui se poursuit d'un bout à l'autre du *Faust*.¹⁴

Lasserre trouvait dans les étapes de cette éducation, et la méditation continue qu'elle entraîne sur la destinée de l'homme, le sens réel et authentique du chef-d'œuvre de Goethe. De toutes ses expériences et de tous ses malheurs, Faust a retiré un enrichissement de la sensibilité, un affermissement de la volonté, et surtout une vue claire et profonde des choses qui l'empêche de croire que les distinctions arbitraires que font ordinairement les hommes sur les notions de bonheur et de malheur, de victoire et de défaite, existent au cœur des événements eux-mêmes:

Rien ne réussit, rien n'est vaincu absolument. C'est notre courte vue, ou plutôt ce sont nos irritations, nos rancunes, notre partialité, qui établissent ces catégories, et s'imaginent puérilement que l'essence des choses comporte de ces noms flétrissants ou louangeurs, lesquels n'expriment que nous-mêmes. Faust est un héros par la décision de subir tout entière la leçon de la réalité, de ne pas

avant sa mort, il écrivit: "Il est bien possible que je revienne encore sur ce grand sujet. Le *Faust* m'a toujours occupé l'esprit. Il a été une des Bibles de ma jeunesse" (*Faust en France* . . . , p. i). Rappelons enfin qu'en parlant de sa *Jeunesse d'Ernest Renan*, Lasserre se plaisait à dire: "Ce sera mon *Faust*," et que le chef-d'œuvre de Goethe a aussi fait l'objet du dernier cours qu'il ait professé à l'Ecole des Hautes-Etudes en 1929-1930.

13. *Portraits et discussions*, p. 140.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

l'interrompre ni y couper court par des cris furieux ou joyeux d'enfant, de se respecter soi-même en la respectant.¹⁵

Dans cette volonté du héros qui ne fléchit pas, qui considère chaque leçon que lui inflige la réalité comme un nouveau mobile d'action, Lasserre devinait aussi l'unité cachée, la colonne vertébrale, pour ainsi dire, d'un chef-d'œuvre qui resta inachevé, parce que la sagesse humaine est toujours incomplète et fragmentaire, comme l'acquisition même de cette sagesse.¹⁶

Mais sans doute anticipons-nous en assumant que Lasserre s'avisait d'emblée, et s'en tint dès l'abord, à cette explication du sens réel qu'eut pour lui pendant longtemps une œuvre qui laissa sur lui une empreinte profonde. Ce qui l'intéressa, dans ce premier contact avec l'œuvre de Goethe, c'était d'y trouver plutôt l'expression de sa propre inquiétude, du "besoin d'universel, d'infini, qui travaille l'humanité," dans lequel le Christianisme voit l'appel que Dieu adresse aux hommes pour les ramener à lui, mais que ceux que la foi a abandonnés espèrent combler par un effort continu de science, de création ou de progrès. Dans un univers sur lequel plane, comme a dit Sainte-Beuve, la grande absence de Dieu, des esprits ainsi constitués ne se demandent pas, comme Pascal, ce qu'il faut croire, mais plutôt, comme Faust, ce qu'il faut faire. Leur disposition morale correspond à l'attitude de beaucoup d'âmes modernes qui, ne trouvant pas dans la morale évangélique la réponse au tourment qui les dévore, cherchent dans l'action sur eux-mêmes ou sur le monde extérieur, la véritable raison d'exister: *Au commencement était l'action*.¹⁷

15. *Ibid.*, p. 151.

16. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 152. Jusqu'à la fin de sa vie, Lasserre resta presque entièrement fidèle à cette interprétation du *Faust* conçue dans la ferveur et l'enthousiasme de la jeunesse. Sur le tard, il élargit un peu cette conception initiale pour voir, dans l'œuvre de Goethe, à la fois "l'éducation d'un homme individuel et réel" et celle aussi "d'un homme fictif et abstrait, que l'on supposerait avoir vécu tous les siècles, habité tous les lieux où a régné une civilisation," en d'autres termes, de "l'homme-progrès, l'homme synthèse, cet homme unique qui est, selon Pascal, l'humanité elle-même, quand on la considère dans la chaîne de ses acquisitions successives." Dans ce sens, le *Faust* représenterait à travers l'histoire un même homme à la fois concret et allégorique, "ce double tableau de l'éducation de l'individu et de l'éducation de l'espèce" (Cf. *Faust en France* . . . , p. 39). Il convient d'ajouter qu'il s'en faut un peu que cette exégèse s'accordât avec les intentions déclarées de Goethe qui, dans une conversation avec Eckermann, a nié avoir relié les diverses parties de son poème à "une idée qui puisse servir d'appui et à l'ensemble et à chaque scène détachée." "En général," dit-il, "ce n'était pas ma manière, comme poète, de chercher à incarner une abstraction. Je recevais dans mon âme des impressions, impressions de mille espèces, physiques, vivantes, séduisantes, bigarrées, comme une imagination vive me les offrait; je n'avais plus comme poète qu'à donner à ces impressions, à ces images, une forme artistique, à les disposer en tableaux, à les faire apparaître en peintures vivantes, pour que, en m'écoutant ou me lisant, on éprouvât les impressions que j'avais éprouvées moi-même" (*Conversations de Goethe avec Eckermann*, trad. E. Délerot, II, 363-364. Cf. aussi à ce sujet, G. Bianquis, *Faust à travers quatre siècles*, Paris, Droz, 1936, pp. 123 sq.). Mais sans doute est-ce le propre des grands chefs-d'œuvre, et de toute œuvre quelque peu complexe, de se prêter à des interprétations variées et qui contredisent parfois les intentions déclarées de l'auteur. C'est ainsi qu'un Gide, plus pénétré encore que Lasserre de sagesse goethéenne, a dit de son œuvre, qu'avant de l'expliquer lui-même, il attend que d'autres la lui expliquent. Cf. *Paludes*, p. 10.

17. Cf. *Faust en France* . . . , pp. 16-17.

II

C'est un état d'esprit analogue, et une leçon plus immédiate encore, que Lasserre découvrit dans les livres de cet autre "Allemand d'exception" qu'est, selon lui, l'auteur du *Zarathoustra*. La révélation de Nietzsche, au cours de cette même année 1896, fut pour lui un événement aussi capital, et peut-être même plus significatif encore, que la découverte de Goethe. Aussi l'étude dans laquelle il s'attacha à dégager les principes directeurs de l'éthique nietzschéenne n'avait pas, comme il le reconnut plus tard, "le ton calme et rassuré qui convient à l'exposé critique d'un philosophe" et s'animait plutôt "d'accents de sympathie intellectuelle qui ont une apparence de recommandation":

Je ne parlais pas de Nietzsche froidement, parce que je lui devais beaucoup. La connaissance de certains de ses écrits m'a rendu, à un moment de ma jeunesse, un service passager et limité, mais puissant et décisif . . . Au moins, qu'on n'aille pas, sur cet aveu, faire de moi un nietzschéen. Kant disait que Hume l'avait éveillé du sommeil dogmatique; il n'avait pas adopté pour cela la philosophie de Hume. De Nietzsche, je pourrais dire aussi que, à certains égards, il m'a éveillé, il m'a aidé à entrer dans ma route, fort différente de la sienne.¹⁸

Le jeune Lasserre entra d'autant plus volontiers dans l'intimité intellectuelle de Nietzsche, qu'il reconnut immédiatement en lui un esprit qui, mieux que Goethe lui-même, avait compris en quoi résidait la supériorité, la suprématie même, de la littérature française classique sur toutes les autres formes d'expression, à une époque et dans un pays où toute la sympathie, toute la compréhension, tout l'effort de la recherche allaient plutôt aux monuments de la littérature du moyen âge, aux créations de la poésie primitive, aux mystères des traditions et croyances populaires. Et coïncidence rare et affinité plus certaine encore, il trouva que le penseur allemand joignait à son amour intense des lettres françaises, un sentiment très vif de la musique et une grande compétence pour en parler avec autorité. Ces trois aspects divers de la physionomie intellectuelle de Nietzsche—le philosophe, le lettré, le critique musical—Lasserre devait les étudier séparément, mais ce sont ses idées sur la morale et les mœurs, sur la psychologie et l'esthétique du romantisme, qui, dans cette année 1896, sollicitèrent surtout son attention.¹⁹

18. "Réflexions sur Frédéric Nietzsche" (*La Revue Universelle*, 15 juin 1921, p. 658). L'étude de Lasserre sur Nietzsche fut achevée en mars 1897, lors du séjour de son auteur en Allemagne. Elle parut pour la première fois dans *L'Action Française Mensuelle* en novembre-décembre 1899, sous la forme d'une série d'articles portant le titre commun "Nietzsche contre l'anarchisme." Le texte en fut ensuite légèrement remanié et recueilli en volume en 1902 sous le titre définitif de *La Morale de Nietzsche* (Librairie du Mercure de France). Nos références sont à l'édition courante qui parut en 1921 chez Calmann-Lévy, précédée d'une nouvelle préface et enrichie de notes explicatives d'une tonalité plus neutre, plus détachée, que le texte original.

19. A son retour en France, Lasserre résuma les vues de Nietzsche sur la littérature française dans un essai intitulé "Nietzsche en France," qui parut dans la *Revue*:

On sait à quel point la jeunesse française était obsédée, à la fin du XIX^e siècle, par le besoin de concilier des antinomies en apparence irréconciliables, avec quel docile empressement elle écoutait quiconque lui proposait, soit de nouveaux motifs d'action, soit même un essai d'explication de l'anarchie qu'elle voyait régner autour d'elle dans les divers domaines de la pensée et de l'activité humaine.²⁰ Lasserre lui-même, dans *La Crise chrétienne* (1891), avait essayé d'analyser un état d'esprit dont Nietzsche lui sembla, plus qu'aucun autre, avoir ressenti les effets et sondé les profondeurs. Toutes les idées du philosophe allemand, selon lui, "se subordonnent à sa critique de l'anarchie, anarchie tant dans les mœurs et les sentiments de l'homme que dans l'institution sociale."²¹ Le but de Nietzsche, dans toute son œuvre, a été de dévoiler et de mettre au jour les sources de désordre qui se dissimulent "dans la plupart des principes et des sentiments dont l'époque moderne s'enorgueillit comme de ses plus nobles conquêtes morales."²² Aussi est-ce autour de cette idée centrale qu'il élaborait un exposé succinct et dense de ce qu'il y avait de positif, de constructeur, dans la pensée d'un écrivain que des interprètes de la première heure, comme Bourdeau, de Wyzewa, Schuré, Fouillée, avaient présenté au public français comme le type même de l'anarchiste, du nihiliste pessimiste et destructeur.²³

En faisant résider avant tout dans les mœurs, et à travers les mœurs, dans l'homme discipliné et maître de soi le critère de toute civilisation digne de ce nom, Nietzsche se révélait par là même l'adversaire de tous ceux qui avaient érigé comme idéal la notion chimérique de "l'homme naturel" qui n'avait pas encore réussi à s'élever par la force de son énergie originelle, de sa "volonté de puissance," à un niveau d'existence supérieur. Sa pensée rejoignait sur ce point la sagesse des Grecs anciens qui, partant de la donnée initiale d'une nature humaine discordante et divisée contre elle-même, avaient compris la nécessité de la discipline, de la hiérarchie, de la soumission à une règle. Les êtres humains n'accèdent à une existence riche et harmonieuse que dans la mesure où ils comprennent la nécessité de concilier des tendances et des impulsions opposées. Pour les Grecs, "tout ce qui est ordonné, hiérarchisé, est bon. Tout ce qui est aisé et libre est beau." Leur

Encyclopédique du 6 janvier 1900 (recueilli dans *La Morale de Nietzsche*, pp. 128-143). A ses notions sur l'art musical, il consacra plus tard sa thèse complémentaire sur *Les Idées de Nietzsche sur la musique* (Paris, Mercure de France, 1907).

20. Cf. à ce sujet, la brochure de Maurice Barrès, *Tout le monde, sauf contre l'amour* (Paris, Lemerre, 1892), et en particulier le chapitre intitulé "Conciliation des antinomies de la pensée et de l'action"; *Portraits et discussions* (pp. 219-223), *Les Chapelles littéraires* (Paris, Garnier, 1921, pp. 153-165), *Cinquante Ans de pensée française* (Paris, Plon, 1922, pp. 46-48), et surtout le livre d'Agathon, *Les Jeunes Gens d'aujourd'hui* (Paris, Mercure de France, 1919, pp. 1-28).

21. *La Morale de Nietzsche*, p. 44.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

23. Cf. à ce sujet, G. Bianquis, *Nietzsche en France*, Paris, Payot, 1929, pp. 4 sq. et l'utile bibliographie (pp. 119-126). Le premier exposé méthodique et clair de la pensée nietzschéenne (*La Philosophie de Nietzsche*, par Henri Lichtenberger) parut en 1898 et fut composé à environ la même époque que l'opuscule de Lasserre.

morale était tout orientée "vers la liberté et la puissance, mais par le moyen de la discipline."²⁴ Cette morale, Nietzsche savait qu'elle ne pouvait être mise en pratique sur le niveau humain et sur le niveau social que par une élite pénétrée de ces principes et consciente de ses devoirs, car la multitude qui est aisément séduite par les solutions partielles et les idéologies sommaires a toujours témoigné un éloignement instinctif pour les contraintes et les sacrifices que la conservation de l'individu et la stabilité de l'Etat exigent. La distinction qu'il a établie entre la morale des maîtres et la morale des esclaves repose sur une profonde entente de la psychologie des mobiles humains et de l'évolution des sociétés. Transposée dans le domaine esthétique, elle pose comme condition essentielle de la maturité dans l'art l'acceptation aussi de la contrainte, de la subordination à des lois que des esprits insuffisamment avertis considèrent comme arbitraires, mais que de plus zélés reconnaissent comme la condition nécessaire à toute réussite, à toute perfection.²⁵

Si l'art classique est l'art des maîtres, l'art romantique exprime l'idéal de ceux qui ont cherché à dissimuler sous un art surchargé et prodigue la faiblesse de leur "puissance organisatrice" dans le vain espoir d'échapper "au sentiment cruel de la décadence qui, par eux, s'accomplit."²⁶ Toute la dernière partie de l'étude de Lasserre est consacrée à l'analyse de la psychologie et de l'esthétique nietzschéennes du romantisme, car l'auteur de *La Volonté de puissance* avait exploré avec une perspicacité singulière les germes de décadence et de dissolution que recèlent une conception de la vie et de l'art dont Rousseau a été, selon lui, l'ancêtre direct. Nietzsche a proclamé, l'un des premiers, que tout le romantisme se retrouve déjà dans Rousseau, "celui des génies modernes en qui la morale des esclaves a atteint son plus haut degré d'ébullition." Chez l'auteur du *Contrat Social*, "on surprend le passage des rancunes et des sensibilités de l'esclave à l'idéologie qui va les magnifier en dogmes, en vérités de raison et de sentiment."²⁷ Selon Nietzsche aussi, le romantisme n'arriva à son plein développement qu'avec Hugo et la génération de 1830 qui ne se contentèrent pas de glorifier un art libre et sans entraves, mais proclamèrent également leur amour des humbles et leur goût pour un idéal de nivellement démocratique. Et ce qui donnait à ses arguments leur grand pouvoir de persuasion, c'est qu'à l'origine de ses attaques véhémentes, et pas toujours bien fondées, contre le romantisme, il y avait, comme l'a observé Charles Andler, un grief personnel. "Dans toutes ces accusations," a dit cet interprète avisé, "lisons

24. *Op. cit.*, p. 67.

25. "Le principal 'au ciel et sur la terre,' semble-t-il, c'est d'obéir longtemps et dans une même direction: il en résulte toujours à la longue quelque chose pour quoi il vaut la peine de vivre sur terre, par exemple, la vertu, l'art, la musique, la raison, l'esprit, — quelque chose qui transfigure, quelque chose de raffiné, de fou et de divin." *Par delà le Bien et le Mal*, cité par Lasserre, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

26. *Op. cit.*, p. 112.

27. *Ibid.*

de douloureux aveux . . . Le romantisme est l'art des systèmes nerveux désagrégés, et Nietzsche se sait atteint de la même tare."²⁸ Comme Lasserre, il avait trouvé la confirmation de son désarroi moral dans les conclusions que Bourget avait résumées dans ses *Essais de psychologie contemporaine* et, armé du point de vue du "psychologue" et du "médecin moral," il avait vu surtout dans le romantisme la manifestation d'un état d'âme décadent et morbide dont les effets s'étaient prolongés par ondes successives jusqu'à la fin du dix-neuvième siècle.²⁹ Il éveillait ainsi dans l'âme de Lasserre des échos profonds, lui inspirant aussi le dessein de vérifier ces conclusions dans une étude plus détaillée, plus compréhensive aussi. Que Nietzsche ait été l'un des ancêtres directs du *Romantisme français*, le passage suivant l'atteste conclusivement:

Il y aurait une jolie psychologie, une fine classification des grands romantiques à faire, d'après ce qui s'est mêlé à leur religieuse inspiration d'anarchique amertume, d'esprit de vengeance contre les formes ordonnées et les bonnes mœurs. Nietzsche souligne ce trait commun à la plupart d'entre eux: l'affectation de sentiments grandioses, l'impudeur à s'attribuer de sublimes émotions. Signe de natures sans mœurs et que le sentiment d'en manquer fait souffrir, enfièvre.³⁰

Ajoutons aussi que la forte séduction que la pensée de Nietzsche exerça à cette époque sur l'esprit de Lasserre ne contredisait en rien la leçon qu'il avait puisée quelques mois auparavant dans l'œuvre de Goethe. L'enseignement essentiel du *Faust*, comme il le réitéra dix ans plus tard, réside surtout dans la "découverte progressive de l'ordre classique par un barbare," et la grande utilité de l'œuvre de Goethe, c'est de montrer le progrès d'un esprit qui part "de la fraîcheur de la barbarie et de la spontanéité, pour parvenir, à travers des expériences poétiquement exprimées par les malheurs et les labeurs du *Faust*, jusqu'à une connaissance consommée et sereine."³¹ L'expérience de Nietzsche confirmait sur ce point les conclusions de Goethe, avec cette différence toutefois qu'on observe chez lui "un contraste entre le fond des idées, classique, positif, traditionnel, et le ton, dont l'ardeur va souvent jusqu'au sarcasme," et qui s'explique par

28. *Nietzsche, sa vie et sa pensée*, Paris, Bossard, 1931, VI, 258.

29. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 255 sq. A une période antérieure de sa jeunesse où il cherchait à s'expliquer les raisons du sentiment de pessimisme et de décadence que dégageait la littérature romantique, Lasserre avait lu les analyses de Bourget "avec l'espèce d'ivresse que l'on éprouve à cet âge à découvrir peintes de la main d'un maître de chères parties de soi-même." Cf. *Le Romantisme français*, Paris, Garnier, 1919, p. 539, et aussi les aveux révélateurs rapportés par M. Frédéric Lefèvre dans "Une Heure avec M. Pierre Lasserre," *Les Nouvelles Littéraires*, 29 décembre 1923.

30. *Op. cit.*, p. 113. Et plus loin (p. 121): "Ces traits originaires du romantisme, il resterait à les vérifier sur ses plus grands représentants au XIX^e siècle. Mais on comprend le principe." Dans la page de garde de la première édition de *La Morale de Nietzsche*, il annonçait déjà la préparation d'une *Histoire de la sensibilité romantique*, et dans la préface qu'il écrivit en 1908 pour la réimpression de sa thèse (p. xi), il a désigné Nietzsche comme un des devanciers qui ont fourni "des éléments importants à la définition que j'ai essayé de construire du romantisme."

31. *Le Romantisme français*, pp. 95, 475.

le fait que Nietzsche "parvenu à la sagesse, en a moins joui qu'il n'a été irrité par l'erreur."³² Lasserre qui était en pleine communion d'esprit avec Goethe et Nietzsche, se sentait entraîné par surcroît vers ce dernier par de fortes affinités de sentiment et par toute l'ardeur de sa sympathie compréhensive.³³

Goethe et Nietzsche ont donc aidé Lasserre à entrer en pleine possession de sa pensée, à le libérer du doute et du scepticisme qui avaient entravé l'essor de son esprit épris de certitude, à le purger définitivement de cette creuse religion de la pitié que ses contemporains avaient puisée dans Tolstoï et dont l'"idéalisme" alors en vogue était un pâle reflet. On aime imaginer la direction que la carrière intellectuelle du jeune critique aurait assumée si, peu après son retour en France (1898), des préoccupations d'un ordre plus immédiat n'eussent privé son esprit d'une bonne part de sa sérénité, l'obligeant pendant un temps "à une sorte de repli méfiant, de rétractilité, de mise en défense."³⁴ Le déchaînement de l'affaire Dreyfus, cette "guerre civile étrange qui ne coûta pas de sang, mais qui mit en révolution toutes les idées,"³⁵ les sommations urgentes qu'elle imposait à son intelligence, lui firent comprendre que, pendant la période de crise qui se préparait pour la France, il ne lui était plus permis de poursuivre avec calme le développement d'une "pensée active et ardemment curieuse de tout." Bien plus, devant le danger que les forces occultes du pangermanisme faisaient courir à la sécurité de son pays, il comprit aussi qu'il ne pouvait plus être question de considérer toute chose d'un point de vue impassible et serein, de s'accorder "le noble luxe de penser et de sentir en 'ami du genre humain.'" "En un pareil temps," comme il l'écrivit plus tard en évoquant le souvenir de cette période troublée, "le véritable et sincère amour de l'humanité, c'était, de la part d'un Français, l'amour de la France, l'inquiétude pour la patrie."³⁶ Et c'est ainsi que, sous la poussée des événements, ce philosophe, ce rêveur, cet humaniste enivré de sagesse goethéenne, se jeta résolument dans la mêlée, dans la lutte des partis et, s'étant rangé du côté nationaliste, se prépara à forger cet instrument de combat qu'a été, à certains égards, *Le Romantisme français*.³⁷

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32. *Op. cit.*, p. 43.

33. Dans une note qui avait paru dans *L'Art et la Vie* en décembre 1895 (réimprimée dans *La Statue volée*, Paris, Le Divan, 1930, pp. 87-88), Lasserre distinguait deux familles de génies—ceux chez qui le goût de l'universel s'accommodait d'une nature détachée, douce et sereine, et qu'il appelait "les grands pacifiques" (tels que Goethe et Léonard de Vinci)—et ceux qui, plus fiévreux, plus violents, plus subjectifs, "veulent forcer le ciel avec armes et bagages" (tels que Pascal, Rembrandt, Wagner). "Parce que je me sens plus voisin de nature des premiers," ajoutait-il, "je chéris plus les autres, ces terribles enfants de la nature et de Dieu."

34. Cf. *Mise au point*, Paris, Le Divan, 1931, p. 30.

35. *Mes Routes*, p. xxvii.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

37. Cf. *Mise au point*, p. 31.

REVIEWS

Onze Poèmes de Rutebeuf, concernant la croisade. Publiés par Julia Bastin et Edmond Faral. (Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades publiés par l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, I) Paris, Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1946. Pp. 145.

Professor Faral and Mlle Bastin have chosen from the fifty-six poems of Rutebeuf eleven which relate more or less directly to the Crusades, and have re-edited them with detailed information concerning the circumstances of their composition and their chronology. A list with the proposed datings follows: I. *La Complainte de Monseigneur Geoffroi de Sergines* (middle of 1255 to middle of 1256), II. *La Complainte de Constantinople* (second half of 1262), III. *La Chanson de Pouille* (1264-1265), IV. *Le Dit de Pouille* (middle of 1265), V. *La Complainte d'outre-mer* (end of 1265 to beginning of 1266), VI. *La Complainte du Comte Eudes de Nevers* (October to December 1266), VII. *La Voie de Tunes* (second half of 1267), VIII. *La Disputaison du croisé et du décroisé* (1268-1269), IX. *La Complainte du Roi de Navarre* (1271), X. *La Complainte du Comte de Poitiers* (second half of 1271), XI. *La Nouvelle Complainte d'outre-mer* (1277). A thorough examination of the original historical sources, particularly papal correspondence, revealed additional sidelights on Rutebeuf's connections with the principals of these poems, and especially his rôle as propagandist both for the eighth crusade proper and the Sicilian expedition of Charles of Anjou against Manfred.

Mlle Bastin, who was mainly responsible for establishing the text and the glossary, has also made a valuable contribution. MS C (Bibliothèque Nationale, MS fr. 1635) was used as a base since it contained all eleven poems, and despite the fact that its copyist was Eastern, while Rutebeuf wrote largely in Francien.¹ MS A (Bibliothèque Nationale, MS fr. 837) would have been preferable both as to readings and dialect, but it contained only poems I, II and V. MS R (Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royale, 9411-26), unknown to the previous editors,² contains poems V, VIII and XI, and was put to good use for several emendations. The basic MS is, in principle, reproduced faithfully, although in practice departures from MS occur with some frequency.³ These are always justifiable, if not always necessary. Although they are not listed, there appear to be a number of revisions of the readings of Jubinal and Kressner. The punctuation has been improved.⁴

No study was made of the poet's language or versification, and the notes

1. See H. Lucas, *Les Poésies personnelles de Rutebeuf*, Strasbourg, 1938, p. 7.

2. A. Jubinal, *Œuvres complètes de Rutebeuf*, revised edition, Paris, 1874, 3 vols. A. Kressner, *Rutebeuf's Gedichte*, Wolfenbüttel, 1885.

3. The combined MS testimony is at times rejected, as in VIII 212 *Buer* (*C Boen, R Boins*).

4. There are almost no misprints. The period in X 29 should be deleted.

are on historical and literary rather than linguistic matters. The glossary contains excellent definitions carefully adapted to the passages in question. It is incomplete in that considerable competence on the reader's part is assumed.⁵ However, in view of the fact that vocabularies serve several purposes, and none was provided by the earlier editors, the present glossary might well have included such items as: *abaier* IV 60, *aencreiz* XI 336, *aservir* VII 75, *aünement* II 116, *bleif* XI 298, *chiennalle* VII 31, *cleis* VII 56, *dampnement* III 32, *desperement* III 24, *doint* IV 3, *enxui* VIII 183, *gabois* VIII 24, *gratei* VIII 232, *parmenable* IV 36, *pietaille* XI 162, *resclairer* VI 102. Professor Faral's *Index personarum et rerum* is most helpful. A bibliography on Rutebeuf is lacking.

The limitations of this otherwise excellent edition are understandable in that it is a partial edition of Rutebeuf intended for the new series of Crusade studies published by the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.

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Contes pieux en vers du XIV^e siècle tirés du recueil intitulé Le Tombel de Chartrose. Par E. Walberg. (Skrifter Utgivna av Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Lund, XLII) Lund, C. W. K. Gleerup, 1946. Pp. xlix + 181.

This latest work of the distinguished dean of Swedish *romanistes* contains nine of the thirty-one pious tales in the collection somewhat mysteriously entitled the *Tombel de Chartrose*. Since the work is dedicated to the prior and monks of a Carthusian monastery, M. Walberg conjectures that the title satisfies, in some symbolic fashion, the anonymous author's desire to be buried in a monastic church. This explanation may seem a bit far-fetched; I suspect that the title may be borrowed from some feature of Carthusian spiritual tradition with which the author was familiar, possibly based on *Romans* VI, 4: "Consepulti enim sumus cum illo (Christo) per baptismum in mortem; ut quomodo Christus surrexit a mortuis per gloriam Patris, ita et nos in novitate vitae ambulemus . . ."

Of the nine tales here presented all but one have never before been published; since four others have been separately edited (see page xlix), there remain eighteen which still await publication. While it is difficult to regret this unavailability on strictly literary grounds (one can only agree with Charles-Victor Langlois who found our author "honnête et plat" in his article in the *Histoire littéraire de la France*, XXXVI, 247), it is nonetheless to be hoped that the remaining tales will find an editor. They are valuable, I think, primarily as an expression of a mentality of a transitional period of crucial importance to the history of our civilization.

M. Walberg rightly rejects (page xi) Langlois's suggestion (*op. cit.*, page 227)

5. Thus no help is given for the expression *Tant com il fu poinz et mestiers* I 106 and VI 26, nor for such forms as *desavoir* XI 43, *parsois* VIII 49, etc.

that the author of the *Tombel* may have been a layman; his learning, his interests and his attitudes are entirely clerical and ascetical. He is well acquainted with Cassian, Bede, Gregory the Great's *Dialogues* and his *Moralia in Hiob*, Peter Damian, etc., as well as with Scripture; he moreover clearly identifies himself with the clergy (V, 159). He was, however, familiar with and sensitive to the growth of the new spirit of naturalism that was to cause such tremendous upheavals in succeeding centuries. Though his doctrine was uncompromisingly ascetic and otherworldly, as was to be expected in a friend of that most austere of religious orders, the Carthusians, he nonetheless believed, to some extent, at least, in giving nature its due. He recognized, for example, that

*Clers seulent mierz estudier
Qui se vont es champs solacier
Lors esperiz el lor nature
De bon air et de la verdure,
Quant de l'estude sont lassez.*

(IV, 103-107)

He thought, also, in an age in which violence and harshness were all too common, that religious guidance and admonishment to young novices should be "doux et debonnaire" (VIII, 446).

On the other hand, gently as he would have the young novice treated, he still considers sinful the act of the pitiful young Serapion (V) who secretes in his gown a small loaf to supplement the one meager daily repast allowed in the Egyptian monastery. The author is guilty, also, of a piece of rather macabre unconscious humour in his reflections on the last tale in the present book: a Jewess, convicted of adultery, is sentenced by her own people to be thrown from a precipice. Her execution draws curious Christian

*Jennes gens, qui ont grant envie
D'esgarder tel justice faire . . .*

(XXIV, 94-95)

They are, however, not hard of heart, like her executioners, and, despite their morbid curiosity, weep bitter tears of pity because of her obviously delicate condition. When she is saved by the intercession of the Virgin Mary to whom she had addressed a prayer for succor, the Jews in dismay take to flight,

*Quar crestiens, qui ne queroient
Fors meslee, par charité
Lour disoient mainte villé . . .*

(185-187)

These reflections, asides and digressions are perhaps as the anonymous author himself and M. Walberg think (page xlv), the collection's outstanding literary defect, but to many they may constitute its principal interest. The longest (992 lines) and doubtless most interesting of the tales is the version

here printed of the *Vie de St. Alexis*, which is the only remaining heretofore unpublished verse form of the well known legend. The present version has none of the epic grandeur and psychological insight of the eleventh-century text. It is extremely interesting, however, to find anticipated, in one of the author's numerous digressions, the strictures of Professor Urban T. Holmes who found the legend "somewhat unpleasant to the modern reader because of the utter selfishness of its asceticism . . . Alexis sees his mother and father, not to mention his wife, sorrow unceasingly, and yet he keeps his silence to the last" (*History of Old French Literature*, page 31). This point of view was evidently shared by "maintes gens" of the fourteenth century who

*Maintiennent que ceste celee . . .
Fu malvestié grande et amere . . .*

(XVIII, 460-462)

for exactly the same reasons as Professor Holmes, as the text continues to explain. Our fourteenth-century author, however, firmly rejects this criticism in favor of a more rigidly supernaturalistic view.

M. Walberg demonstrates in his introduction that the Paris MS of the *Tombel* is a copy of the distinctly better MS of Avranches. Since these are the only two extant, the latter is evidently his base MS. There follows an excellent study of the language of the text, which is of considerable interest, since the language, like the spirit of the author, belongs to a transitional stage from medieval to modern in its phonology, morphology and syntax. One may express doubt, in regard to the present text, as to M. Walberg's distinction between *s* plus voiced consonant, assuredly silent, and *s* plus unvoiced consonant, which he apparently thinks may have been pronounced (page xxvii). Surely the rhyme *haste : chaste* advanced by M. Walberg does not prove that the *s* was pronounced before *t*. The learned editor himself shows that the author used the rhyme *adjouste : double* (the same rhyme is found in Gringore, *Œuvres complètes*, ed. D'Héricault and Montaiglon, Paris, 1877, II, 69: *double : jouste*). The fact that we now pronounce the *s* in *chaste* is no indication that this pronunciation is traditional; many words in which the *s* before unvoiced consonant is heard today were not so pronounced in the late Middle Ages and the early Renaissance. See, for example, *trillesse* (*Anticlaudian*, ed. Creighton, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1944, line 3401), the forms *juques* and *duques* which are very common in many texts, the rhymes *dextre : mettre* (Marguerite d'Angoulême, *Marguerites de la marguerite des princesses*, ed. Frank, I, 46) and *Prophete : feste : manifeste : mette* (*ibid.*, II, 3-4), *retraindre* (*Défense et illustration*, ed. Chamard, II, 6), etc. It would require incontrovertible evidence to make one admit the pronunciation of *s* before *t* in a mid-fourteenth-century Norman text, since *s* before unvoiced consonants apparently fell first in western dialects and became general in all regions

except the *wallon* by the thirteenth century (see Nyrop, *Grammaire historique de la langue française*, I, 415).

M. Walberg is obliged rather frequently to emend his MS (since P is a copy of A, it is without separate authority) in places where there is obvious error. He does so with perspicacity and prudence, perhaps at times even with excessive conservatism. It is difficult, for instance, given the context, not to read *Li mandement* in the following lines:

*Il n'osa en nulle maniere
Li maintenant a l'emperiere
Contretenir ne destourner . . .*
(IV, 373-375)

M. Walberg remarks in his note that V, 224-229 is illogical as it stands. The whole difficulty lies in the contradiction inherent in line 228 *Et tant . . .* if we read *Et n'ant* (< *inde*), the passage is irreproachable. In V, 255, if we read *sortent* (MS *sentent*), the difficulty raised in the note likewise disappears completely. With somewhat less certainty we might suggest that V, 421 read . . . *regner en gloire*. On the other hand, although the use of the negative verb *Cesson* after *Dieu deffendi et fist deffendre* (VI, 16-19) is illogical, as M. Walberg points out, it is perhaps merely an extension of the usage of a negative, even a reinforced negative, as complement of *deffendre*. Compare for instance "la raison nous deffend de n'en (choses) faire point d'illicites" (Godefroy, IX, 288, c). I do not think, as the editor suggests, that *rage* (VIII, 74) is the subject of *descendi* (line 84); the latter is probably an impersonal verb with the subject unexpressed. In the lines

*Dieu ne receit nul pour amis,
Au monde n'a religion,
Fors ceulz qui par temptacion
Sunt premierement esprouvez
Et en la fin leaulz trouvez*
(VIII, 240-244)

pour (amis) should not be understood as "grâce à," "par égard pour," as the editor suggests in his note; the meaning is rather "God accepts no man as friend," i.e. in God's favor, agreeable to God. Line 241 should no doubt read *n'an religion*. In the same tale, a young hermit is sorely tempted and proposes to leave the desert after having been discouraged by an over-severe admonishment from the abbot. An aged monk attempts to dissuade him from this action and pleads:

*Un jour de respit seulement,
S'il te plaist, au mains me dourras
Qu'en la celle au mains demourras . . .*
(VIII, 354-356)

The editor's note to this passage remarks that "la répétition de *au mains* me paraît suspecte. L'original a probablement eu *encor d. ou quelque chose*

d'analogue." A better correction, in view of *Un jour* (line 354), would be to read *au main* ("until tomorrow") in line 356.

English-speaking readers will be interested to note certain of the Norman features which adumbrate modern English usage, particularly in vocabulary. Forms which are somewhat strange to those accustomed to the continental form of the language will seem familiar to them, as, for example, the omission of the preposition in the title of the eighth tale, "D'un jenne homme qui entra religion . . ." which appeared unusual to the editor. We may likewise wonder whether *destroer* (XXII, 12; not in Godefroy or Tobler-Lommatzsch) is not our modern English *destroy* rather than a compound of *estroër* (page 155).

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JEAN MISRAHI

Montaigne chez ses amis anglo-saxons. Paris, Boivin, [1946]. 2 volumes.

Volume I. Pp. 448. Volume II. Pp. 112. *Essai sur le Journal de Voyage de Montaigne.* Paris, Boivin, [1946]. Pp. 218. By Charles Dédéyan.

Professor Dédéyan, already known to us for his work on Montaigne, offers us here two useful and needed books: the first extensive study of Montaigne's fortunes in England, and a good general account of the many aspects of the *Journal*.

The larger and more important of the two is subtitled "Montaigne dans le romantisme anglais et ses prolongements victoriens." It is not confined, however, to English Romanticism; for as Professor Dédéyan explains (page 7), the difficulty of labeling authors satisfactorily as Romantic or otherwise has led him to include any work, any author that belongs between 1760 and 1900. The text (Volume I) is in four parts: I) Autour du préromantisme (1760-1798), II) Le Romantisme (1798-1832), III) Le Goût de l'équilibre et l'interprétation de Montaigne (1832-1875), IV) Les Nouvelles Divergences et le renouveau romantique (1875-1900). Volume II comprises the Appendices (excerpts from various writers on Montaigne) and a Bibliography.

The book as a whole is thorough, judicious, unbiased and eminently readable. My only clear-cut criticisms are minor ones. There is an abundance of printing errors which unfortunately are sometimes distracting.¹ The translations, though generally sound, are sometimes disturbingly inaccurate. "Dishonored and defil'd" becomes "deshonoré et anéanti" (page 109); "science" and "savoir" (and later "sagesse") are used somewhat confusingly for Cowper's clear contrast of "knowledge" and "wisdom" (page 112); "Crabbed age and Youth" is rendered as "Age et jeunesse

1. On p. 181—not a typical but an extreme example—the reader accepts "aristocratique," "physionomie," "Essai" for "Essay," "suposed," "witch the grotesque, farces" for "with the grotesque farces," and "gentlmanly"; but "wench" for "French" is diverting.

se rudes" (page 402); Thackeray's remark "Well, qui s'excuse . . ." loses all meaning as "Eh! bien qu'il s'excuse" (page 285); Clough's "I do not greatly think about Montaigne" is given as "Je n'ai pas une bonne opinion de Montaigne" (page 373). One mistranslation leads to a pointless remark: having rendered the "poor, ignoble life" which Clough in *Mari Magno* ascribed to Montaigne, and which in context clearly means *morally* ignoble, as "une pauvre vie obscure" (page 373), Professor Dédéyan feels obliged to explain in a footnote that Clough had not read Grün's *La Vie publique de Montaigne*, which had just appeared.

In the chapter on Emerson, which is very good (though I wish Professor Dédéyan had had access to Charles Lowell Young's splendid *Emerson's Montaigne* [1941]), it is surprising to find no mention of the poem "Etienne de La Boëce" even in a page (277) on Emerson's fondness for the friendship. And it is disappointing to find (page 280) Emerson's warning not to read Montaigne for inspiration (in the essay of that name) interpreted as an actual loss of affection for his favorite author. For the context shows that Emerson is primarily stressing the great value of poetry and fact-books (Montaigne's own favorites) for inspiration; and elsewhere in the same essay he mentions that "Montaigne travelled with his books, but did not read them." By implication then Montaigne, if not inspiring, is inspired; which is at most a mild reservation.²

Sometimes Professor Dédéyan's search for the *English attitude* toward Montaigne leads him, in my opinion, a little wide of the mark. He is much concerned with English national pride, of which no doubt he encountered a great deal. But when he virtually tells us that Leigh Hunt enjoyed Shakespeare as much as he did Montaigne through national pride,³ he goes rather far. And when he explains (page 169) entirely in terms of "orgueil national" and "un certain snobisme" the fondness of the English Romantics for such competitors of Montaigne as Browne, Burton and Walton, I think he forgets that Montaigne in his entirety was fully acceptable only to such Romantics, English or French, as could misread him to their satisfaction. In this same period the prudery that expurgates Montaigne or raps him on the knuckles for obscenity is almost as typical of France as of England. Four expurgated editions of the *Essais* appeared in France between 1811 and 1847, and most readers shared some of Lamartine's disgust at Montaigne's obscenity, which as far as I know only Dumas père and George

2. Two other minor points are worth noting. On p. 107 Professor Dédéyan, speaking of "Honorio's" selection from the *Essays* (1800) refers to Labouderie's "*La Religion de Montaigne*" of 1819 (it should be *Le Christianisme de Montaigne*) as "la récente dissertation sur sa religion." The reference in the bibliography (II, 93) to the 1759 edition of the *Essays* in English seems to suggest a new translation ("translated into English, the 7th edition . . . from the . . . french edition of Peter Coste"). It is actually the seventh edition of Cotton, claiming "very considerable amendments and improvements, from the most accurate and elegant French edition of Peter Coste."

3. "Il n'y a qu'un écrivain qui jouisse de la même faveur à ses yeux, et comme pour satisfaire son orgueil national, c'est Shakespeare" (p. 199).

Sand expressly defended. It is not that there are not differences between the attitudes of French and English Romantics toward Montaigne; but I think Professor Dédéyan has sometimes overstated them.

One other reservation is inevitable, for I do not believe that there is a perfect method of treating these subjects. In an analytical treatment the personalities and stature of the readers are almost fatally submerged. In the method used here, that of individual portraits interspersed with occasional summaries, there is danger that the portraits will stand out almost disconnectedly for lack of any real links in the substratum of less memorable readers; that there will be a certain lack of depth, of substance, of solidity. The casual remarks of important writers and the careful studies of unimportant ones have no place in this arrangement unless in an appendix; and in Professor Dédéyan's Appendices, according to a principle of selection that is not clear, we find selections from Florio and Coste, who do not belong to this period, Bouhier and Naigeon, who are French, together with about a dozen Englishmen of whom some are studied in the text and some are not. It may be that the material does not lend itself to any excursions; Professor Dédéyan knows what he is doing, and defends his method satisfactorily in his Introduction. But this reader at least would like to ask what impression, however unimportant, Montaigne made on some of the great writers who knew him slightly and mentioned him casually, as did for example George Eliot, Melville, Henry Adams and many others. An essay was written about fifty years ago on Browning and Montaigne; is there anything in this? One would welcome trivial but significant tidbits like the one Van Wyck Brooks tells about the Massachusetts farmer late in the last century correcting the professor who stopped with a colleague to water his horse and made a quotation that he ascribed to Montaigne. "Tweren't Montaigne," pointed out the farmer—and he was right. "Twere Mon-tes-ki-ew." We miss any treatment of the nineteenth-century interest in Montaigne's views on education, which were published in New York alone in separate editions in 1891, 1899, and again in 1905. There is no discussion of late nineteenth-century works on Montaigne other than that of Bayle St. John: the monographs of Collins, Dowden, Lowndes, and Grace Norton (who was already writing on Montaigne before 1900), or the shorter studies of such men as Winsor, Owen, Besant and Tilley. Professor Dédéyan's material is more selective than exhaustive.

But no one, not even La Fontaine's miller, can please everybody and his father. If Professor Dédéyan had included everything that any reviewer might desire, his book would certainly have lost some of the liveliness, clarity and readability that make it a work to read and not merely to consult. There is a richness in its very scope. Here are studies of all sorts of interesting readers of Montaigne: Walpole, Goldsmith, Sterne, Gibbon, Byron, Thomas Moore, Dugald Stewart, Carlyle, Hazlitt, Bentham, Hunt, Landor, Hallam, Sterling, Emerson, Thackeray, Church, FitzGerald,

Clough, Lowell, Stevenson and Pater. The author brings each one to life and shows ably not merely what he said about Montaigne but why he said it and how his view of Montaigne fits into his life and thought. This is a considerable achievement and the greatest merit of the book. There are chapters on editors and translators (Florio, Cotton, Coste, Naigeon, Hazlitt the younger) which show us how the *Essays* were presented to their readers at various periods. There are samplings of representative biographical dictionaries and résumés at various points to remind us of the prevalent attitudes illustrated or contradicted by the principals that we see on stage. In short, there is a wealth of material attractively and judiciously presented. It is good to have all this available in one book. We are indebted to Professor Dédéyan for a valuable and much needed study.

The *Essai sur le Journal de Voyage de Montaigne* is a useful and pleasantly presented examination of the *Journal* from every pertinent angle. Part I (Le Texte) takes up the MS and its authenticity, the parts in it of Montaigne and his secretary, and the various editions; Part II (Le Récit), the causes of the trip, Montaigne's esthetics of travel, the itinerary, Montaigne and Germany and Italy, Montaigne's sickness, his religious attitude, his possible diplomatic role, and other Renaissance travelers. Part III (Le Journal et les Essais) covers book by book the additions to the *Essais* that are traceable to the *Journal*; Part IV (Le Journal, œuvre littéraire), literary sources, language and style, French and foreign criticism; and the Conclusion (Montaigne et Montesquieu), the parallels between the two men as travelers and in their debt to Italy.

A treatment of all these topics in 181 pages of text is bound to be more a sort of *état présent* than a study in depth; and such indeed are the values and limitations of this book. Its only real weakness in my opinion is that it fails to fulfill the early promise of the author to try to make the *Journal* contribute "à préciser la personnalité et la pensée de l'auteur des *Essais*" (page 1). Professor Dédéyan feels that he has done this; in concluding he claims to have "confronté le *Journal* et les *Essais* en indiquant tout le profit que l'œuvre maîtresse a retiré de l'œuvre secondaire" (page 181). But Part III, which might have been the crown of the book if the treatment had been of this nature, is little more than a catalogue of the passages in the post-1580 *Essais* that can be traced to the *Journal*. Professor Dédéyan seems himself to recognize that he has not shown the contribution of the minor to the major work when in his final chapters he labors to build up instead the intrinsic merits of the *Journal* as a work of literature. But being too good a judge to claim more than documentary interest for the *Journal* as a whole, he is forced to conclude on such a side issue as the affinities between Montaigne and Montesquieu.

The fact remains that this documentary interest of the *Journal* is so great that it deserves a careful and intelligent survey. That is precisely

what Professor Dédéyan has given us. If it is no more than that, neither is it less. And that is a considerable merit.

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DONALD M. FRAME

The Greek Anthology in France and in the Latin Writers of the Netherlands to the year 1800. By James Hutton. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1946. Pp. xi + 822.

In the preface (page ix) to Professor Hutton's earlier volume on *The Greek Anthology in Italy* (Cornell University Press, 1935) we find the following passage:

Ten years ago I began to assemble materials on the Anthology in English literature, and became aware that the subject could not be clarified save by a study of Continental intermediaries. The modern Latin poets in particular, I saw, had been the middlemen, by whom such Greek motives as those of the epigrams had been passed on to vernacular writers, including the English. It seemed best to make substantial studies of the Anthology in Italy and France before returning to my original subject. Those studies formed in 1927 a doctoral dissertation. Since then materials have accumulated until I feel justified in publishing the present collection for Italy.

Another decade has elapsed. During this interval a large body of material has accumulated on France and the Netherlands, and is brought forward in the present volume.

Further elucidation of the author's purpose may be found in the preface (page vii) to the new work:

Only . . . by making as clean a sweep as possible down the main highway of literature since the Renaissance, can the investigation of classical sources be withdrawn from uncertainty and placed upon something like a solid footing. We wish not merely to know that such and such a theme used by a modern writer came to him ultimately from a classical source, but to know precisely where he found it and in what shape. Such knowledge is fundamental to the proper valuation of any writer, above all in the sixteenth century in the heyday of Imitation.

Determined by this continuing identity of purpose, the arrangement of the present volume is closely parallel to that of the earlier one on Italy. There is a long and instructive Introduction dealing, in the form of related essays, with certain aspects of the subject which are logically preliminary to the main body of the work: e.g. "The Background of Learning," "The Greek Epigrams as a Schoolbook," "The Reputation of the Greek Epigrams," and the like. This is followed by the three great divisions of the work proper: "Latin Writers (France)," "Latin Writers (Netherlands)," and "French Writers." For each of the individuals who come under discussion

these sections give a brief but useful biography, an analysis of the writer's relation to the Greek Anthology, examples of his epigrammatic style, and exhaustive lists of the epigrams translated by him. Where we are concerned with an edition of selected epigrams translated by various hands, an exhaustive table is provided of all the epigrams with the names of the translators and the *loci* of the translations. Pages 297-300 contain an Appendix describing Mr. Hutton's copy of Jean Brodeau's Anthology of 1549, "completely interleaved, the interfoliations being filled with Latin verse-translations." The last two hundred pages are occupied by a Register, arranged in the order of the Greek Anthology, which enumerates, with certain exceptions, "all translations, imitations, and allusions noticed in the present volume." Thus the student may approach a given research affecting the Anthology either through Latin or the vernacular, if he is studying a modern writer, or group of writers, or period; or else, by means of the Register, through the Anthology itself, if he is studying the fortune of a given epigram, or type of epigram, or author, or period of antiquity.

One cannot withhold admiration for the science that organized the present investigation, for the patience that acquired control over its abundant materials, and for the lucid economy which arranged and presented the results in a form so immediately serviceable. But we would not have the reader conclude that Mr. Hutton's gifts are solely or preponderantly those of a mobilizer of scholarly information, although the nature of the task that he has set himself inevitably brings such gifts into prominence. From time to time, as in his discussion of the reasons for the greater success of the erotic over the comic epigram in the sixteenth century (pages 50 f.), the writer reveals a talent for literary criticism on a high theoretical plane. Again, in his remarks on the *vœu* as a literary form derived from the Anthology (pages 333 ff.), he discovers a delicate appreciation of the esthetic consequences of the imitation of ancient themes by modern writers. The treatment of the literary relationship subsisting between Bacchylides, Navagero, Du Bellay, and Ronsard, and of the transmutation of values that occurs at each stage in the filiation of the votive theme that binds these poets together, constitutes practical criticism of a high order, equally remarkable for the solidity of knowledge upon which it is founded, and for the controlled judgment that evaluates poetic effects in three different languages, literatures, and times.

In his discussion of "The Greek Epigrams in French Literature of the Sixteenth Century" the author points out (page 35) that "these themes mainly reached the French poets between 1530 and 1550 by way of Latin intermediaries . . ." and that

Seldom . . . do the French poets draw these or indeed any other subjects from the Latin poets of their own country. That would have approached a culpable plagiarism; they and their Latin-writing compatriots were fellow-workmen,

who did not rob one another, but together looked towards Italy and the ancients.

Mr. Hutton states the theory of imitation, as it was understood in Renaissance literary circles, with great exactness. He probably did not intend, however, to limit the force of his comment to Latin literature. Literary theorists of the French Renaissance, like Du Bellay and Ronsard, very expressly prohibit the imitation of compositions in one's own vernacular. But poets who have a school to establish and careers to hew out are prone to enunciate theories which they do not always realize in practice. Thus Mr. Hutton asserts (page 36) that an image which occurs at the end of Ronsard's sonnet, *Je voudrais estre Ixion et Tantale*, was really borrowed by Ronsard from Baif's imitation of the Greek epigrammatist, Rufinus; and that, in another instance, "Baif has translated a part of a Greek epigram from a Latin imitation by Dorat . . ." (page 338). The poets of the Renaissance irresistibly abandoned an unnatural aspect of the theory of imitation for a natural procedure. They used whatever echoes made consonances in their mind with the thought they wished to express.

Mr. Hutton's new volume is a valuable contribution to our knowledge of an important phase of the revival of Greek learning in the Renaissance. Incidental glimpses that we obtain in his pages of the implementation of that revival are very informative. It is significant of the state of Greek studies in Europe in the first half of the sixteenth century that Erasmus was able to write in 1528, "An tu credideris unquam fore ut apud Britannos aut Batavos pueri graece garrissent, graecis epigrammatis non infeliciter luderent?" (page 14). The reconstruction of a Renaissance lecture on the Greek epigrams (page 17) is also full of interest—the method here described would be applicable to other forms of Greek poetry. The course of reading that a leading French scholar, Denys Lambin, could recommend in 1554 to a student "who wished to learn enough Greek to read Aristotle," provides (page 18, note 46) a further useful insight into the contemporary state of Hellenic studies.

The Pléiade, together with its humanist satellites, is accorded full and understanding treatment. The speculations advanced (pages 123 and 358) on the literary relationship between Muret and Ronsard, touching the Anthology, stimulate one's curiosity and merit further development. The section devoted to Jean Dorat (pages 108 ff.) brings together valuable information about the humanist who was the *nexus* between scholarship and literature in the French Renaissance. Particularly welcome is the evidence (page 357 and note 48) that Ronsard worked with the Greek, as well as with Latin translations, of the Anthology.

One of his rare mistranslations occurs in an epigram, A. P. 11.162, where the translator in Cornarius (Velius) has omitted the phrase in question: Ronsard gives "d'Olympe le prestre" (i.e. the priest of Olympia) for Ὀλύμπικον . . . τὸν μάντιν, the priest named Olympicus. If he had understood, he would

probably have omitted the name entirely, for in these translations he consistently either substitutes contemporary names for the personal names in the Greek or else gives no names at all.

The conclusion drawn by the author as to Ronsard's Hellenic attainments seems both moderate and sound:

. . . the impression that one receives from the firmness with which he handles the epigrams, and also from his mistakes, is that he was actually working from the Greek, that already in 1553 he knew enough Greek to use the cribs in Cornarius with intelligence.

Nor is there any difficulty in agreeing with the later qualification (page 367) that Ronsard "was probably in no sense a finished Greek scholar."

Almost all of the comment on Du Bellay, whose debt to the Anthology was a light one, deals with the celebrated votive composition *Vœu d'un vannneur de blé aux vents*, for which the poet was ultimately indebted, by way of Navagero, to the Greek lyric writer Bacchylides. Jean-Antoine de Baif was, on the other hand, very heavily indebted to the Anthology. The extent of this obligation, and the various literary relations that arose in his exploitation of the Anthology, are carefully investigated. The minor figures of the Pléiade are likewise accorded adequate treatment.

The work that Mr. Hutton has thus far accomplished will render infinitely more easy the way of students who may wish to study the fortune of some special aspect of the Greek Anthology in the modern literatures. We believe that the author will indeed "have the satisfaction of seeing a considerable number of literary relationships spring to light" (page vii), but not spontaneously, for his volumes on the Anthology in Italy, and in France and the Netherlands, provide the indispensable material and chronological basis for special research. Not the least merit of Mr. Hutton's achievement, however, is that it places in a clear light the general succession of phases through which the Anthology passed, as it rose in the firmament of European literature: from the uncritical nature of its acceptance by the scholars and poets of the Renaissance, to the shrewder appreciation of Boileau and Voltaire, and finally to the genuine insight of Chénier, who found simplicity, *naïveté*, as he calls it, to be the most admirable quality in the literature of the Greeks, because "eux seuls . . . suivaient toujours la nature et la vérité."

ISIDORE SILVER

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América en el teatro de Lope de Vega. Por Marcos A. Morfínigo. (Revista de Filología Hispánica, Anejo II) Buenos Aires, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, Instituto de Filología, 1946. Pp. 259.

The occurrence of allusions to America in the theatre of Lope de Vega, his dramatization of certain events of the discovery and conquest of the

New World, and his utilization of the *indiano* as a character in numerous plays have frequently been noted by the critics. But, as has happened almost always in the criticism of his theater, so seldom examined in its entirety, the comments have been confined to the few plays dealing specifically with American themes, or at best have been in the nature of fragmentary impressions. Sr. Morínigo's study—for which he received the Carlos Octavio Bunge award granted by the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Buenos Aires for the best thesis in literature for 1943-1945—based as it is on a reading of all of Lope's plays, plus certain *autos* and other writings, now provides us with a well-rounded picture of Lope's conception of America and its relation to Spanish life of his day.

In an introductory chapter Sr. Morínigo presents a brief survey of the interest in America by Spanish historians and literary writers of the sixteenth century, in which he stresses the fact that the early attention of the Spaniards was directed chiefly toward the economic gains derived from the conquest and that it was only in the last quarter or so of the century that America acquired a heightened significance for Spaniards. This latter fact is reflected in the literature of the period. Lope de Vega quite early in his career shows his interest in the American theme by writing *La Dragontea* (1598), an epic poem recounting the resistance of the Spaniards to the depredations of Sir Francis Drake's forces. But it is in Lope's theater that Sr. Morínigo prefers to look for his ideas, because of the more popular and spontaneous character of the dramatic writings. In the non-dramatic works, says Sr. Morínigo, such as *La Dragontea* or *El laurel de Apolo*, Lope is inclined to display an erudition that does not add fundamentally to his vision of America. With this we can agree, though it may be pointed out that occasionally the non-dramatic writings will reward us with details not encountered in the plays. Thus while, as Sr. Morínigo notes, there is no mention in the latter of the proverbial "tierra de Jauja," we do come across it in one of Lope's versified epistles (*Biblioteca de autores españoles*, XXXVIII, 411a), an example that might have been recorded along with those cited from other writers. (In the discussion of numerous points, Sr. Morínigo includes passages from contemporary authors in order to corroborate or amplify what is found in Lope or sometimes to illustrate a divergent viewpoint, as for example Suárez de Figueroa's ill-tempered denunciation of the *indiano* as contrasted with Lope's more tolerant attitude toward the latter's failings.)

The major portion of Sr. Morínigo's book consists of a discussion of the pertinent material in Lope's theater under the following chapter headings: "La idea predominante" (i.e., America as the land of fabulous riches); "Las Indias como lugar de origen de cosas exóticas" (fauna, flora, native products, etc.); "Indias apartadas" (the emphasis on distance, the dangers from storms and pirates, etc.); "La geografía del oro" (the fame of Lima, Potosí, Mexico, etc.); "La vida en las Indias" (the importance of climate in the

discoveries and colonization); "Los indios" (the character of the Indians, cannibalism, religion, native dances, language, etc.); "El indiano" (the character and characterization of the *indiano*); "El nuevo estado de España" (the influence of the colonies on Spain's social, economic and political life); "Los héroes del descubrimiento y la conquista" (Lope's treatment of Columbus, Cortés, García Hurtado de Mendoza, Magellan, the Pizarro brothers, and others); "Las Indias como parte del imperio español" (Spanish pride in the American possessions); "El nuevo instrumental retórico" (the enrichment of poetic language by terms related to America). The quantity and variety of the material studied, taken from some 134 plays, reveal a wider knowledge by Lope of facts and ideas concerning America than the reading of a smaller number of plays might lead one to imagine, and we are therefore indebted to Sr. Morfínigo for having made so exhaustive a survey. As he is aware, some of the plays are of doubtful authorship, but the accuracy of the total picture obtained is not seriously affected thereby. So far as I know, he has not overlooked anything of importance, and what omissions there may be will no doubt prove to be, like some I have noted (of passages in *El acero de Madrid*, *El caballero de Olmedo* and the autos *La Maya* and *El Misacantano*), merely repetitions of things already dealt with in the book. Moreover, by skillfully weaving together so many varied passages into a unified, coherent pattern, and by providing a sufficient historico-cultural background in the form of running commentary, Sr. Morfínigo enables the reader to get a clear idea of what America must have meant to Lope and his contemporaries and of its impact on Spanish life of the time. Unlike Aurelio Miró Quesada S., author of another book on the same topic—*América en el teatro de Lope de Vega* (Lima, 1935), which is devoted, however, only to Lope's three comedias with American themes and to the auto, *La Araucana*—Sr. Morfínigo does not take Lope to task for the deficiencies of his knowledge of New World peoples, places, customs and the like. What is more important for Sr. Morfínigo is that the image of America, however superficial or inaccurate at certain points, was so often present in Lope's mind and that it was so rich in what our critic calls "resonancias afectivas y valorativas."

While the picture thus provided by Sr. Morfínigo is on the whole both complete and accurate, there are a few interpretations with which this reviewer would disagree. There is first of all the statement in the Preface (page 7) to the effect that "aun autores indianos como Alarcón, que había nacido en América, o como Tirso, que había vivido en ella durante años, apenas la mencionaban en sus obras." Alarcón, it is true, makes relatively little mention of America in his plays—though they do contain more reminiscences of his Mexican background than has generally been understood (cf. Miss Dorothy Schons, "The Mexican Background of Alarcón," *PMLA*, LVII [1942], pages 89-104)—but a closer examination of Tirso's theater would have disclosed that the latter does allude to quite a number

of things and thoughts associated with the New World. His observations, furthermore, often give the impression of first-hand knowledge, as when he comments on the slowness with which customs officials at the *Casa de Contratación* in Seville conducted their examinations (*La villana de Vallecas, Biblioteca de autores españoles*, V, 52b). One finds in his writings, also, details not given by Lope; thus, while there is no mention of cacao or chocolate throughout Lope's theatre (though chocolate does occur in *La Dorotea*), Tirso refers to cacao at least once (*op. cit.*, page 57c).

In dealing with Lope's treatment of Hernán Cortés, Sr. Morínigo accepts the hypothesis proposed by this reviewer (in *Hispanic Review*, III [1935], 163-165) that the lost Lopean play, *La conquista de Cortés*, was in all probability the same as another lost play ascribed to Lope, *El marqués del Valle*. However, after attributing to me the statement that the play in question was "indudablemente de asunto mexicano" (page 230), a statement which I did not make but to which I would subscribe if "posiblemente" were substituted for "indudablemente," Sr. Morínigo gives it as his opinion that Lope probably treated the story of Cortés as Gaspar de Ávila did in his play *El valeroso español y primero de su casa*, in which Cortés appears, not as a conquistador in Mexico, but after his return to Spain, where at the court of Charles V he is the victim of envy and intrigue but is finally rewarded with the hand of a noble lady and a title of nobility. Sr. Morínigo adds: "El tema condice además con la especial inclinación de Lope, y de su público, por la vida sentimental de los personajes históricos" (page 231). However that may be, there is nothing in Lope's practice as a dramatist to indicate that he would have preferred to present Cortés in the manner mentioned. Without the text of his play or any information regarding it, it is impossible to know how Lope handled the story, but it seems just as likely that he depicted Cortés in the midst of his famed exploits in Mexico as that he made him the hero of a play involving "lances de amor e intrigas de palacio." It may be pointed out, incidentally, that while Ávila used the latter type of plot, another contemporary dramatist chose to show Cortés in the role of conquistador (in *La conquista de Méjico*, attributed to Fernando de Zárate, but not his, in my judgment).

A third point on which I find myself in disagreement with Sr. Morínigo is his appraisal of the importance, for literary purposes, of various concepts related to America. That these concepts contributed to the enrichment of poetic expression there can be no doubt, but that the new symbols, as he states in his final chapter, were more effective, because of their novelty and "resonancias afectivas y sentimentales," than the corresponding classical (*i.e.* Greco-Roman) ones, is very much open to question. The proof of the vitality of the classical concepts (mythological allusions and the like)—which also have their emotional values—is to be seen in their continued predominance despite the inroads of new figures of speech. Poets might now speak of "Bahamas y Bermudas," but they still preferred "Scila y Carib-

dis." Góngora might write "bárbaro caribano" rather than "fiero scita," but the classical symbols in his poetry far outnumber those that had their origin in the contacts with the New World. It is true that the poets sometimes complained of the triteness of certain time-honored figures, as witness the example from Lope quoted by Sr. Morínigo (page 247, note 1), but this did not prevent them from drawing freely on the classical patrimony. It was precisely the accumulated associations of a long literary tradition that gave the old symbols, whether classical or medieval, such endurance, as is well illustrated in the persistence in poetry of the geocentric conception of the universe long after science had adopted the Copernican theory. At the same time, as far as poetry was concerned, it was not a question of ancient versus modern concepts. Poets accepted both kinds, at times even combining them, as Lope did in these lines: "Yo no espero la flota ni importuno / al cielo, al mar, al viento por su ayuda, / ni que segura pase la Bermuda / sobre el azul tridente de Neptuno" (*Rimas humanas*, sonnet LXVII).

There is always the danger in this kind of study, in which so many passages are culled from so many sources, that an occasional passage may be misinterpreted because the context is not kept sufficiently in mind. That danger has here been avoided, as far as I have observed, except in a few instances. The passage from *El sembrar en buena tierra* quoted on page 183 is not an example of the uncouthness of the *indiano*, for Don Félix is in every sense a gentleman, and the lines spoken by the worldly-wise Florencio refer rather to the former's innocence (the true import of the passage is recognized on page 198). Another passage from the same play, cited on page 206, is also misunderstood: Prudencia, who recites these lines, is anything but a "dama desinteresada" (her mercenary character is revealed in a passage given on page 199). In the passage from *Las bizarrías de Belisa* on page 237, Sr. Morínigo, accepting the interpretation given in *Ac. N.*, XI, 459a, n. 1, sees a literal reference to Magellan's voyage and his ship *Victoria*, whereas the allusion is clearly to the street by this name in Madrid, which because of its narrowness and congestion, making it difficult for coaches to pass through it, is here called "Magallanes (*i.e.* estrecho de Magallanes) de los coches." This is a good example of the figurative use of *Mar de Magallanes* mentioned in the final chapter of the book (page 248).

So much for the criticism, which affects only minor aspects of Sr. Morínigo's work. Taken as a whole, his book, written with competence and sympathetic understanding, is a valuable contribution to our appreciation of yet another phase of Lope de Vega's many-sided genius.

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Racine: Principes de la tragédie en marge de la Poétique d'Aristote. Texte établi et commenté par Eugène Vinaver. Editions de l'Université de Manchester, 1944. Pp. 77.

This brochure affords us a glimpse of Racine in a studious mood. We can see him, as it were, attentively examining his old copy of Pietro Vettori's *Commentarii in primum librum Aristotelis de arte poetarum* (2nd edition, 1573). He has before him, in this treatise, the Greek text of the *Poetics*, a Latin translation by Vettori, and the latter's lengthy commentaries. Thus equipped, he ponders the terse, at times obscure Aristotelian critique of poetry. Here and there, in the margins, he pauses to paraphrase or translate a passage into French.

These marginalia, which are of signal interest, have been published before—fourteen times in the past century—but not as a separate unit. Of rather slight bulk, they remained for many decades thoroughly submerged in voluminous collections of Racine's works. Professor Vinaver now makes them available in a special and more handy pamphlet edition. The new editor lavishes every care on the invaluable fragments, tidies the text more meticulously than his predecessors, and appends two sections of commentary, "Remarques" and "Notes," with a glossary of terms used in an unusual seventeenth-century sense. Whenever necessary, Racine's French can be checked, on the same page, with excerpts from Vettori's edition of the Greek; it can also be closely compared with Vettori's Latin translation, by which the poet often allowed himself to be guided. Simple typographical devices point out Racine's errors of interpretation and, more important still, additions that he made to the original; these help to show to what extent he elaborated or even modified the Aristotelian doctrine; in particular, they illuminate his views on catharsis and the tragic hero.

As Professor Vinaver suggests, it all reads like a subtle, leisurely dialogue between the philosopher and the poet; that impression, one must add, is made the more vivid by the editor's skill in confronting the texts. But there are gaps in the dialogue. Two substantial passages (one on the necessity of "un commencement, un milieu et une fin" and another containing Aristotle's eulogy of Homer) have been lifted out of their place in the text and relegated to the "Notes" (see pages 5, 63, 68); and here, for some unspecified reason, they are transcribed, unlike the rest, from Paul Mesnard's older edition. The real lacunae, however, are due not to the editor but to Racine himself. Why did he translate certain passages and not others? Though many a possible explanation comes to mind, none appears conclusive. Professor Vinaver seems willing to take for granted that the poet deliberately chose those points in the *Poetics* most meaningful and interesting to him (page 39). But there is no evidence. We do not know just when, or in the courses of how many readings, or above all for what purposes, Racine wrote his marginal notes. Can we explain, for instance, why he

appears ready on two occasions to start a new paragraph and, each time, in the middle of the first sentence, stops short? The editor, here, offers no comment. He transfers one of the unfinished sentences to the "Notes." The other, to be found in Mesnard's edition, is wholly struck out; it should come at the end, in a chapter where Aristotle considers whether the epic is superior to tragedy; Racine writes out in French that part which summarizes the argument in favor of the epic and merely adds: "Je réponds à cela premièrement . . ." Could we be very wrong in believing that although he did not go on translating the rest—a firm defense of tragedy—the tragedian surely was deeply interested in it?

What is undeniable, and stands here solidly demonstrated, is Racine's preoccupation with matters of doctrine. A consummate artist, he was also, as we are shown, a competent theorist of his art; he seriously probed the nature and principles of tragedy. Nine years ago, to be sure, this whole question was discussed most extensively by Sister Mary Philip Haley. In her *Racine and the "Art poétique" of Boileau* (1938) she dwelt on "an important trait of Racine's mind that is seldom fully recognized: the scholarly and critical bent of his temperament," and learnedly analyzed his views; one of the many texts that she examined was the very one edited in the present study. Professor Vinaver, apparently without any assistance from Sister Mary's work, reached conclusions remarkably close to hers. We learn from both—and the thesis can bear repetition—that pathos was to Racine the heart and essence of tragedy; to awaken and chasten emotions of pity and fear was his central purpose, in the light of which all problems, whether of plot, character, prosody, or any other phase of dramatic composition, were to be resolved. Both scholars compare the Aristotelian and Racinian concepts of *hamartia*, Professor Vinaver more briefly but with a livelier sense of differences. He neatly distinguishes the tragic flaw defined as error of judgment from that passion which drives and impels certain Racinian characters, like a furious, inward fate.

Needless to say, Professor Vinaver does not deduce all that exclusively from his one piece of evidence. He cannot but cast a glance now and then at the tragedies and their prefaces. All to the good, for his "Remarques" and "Notes" are not merely an explication of marginalia; they constitute, in sum, a valid critique of Racine's art.

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La Pensée européenne au XVIIIème siècle: de Montesquieu à Lessing.
Par Paul Hazard, de l'Académie française. Paris. Boivin et Cie, [1946].
2 tomes. Tome I. Pp. v + 375. Tome II. Pp. 301. *Notes et références.*
Pp. 156.

This posthumous work is a fitting and durable monument to Paul Hazard, member of the French Academy, distinguished professor of the Collège

de France and, in alternate years, of Columbia University. Of the same general nature and format as his *Crise de la conscience européenne*, the new publication shows even superior qualities of breadth, vividness and scholarly precision. It is a finished product, the epitome of the author's vast learning, critical judgment, sensitive temperament and literary skill. Few literary historians can match his ability to dramatize the history of ideas and give life to abstractions. The dramatic development of eighteenth-century thought is presented with pictorial vividness. The Christian religion is first brought to trial (Part I. *Le Procès du christianisme*), a lay system is built to replace it (Part II. *La Cité des hommes*), only to fall prey to external forces and inherent weaknesses (Part III. *Désagrégation*). The "philosophes" and "rationalistes"—the intellectuals—are alone considered. With his memorable studies of Abbé Prévost, Paul Hazard had begun the complementary study of the "homme sensible," which he expressed the hope of finishing some day: "*Si vis suppedital, comme disaient les Anciens*" (I,v). Life was not that kind, either to him or to us.

The French, the author says in his Preface, are weighed down by many heritages—Antiquity, Middle Ages, Renaissance—"mais c'est bien du dix-huitième siècle que nous sommes les descendants directs." The temptation must have been strong, during the dark days of the Occupation, to draw conclusions from this pertinent conviction. Paul Hazard disclaims explicitly any such intention. He was unwilling to play the part of prophet, doctrinaire or partisan in his great desire to seize and present the facts in all their objective truth and historical fidelity. The result is a tribute to his irreproachable integrity and breadth of understanding. Yet from these very first pages, there is no doubt where his sympathies lay.

The eighteenth century opens on the theme of satire and universal criticism (Part I), John Arbuthnot and the Scriblerus Club in England, Gulliver and his ubiquitous children, Panini in Italy, the Montesquieu of the *Lettres persanes* in France. The quest of happiness, eighteenth-century grail, had begun, with its attendant utopias, travels, predilection for the exotic. Thanks to the light of reason, once the prejudices of the past had been destroyed, public felicity would reign supreme. Reason was based on experience, philosophy on the practical. Descartes was cried down, Vico (unfortunately) ignored, under the pressure of Bayle's pervasive influence, Wolff's success and Locke's triumph. Because the Christian interpretation of man's fate already occupied the scene, the greatest struggle ever witnessed was joined, to determine whether Europe should remain or should not remain Christian. The Christian revelation was "made reasonable" in England by the deists; in France Helvétius studied man, "l'homme sans mystère et sans lendemain"; in Germany theologians modified the very essence of the doctrine. The ardor of the defense was no less keen. In the Latin countries, the State came to the aid of the Church; in France the

Encyclopedists were ridiculed by Palissot and Fréron; in England Sherlock, Warburton and Joseph Butler upheld the ancient faith. But there was no Bossuet, no Fénelon, no Pascal. Voltaire easily "suppressed" Le franc de Pompignan. The clandestine literature of the first half of the century came out of hiding in the sixties, edited by Naigeon, d'Holbach, Voltaire. The Jesuits were banished and the "philosophes" felt liberated at last. But what did they propose to substitute for what they had abolished?

The middle part of Paul Hazard's study, "*La Cité des hommes*"—no heavenly city, be it noted—is an essential and most rewarding answer to this question. It should forever lay the ghost of that most curious of paradoxes—a "destructive" century, from which, nevertheless, came the ideals of the political system and the freedoms which democratic nations still presume to cherish. It is all the more effectively objective because the author is here most successfully making every effort to deal fairly with a tide of opinion which, however vigorous and salubrious it may have been in general, bore with it many an offense to delicate sensitivities.

The humanistic city was built, as has long been recognized, according to nature's simple plan. To natural religion, supported by the light of reason, were soon added the sciences of nature. The Christian God was transformed into a more catholic Supreme Being, though under the influence of Locke—who, in France, led not to the followers of Berkeley but to La Mettrie, d'Holbach and Diderot—even the Supreme Being had enemies. Along with Newton, Bacon came into his own and nature was interpreted less through logic than through scientific observation. For the century had its full share of great scientists, among whom the author selects Buffon for an especially vivid portrait, as well as its philosophers of science. Then came Grotius, Pufendorf, Cumberland, Leibnitz and Gravina, jurists and political scientists throughout Europe, from Heinecke and Wolff to Burlamaqui, who, with Montesquieu and Beccaria, founded on natural law their humanistic systems of justice and equity.

Since ethics, too, had been detached from religious sanctions, the basis of a lay system had to be founded first on national then on increasingly empirical grounds. The stoic and the epicurean blended into hedonism and utilitarianism. The three great virtues were tolerance, beneficence and, in the full sense of the term, humanity. From here the step is easy to government and politics, from natural liberties to political liberties, based on the idea of the social contract, of the State as a moral, beneficent and humane being. The best of states, to Montesquieu, was that which assured the maximum degree of independence with the maximum degree of social stability. The Abbé de Saint Pierre formulated his project for perpetual peace. Equality before the law, but not in property, was advocated. The chapter on government ends as it should, dramatically, with terse sentences quoted from the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of 1791.

Among many fine chapters that on the *Encyclopédie* is an excellent example of Paul Hazard's ability to grasp the essentials and point them up into a magnificent synthesis. As a popularization of science and the scientific method, an inventory of the knowable and of the known, the *Encyclopédie* was one of the representative forces of Europe. Again the human factor prevailed, for the very principle of the systematization of knowledge is found in man's three dominant faculties, memory, reason and the imagination, which create, respectively, history, philosophy and the fine arts. In spite of D'Alembert's hedging, knowledge, no more than ethics, descends from God. And Diderot put man in the center of the universe: "The presence of man alone makes the existence of beings interesting. . . . Why should we not introduce man in our work as he is placed in the universe? Why should we not make him our common center?" Social values are changed, the manual arts are considered more dignified than the theoretical, the age of the machine is at hand. Pervasive throughout the *Encyclopédie*, in spite of certain entirely orthodox articles, is the spirit of rebellion against ecclesiastical authority. The social conscience is substituted for the sense of the divine and the way is prepared for the science of man.

In the final chapters of Part II, Paul Hazard deals with the relationship between ideas and literature and morals. The master of comparative literature once again embraces the entire European scene and picks his giants, Samuel Johnson and Wieland, Goldoni and Voltaire. Typical individuals are chosen, too, to illustrate the manners of the age: the adventurer, the woman, the man of letters, the bourgeois, and finally the "philosophe." The kings had mistresses! the philosophers had mistresses! The intellectual revolution was no impediment to the cultivation of the social graces.

The "philosophes" were, however, to be denied the victory that they so proudly claimed. Part III, entitled "Désagrégation," is an attempt to explain how, through internal weaknesses and antinomies, the great humanistic ideal, in its eighteenth-century form at least, fell to pieces. Whereas Part II is concerned with the commonly accepted principles in the general movement of ideas, often best illustrated by minor figures, we are now confronted with the more fascinating and, from the literary and human point of view, richer domains of individual disagreements. Frequent miniature portraits enliven the play of abstract ideas. Especially successful are those of Frederick II, Winkelmann and Vauvenargues. Considered in relation to the fact that these pages were written under the German occupation, the sketch of Vauvenargues, colored by his theories of heroism and sacrifice, is as appealing to the reader as it must have been to the author. Here Paul Hazard was not unwilling to reveal his genuine sympathy.

As in other centuries the great figures of the eighteenth were essentially individualistic in thought and temperament. Voltaire, for example, fought Montesquieu's relativistic morals, Diderot's naturalistic atheism, Leib-

nitz's optimism, Rousseau's conception of natural goodness; Diderot attacked the Cartesian dichotomy of rational man and emotional man, enrolling them both under the banner of science, a science which should include physiology, psychology and even esthetic as well as ethical theory. Hume is considered to have given the "philosophes" a body blow and Kant to have delivered the "coup de grâce." For good or for evil Lessing picked up the remains. France's intellectual supremacy, which had for a time produced a cosmopolitan and united Europe, gave way through a process of self-destruction to nineteenth-century nationalisms. It can readily be seen that this final part, of necessity more personal, both as a study of discordant personalities and as an interpretation on the part of the author, is less objective and more subject to dispute.

The reviewer accepts only with great diffidence his responsibility of judging such an obviously excellent and masterful book. To return to Part I, the usefulness of clearing the ground of the attack on Christianity is apparent. But neither logically nor chronologically did this attack come first. Even when it went beyond the rationalism and skepticism of the preceding centuries, it was not an attempt to abolish Christianity *per se*. It started rather ambiguously and cautiously with Pierre Bayle after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, went underground for many decades except when it revealed itself, with Montesquieu, disguised in Persian dress, and became pronounced and effective only in the sixties, after the general condemnation of the *Encyclopédie* and books by Voltaire, Diderot and Helvétius in 1759. From then on, Voltaire, Naigeon and D'Holbach really went to work, inundating Europe with their "dictionaries," "systems," "collections," and "gospels." In other words, the attack was secondary to the struggle for the freedom of thought and worship, secondary to the effort to break the persecuting power of the Christian Church supported by the civil power of the State. Is it bad taste to mention Calas and La Barre? However we judge Voltaire's methods, we should not forget to say that he fought in the name of justice and humanity.

It has been observed that Diderot, Voltaire and Rousseau have been played down in the second part and reserved for the discussion of disaggregation. For this and other reasons, they never really come into their own. Yet many good pages are devoted to Diderot and he is at least recognized as "le gêneur" in any synthesis of the age. The separation of the sentimental man from any picture of eighteenth-century France is hazardous at best. It leads the reader to miss the full import of the rehabilitation of the emotions already well launched in the works of Bayle and Fontenelle and the impact of the great mid-century change when, with Maupertuis, La Mettrie, Buffon and many others, Cartesian reason gave way as a dominant force to scientific observations and experimentation. The new spirit was personified by Diderot who, in Paul Hazard's book, is not given sufficient credit either for his psychological insight or for his philosophy of

science. The reasons for the decline of the eighteenth-century ideal are complex. In view of the great social, economic and political upheaval of the Revolution it will be difficult for many readers to believe that the main causes were the essential disagreements and errors of the intellectual leaders of the age or that Lessing was in any important sense its end term.

The very organization of the book reveals an underlying interpretation. It is evident (I, iii, 135) that Paul Hazard was strongly influenced by Paul Valéry's critical analysis (in *Variété*, II) of the *Lettres persanes*, in which Valéry asserts that the dissolution of an era of myth through contact with an era of fact could produce only anarchy and disorder. This theory is dangerously close to an intellectualism which has been called in some quarters "the new failure of nerve."¹ We may fully understand it and sympathize with it as a mood but are not impelled to surrender to it. Even Benda, while praising Voltaire's preconception of a democratic society,² uses the dangerous terminology of "la mystique démocratique et républicaine." Rousseau, least representative of the "philosophes," may be held in some measure responsible for the European preoccupation with the myth of the State³ and Voltaire, too, believed that certain myths or "préjugés" were useful to society. But Diderot, who, because of the breadth and profundity of his thought, seems to be more acceptable to conservative critics, developed a method that is flatly opposed to the creation or perpetuation of myths. He believed in facing truths, even when they hurt. It is still at least open to debate whether democracy may not be more securely supported and defended through an alliance with the scientific spirit⁴ than by the protection of myths.

However individual interpretations may vary, Paul Hazard's work will long remain the best available initiation into eighteenth-century European thought and his volume of "Notes et références" is already an indispensable tool for further research.⁵ "The City of Men," the most solid and most brilliant part, eminently deserves translation and possibly separate publication. No clearer, more dependable or more readable synthesis has yet appeared in any language.

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1. *Partisan Review*, Jan.-Feb. 1943.

2. In his Introduction to the critical text of Voltaire's *Dictionnaire philosophique* prepared by R. Naves.

3. Cf. Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*, Yale University Press, 1947, and the excellent review by Albert Guérard in the *New York Herald-Tribune Books*, May 25, 1947.

4. Cf. *The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith*, New York, King's Crown Press, 1944.

5. Errors are of minor importance, many of them attributable to the difficulties of posthumous publication. An English proof-reader would have caught the incorrect quotation from Dr. Johnson: "Man is no weak" (I, 188). La Mettrie died in 1752, not in 1758 (I, 167). Professor Hazard steadfastly refused the modest title "Chevalier" to

Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Discours sur les sciences et les arts. Edition critique avec une introduction et un commentaire par George Havens. New York, The Modern Language Association of America, 1946. Pp. xiii + 278.

Perhaps no one has attached greater importance to the implications of Rousseau's *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* than Jean-Jacques himself. In retrospect, he not only considered this first major work the undoubted cause of all his later unhappiness, he also viewed it as the fountain-head of what he was to call his "grand système."

Scholars have long agreed the first *Discours* contains, at least in incipient form, most of Rousseau's basic ideas. It is all the more surprising then that, until recently, none has attempted a critical edition of the memorable essay.

Professor Havens' contribution is doubly welcome, for it fills a deplorable gap in the history of studies on Rousseau, and it offers an outstanding example of this American scholar's competence and erudition. As the manuscript of the *Discours* is not available—in fact there is serious doubt as to whether it still exists—the editor has reproduced the original edition of 1750, while adding in footnotes the variants between this first edition and the more modern ones of Werdet et Lequien fils (1826–1827) and Hachette (1895–1905).

The text of the essay is preceded by an Introduction and followed by a Commentaire, both written in a clear, sober French which will make the editor's emphatic suppositions, evaluations and conclusions more readily accessible to Rousseau scholars throughout the world. Professor Havens begins his Introduction with a careful account of Jean-Jacques's momentous trip to Vincennes at which time Rousseau either realized his famous "paradox" on the road to the fortress, or, following his arrival, was inspired by the imprisoned Diderot to attack the progress of the arts and sciences. Because of the importance of the *Discours*, the question of whether the first inspiration for Jean-Jacques's approach to the topic suggested by the Academy of Dijon originated with Diderot or with Rousseau, itself becomes significant.¹ After carefully weighing the arguments on both sides of the question, Professor Havens has, with commendable courage, come to a conclusion in a difficult problem. He discreetly suggests Diderot's role to

Louis de Jaucourt. The reason is now apparent: the author has confused the Chevalier with a contemporary, Elie de Joncourt (I, 190; II, 40). Finally a matter of opinion only: the missing document which would prove the Masonic origins of the *Encyclopédie* (I, 292) will never be found, because it never existed.

1. Not all would agree, however. Cf. Albert Schinz, *Etat présent des travaux sur J.-J. Rousseau*, Paris, New York, 1941, p. 172: "Faguet sans doute a raison que toute la querelle est sans importance, puisqu'il reste que Rousseau a fait usage du 'paradoxe,' tandis que Diderot l'a combattu dans toute son œuvre."

have been limited to fortifying Rousseau in his original tendency. Doubtless there are those who will remain unconvinced even to the point of maintaining that the apostrophe to Fabricius itself may well have been written after, and not before, the visit to Vincennes. No one will deny, however, that Professor Havens shows, with a thoughtful command of the historical evidence, that by 1749 Jean-Jacques was already eminently predisposed toward the point of view adopted in the essay.

Following a concise résumé of the part played by the Academy of Dijon relative to the *Discours*, Professor Havens devotes more than thirty pages of the Introduction to the publication and reception of the essay. At least sixty-eight contemporary articles and pamphlets were written to attack Rousseau's work, and the most important of these, together with articles in defense, are effectively utilized in showing the extent, evolution and importance of the controversy. Professor Havens himself concludes: "Les nombreuses réfutations, et les réponses qu'elles ont provoquées de la part de Rousseau, constituent une espèce de pont entre son premier ouvrage important et ceux de plus large envergure qui le suivirent."

Professor Havens, who readily admits that in the first *Discours*, "Rousseau n'avait rien inventé," devotes a substantial part of the Introduction to those influences which helped mold the author's thought. It is convincingly demonstrated that chief among these are Geneva, the Bible, Plutarch and, in particular, Montaigne. Many other influences are emphasized as well, including the writings of such moderns as Pascal, Fénelon, Bossuet, La Bruyère, Montesquieu and Rollin.

The tenth and final part of the Introduction, which is entitled "L'Importance du *Discours*," offers little that is strikingly new to the reader. It nevertheless presents a forceful picture of Jean-Jacques in the mid-eighteenth century, lashing out against luxury and vice, friend and enemy, in the name of virtue and the simple life. Calling attention to the essay's weaknesses, which, moreover, Rousseau himself acknowledged in the *Confessions* and elsewhere, Professor Havens conceives the *Discours* as a sermon whose dominant theme, that material progress without moral progress is a delusion, may be meditated on with profit in the world of today.

The Introduction provides an indispensable background for an informed understanding of Rousseau's first great work. It would, however, be most unwise to judge the merits of Professor Havens as the editor of a critical edition on his introductory essay alone. Many of the points touched upon or even developed there, are both expanded and minutely examined in the *Commentaire* which immediately follows the 1750 text. Bearing on specific passages of Rousseau's essay itself, these notes complement the editor's earlier discussion of such subjects as luxury, the arts and sciences, and Montaigne's influence. If, for example, the reader feels that in his Intro-

duction Professor Havens has treated in too summary a fashion the *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* in relation to D'Alembert's "Discours préliminaire" of the *Encyclopédie*, he will find additional pertinent information in the notes of the *Commentaire*. The same is true of Hobbes whose name is mentioned but once in the Introduction; and even Diderot's important article, "Encyclopédie," is brought to the reader's attention in the notes. In this latter instance, however, it would have been interesting if more had been made of Diderot's article which, so different in spirit and content, was presumably composed at the time of the first *Discours* and D'Alembert's "Discours préliminaire," and which, furthermore, elicited Rousseau's admiration as late as 1755.² The value of the *Commentaire* to students of the French eighteenth century cannot, I think, be overstressed, for it not only throws considerable light on Rousseau's text, but it is rich in suggestions for the research scholar as well.

In his *Etat présent*, the late Albert Schinz insisted upon the distinction between the Rousseau of legend as created by subsequent writers, and the true Rousseau as revealed in his own works.³ Both Rousseaus have their historical and literary significance, but Professor Havens, while writing revealingly about Jean-Jacques, has added not a little to the understanding of the true Rousseau.

OTIS FELLOWS

Columbia University

La Wallonie, 1886-1892: The Symbolist Movement in Belgium. By Andrew Jackson Mathews. New York, King's Crown Press, 1947. Pp. 128.

This book will be useful mainly to provide the libraries with a substitute for a set of *La Wallonie*. Mr. Mathews gives us a rather complete summary of the contents of this review. It was the task proposed to him and he did it conscientiously.

Naturally enough, he would have liked to go beyond that and confer upon his work a greater scope than was inherent in it. He has tried to glorify Mockel by glorifying *La Wallonie* and vice versa.

Mockel was only an intelligent amateur, one of those dilettanti his times produced in abundance. The socio-political considerations which are considered indispensable by all scholars including Mr. Mathews can be limited to this: in Belgium as everywhere in Europe, there was an idle and cultured class that could devote some of its money and all of its time to belles-lettres. Mockel founded a review which was intended to be *liégeoise* and which became merely French. He realized very soon that regionalism in literature is nothing and that literature is a great cultural current which flows along unhindered by local dialects and particular landscapes.

Mr. Mathews' thesis—he could have dispensed with a "thesis"—is

2. *Correspondance générale*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1924, II, 239.

3. *Op. cit.*, pp. 400-403.

summed up in these words: "Wallonia was to be the locale of the Symbolist movement in Belgium, and the first Belgian review squarely to take up the cause was to be published in Liège. We shall see that this review's regional ideals led it naturally to Symbolism, and to a natural working alliance with French writers. As a kind of warrant that the development was historically right we shall also see how this little review gave its name to the region of Wallonia."

To make his point, Mr. Mathews quotes one Garni, a critic: "le symbole est l'essence de la Wallonie," which is nonsensical—and Mr. Mathews half-heartedly conceded it.

This brings us back to the old quarrel: the Symbolists were accused of deriving all their originality—including their syntactic peculiarities—from their ignorance of the traditional French clarity and from their Nordic bad taste. This was absurd. Mallarmé was not a Belgian. Symbolism is a European movement which flourished more brilliantly in France. Mockel eventually aped Mallarmé, falling like many contemporaries under his charm. He then endeavored to show that Mallarmé's style was the logical result of historical experiments and was truly and essentially *classique*. Mockel had then ceased to be Walloon.

If there are Nordic strains in French Symbolism, and if Belgium is brilliantly represented in the Symbolist school, it is because Belgium is more widely open to Nordic Influences, and it is also because of the Flemish influence, far richer than this pitiful "Walloon inspiration" which *La Wallonie*, in spite of its name, did not personify.

As for the merits which Mr. Mathews flaunts in his hero, Mockel, they just cannot be seen. Mockel's critical ideas belong to the whole generation. About the forerunners of Symbolism he shares Symons' ideas; and he tries to reconcile Ghil and Mallarmé about the union of music, poetry and the theater. He did not get his ideas in Liège or Wallonia, but in Paris and at Mallarmé's *madis*.

RENÉ TAUPIN

Hunter College

Perfiles de lingüistas. Contribución a la historia de la lingüística comparada.

Por A. Benvenuto Terracini. Tucumán, Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 1946. Pp. 141.

This is a labor of love. Lacking both the comprehensiveness and the impersonality of Jordan and Orr's *Introduction to Romance Linguistics*, it nevertheless presents an admirable cross-section of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century linguistic thought.

Terracini states in his Foreword that he is restricting himself to a presentation of those linguists who worked within the comparative method. Bopp, Ascoli, Meyer-Lübke, Meillet, Gilliéron, Schuckhardt and Giacomino are the names included. We wonder at the omission of Diez, Grimm,

Brugmann and D'Ovidio, until we discover that the first is amply taken care of under the sheltering wing of Meyer-Lübke, the second under Bopp, the third a little everywhere. The fourth, for some mysterious reason, is nowhere mentioned. The inclusion of Schuckhardt, the relentless critic of the comparativists, is by way of an anti-climax, while Giacomino's profile is, we suspect, the tribute paid by a pupil to a beloved teacher.

A criticism of Terracini's study is a difficult task. Terracini does not easily lay himself open to criticism. His method is both affectionate and objective. From it there transpires little to inform us of his personal feelings toward the theories he accurately and serenely describes. But from every page there breathes forth the writer's sense of admiration and gratitude toward the great ones of the past, the men who have gone on to their well-deserved rest, leaving footprints which we, their followers, are free to tread or to circle.

It would be easy but unfair to criticize the theories so brilliantly and elaborately described by Terracini—Ascoli's idea that linguistic change is the effect of a compromise arising from the state of bilingualism inherent in language (page 24); Meyer-Lübke's statement (page 57) that the literary texts are fragmentary and of doubtful value in comparison with the testimony to be drawn from the living languages; Meillet's declaration (page 78) that "for linguistics history is only a means, not an end."

We may perhaps disagree with Terracini's view of the importance of the role played by Ascoli in the cultural *Risorgimento* of Italy (page 26); or with what seems to be Terracini's own opinion (page 38) that with dialectal borrowings plus analogy, phonetic regularity can be a perfectly safe foundation for linguistic reconstruction. Others (not we) will doubtless object to Terracini's somewhat complimentary mention of Alfredo Trombetti (page 139).

On the other hand, there is fundamental soundness in Terracini's assertion (page 47) that empirical linguistics, based upon the sixteenth-century tradition of the historical continuity of the Romance languages from Latin, had achieved excellent conclusions long before the Romantic movement that led to "scientific" linguistics. Terracini offers his own criticism of Meyer-Lübke's refusal to describe synchronically confused phenomena such as the loss of the declensional system (page 66), which belong to the sphere of Vulgar Latin rather than of Romance. This healthy point of view is developed later (page 69) when Terracini insists upon the intrinsic value of textual material and the interrelation of thought, psychology and history with linguistic change. The critics of the comparative method (Vossler, Curtius, Olschki, Spitzer, Terracini himself) are satisfactorily referred to (page 67, note 30).

Terracini's comparison of Schuckhardt and his adversaries (page 110) is interesting: "while the latter trace the development of a word in a straight line between two points, and consider as an obstacle everything that inter-

feres with this supposed lineal development, the former follows all the curves and windings of the word's course, even where it forks out." Schuckhardt's view of phonetic change as a progressive series of independent analogical processes is also well presented (page 114).

In imparting a final accolade upon this serene, scholarly and delectable piece of work, we cannot refrain from citing a passage from Ascoli's writings, cited by Terracini (page 34) as a sample of the doubts that haunted the old comparativists, who were angels fearing to tread in comparison with the younger generation of "Young Grammarians": "I cannot dream of opposing the principle whereby a sound or sound-group can only have one single outcome in a given language under identical conditions. But it is not always easy to see whether the conditions are really identical."

Such are the wise and moderate words of a wise and moderate man. It is not given to us to know all the facts. The physical sciences, working in the present with a far greater command of materials than we linguists can ever hope to achieve, have given up absolute pronouncements years ago. Linguists, working in a field which is pre-eminently historical, are subject to all the uncertainties to which the historical sciences are heirs. Our field calls for caution, not for cocksureness; for an ever-present consciousness of the shortcomings of our material, not for positive judgments formed on the basis of that material and sometimes in defiance of it; for the humility of the true scientist, not the vainglory of the charlatan.

MARIO A. PEI

Columbia University

American Spanish Syntax. By Charles E. Kany. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1945. Pp. 463.

El presente es uno de los mejores libros escritos en inglés donde con mayor eficiencia se hace un estudio del idioma español hablado en Sur América. Podría decirse que es la mejor obra que se ofrece a los estudiantes de español para dar los últimos toques en el conocimiento de nuestro idioma según corre actualmente en los países hispanoamericanos.

El libro se nos hace simpático en cuanto leemos las primeras páginas y nos fijamos en la excelente bibliografía que le ha servido de base. Su publicación abre un aspecto nuevo, señala una fecha significativa en la historia de la enseñanza de nuestro lenguaje en los Estados Unidos, y se hace práctica y esencialmente útil para los jóvenes estadounidenses que se presume han de tener en el futuro relaciones estrechas o constantes con los países suramericanos.

Su autor ha escogido la parte más difícil de la gramática y se ha internado por el laberinto de la sintaxis presentando muchos de sus más curiosos problemas que ilícita o arbitrariamente surgen en la conversación familiar

y van prendiendo algunos de ellos, con raíces más o menos imperecederas, en la moderna literatura.

Con amplio conocimiento de nuestra gramática histórica, el Profesor Kany no deja de señalar el origen de las divergencias que se apartan de las normas tradicionales y trae a la consideración del estudiante citas de subida calidad de escritores de la tierra peninsular antes de dar, con acertada elección, párrafos de un centenar de libros de la mayor parte de los países suramericanos.

Nuestros fenómenos sintáxicos son menos numerosos que los morfológicos, pero no menos curiosos, viniendo muchos de ellos de la propia tierra peninsular. Basta recordar que en toda Castilla es corriente reforzar los verbos con pronombres personales; en leonés se suprime la preposición *de* en el genitivo así como la conjunción copulativa entre dos verbos; emplean mucho el acusativo masculino *lo*, que predomina sobre *le*, y posponen el pronombre personal con grandísima frecuencia; en Aragón, cuando se juntan los pronombres *me* y *se*, suele anteponerse ordinariamente el primero; es más, el uso tan extendido en México del *pués* al final de frases es vieja práctica común y muy arraigada en el pueblo aragonés donde no admiten la teoría de que sea imitación del francés *Dites donc! Qu'y a-t-il donc?* Podría escribirse extensamente sobre esta hermandad lingüística que nos une.

Los cultores de nuestro lenguaje han de recibir con franca simpatía la obra de un profesor universitario de los Estados Unidos que se ha interesado vivamente en dar a conocer en su país las diferencias que presenta el idioma español en las zonas del Nuevo Mundo.

Es gratísimo registrar obras de erudición como la presente, escritas en otro idioma con el objeto de facilitar el estudio de nuestro lenguaje en tierras extrañas.

Enumerar los capítulos es dar una idea de la importancia de este libro: Nombres y artículos; Adjetivos; El voseo; Otros pronombres personales; Pronombres neutros, relativos, interrogativos, demostrativos e indefinidos; Verbos; Locuciones verbales; Locuciones adverbiales; Preposiciones; Conjunciones; Interjecciones.

Cada uno de esos temas está subdividido con amplitud en subcapítulos que no pueden ser más llamativos y necesarios, y hacen de esta producción valiosísima una de las contribuciones más importantes del movimiento hispanista que se desarrolla en los Estados Unidos.

El Profesor Kany ha triunfado en su empeño de llamar la atención del estudiante norteamericano hacia la multitud de nuestras expresiones populares. Si su libro se tradujera al español prestaría un gran servicio en nuestras mismas Universidades. Podría, sí, hacerse más hincapié en la división entre el lenguaje culto y el plebeyo, sin olvidar que ya se ha impreso el máximo valor o prestigio a expresiones populares que se usan en

nuestra más pulcra literatura sin humillarlas o marcarlas con tipo de letra diferente. Daremos algunos ejemplos:

Al botón: Leopoldo Lugones (argentino): *La guerra gaucha*, page 95.

Al tranco: Ataliva Herrera (argentino): *Bamba* (poema).

En agüita: Antonio José Restrepo (colombiano): *Cancionero de Antioquia*.

Desde ya: José A. Oria (argentino): *Discurso* en la recepción de D. Jacinto Benavente en la Academia Argentina de Letras.

Banqueta (acera de la calle): José G. Montes de Oca (mexicano): *Estampas de Durango*; Darío Rubio (mexicano): *El jaripeo*; Simón Guajardo (mexicano): *Canciones de soledad*.

Vereda (acera de la calle): Hugo West (argentino): *Ciudad turbulenta*, (1943), page 82; V. Fidel López (argentino): *Buenos Aires en 1815*; Carlos Ibarguren (argentino): *La Gran capital del Sur*; Juanuario Espinosa (chileno): *La inútil*; Luis Roberto Boza (chileno): *La grúa* (125); Leonardo Páez (ecuatoriano): *Romance quileño* (1939); Daniel Blixón (uruguayo): *Cobre viejo* (1946), page 15.

Amalayar: Marco Fidel Suárez (colombiano): *Sueños*, VII.

Recién: Augusto D'Halmar (chileno): *Misa de requiem* (1945); Rafael Jijena Sánchez (argentino): *Vidala*, page 15; Juana de Ibarbourou (uruguayo): *La invitación*; Ricardo Güiraldes (argentino): *Don Segundo Sombra*; Luis Toro Ramallo (boliviano): *Ahumada 75* (1941), page 45; J. Diez-Canseco (peruano): *Jijuna* (1942); Jesús R. Guerrero (mexicano): *Los días apagados* (1946), page 191.

En asocio de: Félix Restrepo (colombiano): *La continuación del Diccionario . . .* (*Boletín del Instituto Caro y Cuervo*, No. 3 de 1946, page 430).

Dar constancia: Rómulo Gallegos (venezolano): *El último solar*, page 9.

A la pampa: Antonio José Restrepo (colombiano): *El cancionero de Antioquia*, page 77.


El Professor Kany puede sentirse satisfecho de su obra, instrumento eficazísimo en manos de instructores inteligentes que sepan prestar atención a los problemas que se presentan en el habla de Hispano América, sin cuyo conocimiento no puede producir los debidos resultados la enseñanza del español.

AUGUSTO MALARET

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